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WAR DIARY

....GERMAN NAVAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION

PART A VOLUME 8

APRIL 1940

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
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WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF

(Operations Division)


PART A

April 1940

Chief, Naval Staff:	Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr.h.c.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:	Vice Admiral Schniewind
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:	Rear Admiral Fricke

Volume 8

begun: 1 April 1940
closed: 30 April 1940




OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, operations Division, Part A, Volume 8 is the twenty-fifth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.
2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval Records and ~~Library~~ *History*.
3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

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1949



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Notes:

Documents, instructions, special orders and minutes: see "Reference File Weseruebung" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V, page 120 (Special volume).

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Items of Political Importance1. Norway

According to repeated reports from agents, differences of opinion are said to exist between Great Britain and France. France is said to desire immediate action and to demand increased pressure on neutrals, while Great Britain is more inclined to delay. Great Britain allegedly hopes to be able to effect an estrangement between Russia and Germany.

With regard to Norway, it is expected in London that the Western Powers will take stronger action, at first in that German merchantmen can no longer be permitted passage through Norwegian territorial waters and Norway is forced to stop this traffic by means of political pressure from the Allies.

Reuter states that Great Britain will not penetrate by force into neutral territorial waters or take similar illegal steps. "United Press" reports that in London it is being semi-officially denied that Great Britain is planning to patrol Scandinavian territorial waters, land troops in Norway or occupy ports there.

Reports from Norway and Great Britain express opinions on the subject of ore shipments via Narvik and come to the conclusion that exports of Swedish iron ore to Germany via Narvik have sunk to a fraction of what they were in peacetime, while ore shipments to Great Britain show a marked upward trend.

The Swiss Ambassador in Stockholm reports to his Government:

German and British landings on the Norwegian coast are directly imminent. (See also Foreign Press and Foreign Press (Naval news)).

2. The German publication of documents is still being discussed with unusual excitement in the U.S.A. Roosevelt and Hull have described the documents as unauthenticated and as a transparent German propaganda maneuver. The general

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opinion in neutral countries is that Germany has abandoned hope of improving her relations with the U.S.A., and wishes to prevent Roosevelt's re-election through the publication of the documents.

3. The Norwegian Government has protested to Berlin about the torpedoing of the steamer STEINSTAD off the Irish coast on 15 Feb. while en route from Turkey to Norway. The ship was sailing between two neutral countries with freight for a Norwegian firm. There was a Government guarantee that the cargo would not be re-exported from Norway.

(For further particulars see War Diary, Part C, VIII.)

Afternoon:

The Commander of the LUETZOW, Captain Thiele, reported to Commander in Chief, Navy to give notice of departure and for final conferences with Naval Staff. The ship will be ready to sail for the Atlantic in a few days after the period in dock necessary for completion of remaining work.

During numerous conferences held lately complete agreement has been established between Naval Staff and the Captain - who has adapted himself and his ideas to his cruiser warfare assignment in an excellent manner - on all questions of operations in the Atlantic, on interpretation of the operational order and on all individual military and political questions and those of International Law.

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Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

According to radio monitoring, the old battleship RODNEY is to go into dock. The agent's report about damage to the RODNEY by a bomb hit on 16 March is thus confirmed to a certain degree.

France:

According to an agent's report a British convoy is said to have left Dunkirk today, destination unknown.

No items about naval forces.

North Sea:

No alterations of note in the movements of the Home Fleet.

A report from Great Britain mentions the rumor that the battleship NELSON was also damaged by a bomb hit on 16 March.

Intelligence Center, Belgium reports that in the air attack on the convoy east of the Shetlands on 28 March one ship (EARL CASTLE) was sunk, five damaged and one escort cruiser ("D" class) likewise damaged.

A convoy seems to have left the Norwegian coast on 31 March.

Own Situation

Order from High Command, Navy:

Summer time from 1 April.

1. Summer time is to be used in home waters in orders and reports, also in communications for the duration of summer time.

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2. G.M.T. still applies in foreign waters.
3. Submarines are all to use German summer time in foreign and home waters.
4. If other times are used in exceptional cases, these are to be explained by a footnote, e.g. 1400 "C.E.T."

Atlantic:

Nothing to report.

North Sea:

No reports from Ship "16" and Ship "11", so that operations may be presumed to be proceeding according to plan. The air reconnaissance scheduled for Ship "16" as far as the Shetlands-Norway channel had to be recalled because fog came down in the central North Sea.

The 11th Patrol Boat Flotilla was unsuccessfully attacked by six Wellington bombers on route "Blau".

One Blenheim was shot down by a fighter over the North Sea.

According to observations made on 31 March, the Air Force reports that we must count on the possibility of the enemy using camouflaged planes with an Iron Cross (He 111) for reconnaissance over the Heligoland Bight and to provoke incidents over neutral territory. (They are possibly planes which the enemy has purchased from Turkey.)

Baltic Sea:

Shipping possible from Kiel-Swinemuende-Pillau except for local hindrance from drift ice; conditions good off Pillau. Ice difficulties between Sassnitz and Trelleborg. Route through the Sound blocked by heavy pack ice. Passage through the Great Belt only slightly impeded by ice.

2 submarine chasers in the Skagen area,
2 on return passage.

Investigation of the barrage situation in the Great Belt and repair work in the Gjedser Channel continue. Group Baltic reports that there is no longer any objection to passage through the Great Belt.

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A plane on air reconnaissance accidentally flew over Danish territory in bad visibility and was fired on.

The survey vessel METEOR was commissioned as command ship for Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic in "Weseruebung".

Submarine Situation

Atlantic/Northern Waters:

Off Narvik:	U "46".
Off Trondheim:	U "51".
Proceeding as Ship "16"'s escort:	U "37".

North Sea:

Peterhead area:	U "22".
East of the Orkneys:	U "38", "43", "52".
?:	U "44".
On passage:	U "13", "58", "59".

Merchant Shipping

Disposition of German merchant shipping on 1 April:

1. In home waters:

(Ships over 1,600 GRT) 578 ships = 68.2%

Of these -

On Scandinavian run:

75 ships, totaling 250,603 GRT.
(16 under 1,600 GRT)
of which 51 ships in Norway.

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On Holland run: .

3 ships, totaling 4,504 GRT.

2. In neutral ports: 218 ships = 25.6%
of these anchored: 26.

The following cannot return:

a) Because of unfavorable situation of their anchorages, (Mediterranean, Black Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf)

73 ships
(+ 5 without radio).

b) Scheduled for special duties:

40 ships.

3. At sea, homeward bound:

Returned home to date:

115 ships = 13.5%

4. Lost: 53 ships = 6.2%

(+ 2 without radio and
1 trawler)

849 ships = 100%

A review of German ships which have put out, homeward bound, from ports overseas and have arrived during the war shows the position to be as follows:

Sailed in January 1940:

5 ships, of which lost: 1 ship = 20%
returned successfully 4 ships = 80%

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Sailed in February 1940:

11 ships, of which lost:	8 ships = 72.7%
returned successfully	3 ships = 27.3%

Sailed in March 1940:

4 ships, of which lost:	3 ships = 75%
returned successfully	1 ship = 25%

The motor vessel SEATTLE, coming from Curacao, arrived in Tromsøe with a valuable cargo.

The Ministry of Transportation has informed us that following elimination of the ships held in the Dutch East Indies, the ships in Japan will now also not be sent through the north-eastern route this year, since no cargo can be obtained for these ships.

It would be extremely regrettable if no ships and valuable cargoes at all were to succeed in reaching home by the north-eastern route from East Asia this year. In Naval Staff's opinion the necessary cargoes for the ships lying in Japan in readiness to sail could have been obtained by prompt and large-scale planning. According to the Ministry of Economics' statement, the cargoes so far available of soya beans (40,000 tons) and oil are so small and therefore so valuable that they are to be transported by the safe railroad route.

1330 - 1800:

At 1330, after breakfasting in the Chancellery of the Reich with the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the commanders of the individual landing groups and Commander, 31st Corps also the Commanding Admirals and commanders of the individual naval task forces and the Air Force commanders reported on the arrangement and execution of their operations during "Weseruebung".

The Fuehrer demanded most exhaustive reports from all the officers and asked many questions. In conclusion he stated his complete agreement with the preparations made and expressed his thanks for and recognition of the work performed during the preparations.

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(For minutes of the Fuehrer's address then given to the officers present see reference file "Weseruebung", War Diary, Part B, V, 120.)

See also individual questions, 2 April.

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Items of Political Importance1. Norway

Reuter announces: The possibility of a significant intensification of the blockade cannot be denied, but the Allied Cabinets and the Supreme War Council have so far announced nothing.

The British press goes into detail on the problem of Norway and on the subject of the imminent intensification of warfare. Although any out of the ordinary or illegal action by the Western Powers against the neutrality of a neutral country is denied, "the Allies would take such action that neutral territories are no longer used by the Germans in order to break the blockade."

The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, states in an interview with the press:

"Norway protests with the same energy against the German as against the British violations of Norwegian neutrality. The material harm caused to Norway by Germany is deeply regrettable; Britain's violations of neutrality are, however, different and often did not affect Norwegian material interests so much as her honor and independence."

Norwegian political circles appear to be expecting Great Britain to send a note to the Norwegian Government within a short time, demanding that Norway forbid ore shipments from Narvik to Germany.

2. The German publication of documents is still dominating the entire U.S. press. In the House of Representatives, Republican Fish demanded the appointment of a committee of five within 30 days to examine the documents.

It cannot yet be foreseen how the publication of the White Paper, which has caused noticeable unrest among the American people and has undoubtedly rendered Roosevelt's position more difficult, will affect the presidential elections and the U.S.A.'s attitude to Germany in the weeks ahead.

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3. According to a communication from Copenhagen, the Danish Government has established that the steamer EDMUND HUGO STINNES was definitely inside territorial waters when she was sunk. It is intended to protest to London, demanding the release of the Captain and compensation.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items:

1. "Weseruebung":

During yesterday's conference with the individual commanders of the task forces, the Fuehrer reconsidered whether it was possible to send the destroyers alone to "Nienburg" and to refrain from using the battleships in the northern area, since it is feared that the British Fleet will be prematurely alerted by them.

The question of holding the battleships back was also discussed by individual group commanders on the basis that it might possibly be better that the battleships should first advance with the "Bremen" Group, and should appear rather in the central North Sea, i.e. south of the operational area, in order to avoid a general advance alarm in a northerly direction already two days before "Weserday", and in order to concentrate the enemy's main attention on the battleship group in the south for the purpose of relieving the northern groups.

Naval Staff thinks otherwise and is of opinion that the previous plan of operations must be adhered to under all circumstances.

The aim of the first operation for the success of "Weseruebung" is to bring the destroyers safely through to "Nienburg" and the 2nd Group to "Detmold". In order to carry out this movement it may be necessary for the northern groups to fight their way through the light forces and perhaps also heavy cruisers in this area. The destroyers, limited in freedom of movement and readiness for action by the numerous troops on board, are as good as delivered defenseless into the hands of a superior enemy if they come up against light forces.

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Naval Staff therefore regards the advance by the battleships into the northern area as a necessary condition for successful operations by Groups "Nienburg" and "Detmold". If the battleships are retained in the south and the enemy is therefore forced to concentrate on the southern area, Naval Staff considers that the prospects of a battle with a superior enemy are increased. This, however, is just what is to be avoided. There are, on the other hand, good chances of gaining effective successes if the battleships clash with light forces or heavy cruisers in the northern North Sea and the northern area. Even the destruction of one enemy cruiser might have consequences which would decisively influence the course of "Weseruebung".

There is undoubtedly the possibility - and Naval Staff must take it into consideration - that the enemy will detect the battleships' departure with the 1st and 2nd operational groups on "Weserday" - 2 and that enemy forces will be given the alert. It may, however, be expected that the enemy will not draw any conclusions as to such a significant and comprehensive operation as "Weseruebung". On the contrary there is the possibility, if further air reconnaissance takes place on our movements towards the northern area, that the enemy will conclude it to be a break-through by Atlantic merchant raiders and will concentrate his countermeasures in the area Iceland-Shetlands, with a special view to the area north of the Shetlands. The focal point of countermeasures may thus possibly be diverted from an area in which Naval Staff considers danger to the light German forces operating there specially undesirable, i.e. in the Bergen/Southern Norway area, where the "Bremen" Group would be particularly exposed to enemy measures.

Naval Staff adheres to its previous operational considerations for the reasons given above: The battleships will protect the advance of Group "Nienburg" and Group "Detmold" as per directives already issued.

2. The Fuehrer has ordered that the question of a surprise operation to secure the bridge near Vordingborg over the Storstroem be examined, since the maintenance of the bridge is of great importance for Army transport.

Naval Staff objects strongly to such an operation from the sea. It is not possible to approach the bridge from the east because

of the Danish Groensund barrage. Motor fishing vessels could approach from the west and transport roughly one reinforced company. The main difficulty, however, lies in the necessary very premature use of the inner Danish channels which are normally closed to any foreign traffic by the Danes. Advance warning by several hours (about five) is hereby unavoidable. Naval Staff therefore urgently advises Armed Forces High Command against the execution of such an operation.

3. The Fuehrer has also ordered an examination into the question of despatching an old battleship to "Kassel". (For list of cover-names see reference file "Weseruebung"), to attain an expressly demonstrative effect and to prevent the departure of forces lying in the harbor and also the Government's escape.

Naval Staff must reject such an operation for military and navigational reasons. Putting-in of an old battleship drawing 8 m. would involve great difficulties; the ship would be within range of the strong coastal fortifications both during and after putting-in. If, however, she remained outside the range of these guns, the desired political and demonstrative effect would not be achieved. Further, the premature alarm - which would be given at latest during passage through the Helsingborg/Helsingoer Channel - is also of decisive importance in this question.

On Naval Staff's advice, Armed Forces High Command will refrain from despatching an old battleship. The HANSESTADT DANZIG transport operation previously planned will, therefore, be adhered to.

4. Group West's request that a torpedo boat flotilla be withdrawn from "Weseruebung" for use in Operation "Gelb" is refused, since "Weseruebung" requires the use of all available combat forces.

5. In view of the Fuehrer's decision, Naval Staff has given Group West permission to use aerial mines, effective immediately.

6. The Swedish Foreign Minister, in a confidential conversation with the German Ambassador, requested that the German Naval Attache, Rear Admiral Steffan, be recalled speedily, as he considers him seriously compromised in connection with various Swedish investigations into cases of trade espionage.

The German Ambassador expressly repudiated the accusation of espionage.

Commander in Chief, Navy orders the recall of Rear Admiral Steffan in order to avoid further undesirable discussions.

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

The following are at present suspected to be in the Northern Patrol: BERWICK, GLASGOW and SOUTHAMPTON. The YORK seems to have been relieved and to have put in to port.

Daventry produces a report according to which the crew of the British tanker EL CIERVO, which has arrived in Halifax, believe they sank a German submarine by gunfire on 4 March off Trinidad. This must be regarded as a political report for the purpose of influencing the South American States by propaganda.

France:

Nothing special to report.

North Sea:

The cruisers GALATEA, SHEFFIELD, CAIRO, CALCUTTA and a number of TRIBAL class destroyers are at sea on convoy duty. (The GALATEA was 50 miles east of Pentland Firth in the morning.)

British preparations for troop transports to Norway?:

For result of investigations regarding a number of ships lying in readiness in Glasgow, apparently to transport troops, see Appendix to War Diary, B, Vol.V, 128.

Own Situation

Atlantic:

Nothing to report.

North Sea:

In order to protect Ship "16"'s break-through one Do 26 of the Transocean squadron took off from Travemuende on special reconnaissance. The flight lasted more than 18 hours, as far as roughly 65° N, but no vessels were sighted apart from some neutral merchantmen at about 62° 30' N. No reports from Ship "16" so it can be assumed that she is proceeding as planned.

One of the special trawlers disposed for reconnaissance off Iceland transmitted a weather report; strong east wind and showers.

Ship "11" has carried out her assignment (minelaying east of Smith's Knoll lightship). Not possible to penetrate to convoy route because of patrols. Mines (90 EMC's and 84 explosive floats, type C) were laid as planned in the alternative area east of Smith's Knoll. (See brief report on Ship "11"'s operation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. V., page 127.)

Commander, Naval Air's reconnaissance sighted destroyers east of Lowestoft and had a brush with enemy fighters. One damaged He 115 was sunk after a forced landing. The crew was picked up by another He 115.

The 10th Air Corps sent out during the afternoon 10 planes of the 30th Bomber Wing to Scapa and 11 planes of the 100th Bomber Wing against convoy traffic east of the Orkneys/Shetlands.

Three light cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels were observed in Scapa. The presence of a balloon barrage at 200 m. was detected for the first time.

Bomb hits in the immediate vicinity of the sides of two destroyers were scored in attacks. Success doubtful, especially since several planes experienced technical trouble with their bomb-release gear. Light and heavy anti-aircraft defense.

Own Losses:

1 plane shot down, 1 missing over Germany.

The planes of the 100th Bomber Wing encountered several convoys east of the Orkneys. Attacks unsuccessful.

Baltic Sea:Ice Situation:

Shipping unimpeded from Kiel to Pillau; southern part of the route through the Sound still very difficult, Great Belt passable. Passage possible through the Little Belt. After new barrage markings are laid it is expected that the difficulties in the barrage gaps will be eliminated in the next few days.

The 1st Patrol Boat Flotilla has taken over barrage patrol in the Little Belt.

Submarine SituationAtlantic:

Unchanged.

North Sea:

U "43", "38", "52", "44" (?) received orders to return.

U "13" is proceeding into the operational area east of Pentland Firth. U "22" is south of the latitude of the Pentland Skerries. U "58", "59" are on passage west of the Orkneys.

Merchant ShippingLosses:

According to a British announcement, the MIMI HORN was stopped last week by a British warship in northern waters, set on fire and scuttled by her own crew, all of whom were saved. (Ship sailed from Curacao on 4 March.)

The steamer LUISE LEONHARDT reports from Oslo that on 30 March she was attacked by British bombers west of Esbjerg, outside Danish territorial waters. No hits.

Mediterranean:

Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Affairs/Intelligence Division has received a report that British control ships have put into the Adriatic in order to capture the German steamer ANKARA (put in to Dubrovnik at the end of last week) when she leaves Jugoslavian waters. The report sounds untrustworthy, even though we must expect the ANKARA to be under constant observation in view of the enemy's excellent agent network. The report is being investigated.

Afternoon

Decision of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces:

The execution of "Weseruebung" is ordered. The special importance of keeping the coming measures secret is pointed out. "Weserday": 9 April. "Wesertime": 0515.

(For Fuehrer's order see "Weseruebung" file.)

On the basis of this order Naval Staff issues the following instructions on the evening of 2 April:

1. To Group West, Group Baltic, Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Fleet Command:

Subject: "Weseruebung"

1. "Weserday" is 9 April.
2. When issuing further orders and taking other measures avoid unusual volume in the interests of secrecy.

(Sk1. I op. 616/40.)

2. Naval Staff, Service Division, Transport Branch has been ordered to send off the first steamers of the "export" unit as scheduled. These are, to begin with, the steamers for "Nienburg":

BAERENFELS
RAUENFELS
ALSTER and the tanker
KATTEGAT.
3. The Naval Attaché in Moscow is instructed to despatch the tanker JAN WELLEM from Base North to "Nienburg".
4. Instructions to Group West, Group Baltic and Fleet, based on a directive from Armed Forces High Command: Swastika flag to be painted on the foredeck and after upper deck in addition to markings already ordered.
5. With regard to the cruiser LUETZOW, Chief, Naval Staff reports to the Fuehrer on Naval Staff's plan to despatch her into the Atlantic in the course of "Weseruebung" and requests permission for this.

At the request of Armed Forces High Command, the Fuehrer decides that the LUETZOW is to embark a contingent of 400 men for "Detmold" and be incorporated in the 2nd Group. After the troops have disembarked at "Detmold" she is to put out into the Atlantic.

Orders to this effect are issued to the sections concerned. Embarkation of the troops is ordered in Wilhelmshaven. The Commander of the "Detmold" Group will still be the Commander of the "HIPPER", as previously scheduled. The supply ship NORDMARK is to be sent out within the Bergen Group.

"Weseruebung" has begun with the Fuehrer's order and Naval Staff's executive orders. Thus commences an operation ranking as one of the boldest in the history of modern warfare. Its execution proved to be necessary to protect

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vital German interests and to ward off attempts by enemy powers to exclude Germany from sources of raw material. The fulfillment of the task entrusted to the Armed Forces in the execution of "Weseruebung" North and South is of decisive importance in the war.

Within the whole operation demands involving great responsibility are made especially on the Navy. The success of the whole operation will depend on the efficiency and readiness of all naval forces participating and also on the determination of each individual naval officer entrusted with command. Execution and protection of the landing operation by the Navy will take place principally in an area where not Germany, but Great Britain is in a position to exercise naval supremacy with superior forces.

It is of decisive importance for the successful execution of the whole operation that the enemy and the countries to be occupied be taken by surprise.

The success of the operation will therefore depend on the degree to which secrecy has been and will be maintained during the next few days until "Wesertime". Naval Staff has constantly expressed objections and endeavored to have the first transport operation limited to naval forces and not to have "export" units and sea transport units operate if possible before "Wesertime". Despite this, the number of merchant transport steamers with material, personnel, horses, vehicles, etc., which have been assembled and in readiness for a long time and are to be sent out before "Weserday", has reached such a proportion that the slightest incidents may cause previous warning and endanger the surprise execution of the operation.

With regard to naval measures, thanks to the careful preparations made by all the naval offices concerned for "Weseruebung", Naval Staff awaits the operation with confidence. The fulfillment of our operational task will and must succeed if every commander is determined to reach the goal set him. Chief, Naval Staff again summarizes the importance of the operation and the necessary factors for success in a directive to all Commanding Admirals, Commanders and Flotilla Commanders and expresses his reliance on the resolute will to fight and win of all naval units taking part.

(For directive see reference file "Weseruebung".)

Items of Political Importance

1. Change in the British Cabinet (according to Reuter, to coordinate more closely the work of the different Ministries). Lord Chatfield, the Minister for Coordination and Defense has resigned. Churchill becomes Senior Minister for the three Armed Services. Air Minister Kingsley Wood has been replaced by Sir Samuel Hoare.

These slight alterations in the British Cabinet are on the whole unimportant. The resignation of Lord Chatfield, acknowledged to be a particularly sound man, indicates differences of opinion within the Government.

2. For Chamberlain's speech about the intensification of economic warfare and increased pressure on neutrals, see Foreign Press. Great attention and anxiety among the neutrals. It is assumed that very soon Great Britain will ration severely or stop altogether all imports of raw materials from overseas to neutrals, unless they pledge themselves to cease trading with Germany. Special mention is made in this connection of the cutting-off of ore and oil imports and the suppression of Russian transit traffic.

Shortly before the speech "Havas" reports that Great Britain and France will probably give the neutral countries a final warning before taking draconic steps towards protecting Norwegian territorial waters. Great Britain would allegedly first exhaust all diplomatic means of pressure before she undertook naval action to cripple Norwegian iron ore shipments to Germany. Appropriate British notes to Norway and Sweden are said to be in course of preparation.

3. Report from the German Embassy in Oslo regarding the Norwegian Government's diplomatic step on 2 April against the Western Powers. Protest against continuance of the threat to Norwegian territorial waters by France and Great Britain. For extract from the interview between Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, and Reuter's representative see War Diary, Part B, V, 129.

4. An agent in Denmark reports being informed by a Danish officer that in case of a German attack resistance will be offered under all circumstances; military measures have been taken for this purpose on the southern frontier. Contrary to their views of some months ago, military circles are now of the opinion that Germany is in a more favorable military position than Great Britain.

5. The German Embassy reports that Roosevelt, by-passing the War Minister, has accomplished deliveries of planes for the Western Powers. In spite of the exasperation of public opinion over Great Britain's blockade measures, Roosevelt is determined to extend the U.S.A.'s war economy efforts on behalf of the Western Powers in such a way that an interest for Allied victory arises in the U.S.A. for economic reasons.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the state of "Weseruebung":

- a) For readiness of forces see reference file "Weseruebung".
- b) The first three steamers of the camouflaged "export" unit and the tanker KATTEGAT for Narvik sailed during the night of 2 April. Chief, Operations Division again points out the fact that the use of steamers of the "export" and 1st Sea Transport Units represents an extremely undesirable risk (for the execution of the whole operation), since the enemy and the Norwegians will be given previous warning in case of the slightest incidents. Naval Staff's great objections to the use of these steamers, which will make their appearance several days before "Weserday", have already been pointed out several times to Armed Forces High Command, Group 21. In spite of this, Armed Forces High Command, Group 21 insists on its demand for these steamers.
- c) Boehm's Staff (Commanding Admiral, Norway) has set out its proposals for subsequent defense of the coastal route, (see "Weseruebung" file). Chief, Naval Staff agrees in principle to the requests made for provision of defense forces (4 patrol boat flotillas, 2 PT boat flotillas, 2 torpedo boat flotillas, 8 small submarines). The date when they will be provided however, cannot be promised,

as it will depend on the situation.

- d) Naval Staff consents to Group West's proposal to extend the Skagerrak barrage by further sections. (See letter in "Weseruebung" file.)

2. Report on request from Group West (North Sea Station) regarding different measures in Operation "Gelb".

(Occupation of Rottum, shock attack on Delfzyl by motor minesweepers and PT boats. Penetration into the canals. For particulars see Group West's letter.) Naval Staff is of the opinion that special naval warfare in this area can on no account be considered. The available units of small boats must moreover be used in "Weseruebung". Only the occupation of Rottum is therefore agreed to.

Special Reports on the Enemy:

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

Disposition of forces:

The battle cruiser HOOD appeared in the Gibraltar area on 28 March. The ARK ROYAL is in the Eastern Mediterranean. The cruiser CALEDON stopped an Italian tanker west of Cephalonia on 1 April.

It may be concluded from the fact that Port "A" (Loch Ewe) has, for some time been appearing repeatedly in radio traffic that the heavy forces are staying in this base more frequently.

France:

Nothing special to report, apart from some convoys detected.

North/Sea Channel:

Commander in Chief, Home Fleet and the WARSPITE, also the

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BIRMINGHAM, appear to be at sea, apart from the vessels at sea on convoy duties or in the Northern Patrol named several times.

"Weseruebung":

According to reports from Kirkenes and Aalesund, enemy naval vessels have not appeared there for the past few days.

A report from Narvik states that the two armed coastal vessels EIDVOLD and NORGA have put in to defend Narvik and that two submarines are still expected.

Operation "Gelb":

A merchant captain reports from Delfzyl that a steamer loaded with sand is lying there in readiness to block the harbor entrance.

Own Situation:

Atlantic:

Nothing to report.

North Sea:

No surface force activities. Air reconnaissance as far as 61° was carried out as planned; it spotted a convoy north of Viking Bank.

(Escorted by 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers.)

The 10th Air Corps sent out 15 planes of the 100th Bomber Wing and the 30th Bomber Wing against the convoy reported; 17 planes of the 26th Bomber Wing also took off for an offensive sortie in the direction of the Orkneys. According to the Air Force report, the following successes were scored:

Severely damaged or sunk:

- 2 patrol boats off the east coast of Britain.
- 2 patrol boats northeast of the Shetlands.
- 2 steamers from the convoy.
- 1 destroyer (1 hit on the deck, 2 hits directly beside the ship).
- 3 more steamers and 1 patrol boat were damaged.

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Own Losses:

2 Ju 88, 1 He 111 (forced landing).

Air reconnaissance by the 4th Squadron of the 122nd Group over Le Havre and Cherbourg produced valuable information; the following were detected in Cherbourg harbor:

4 destroyers of the BOURRASQUE class,
2 large destroyers,
4 submarine-chasers and several submarines, etc.

Anti-submarine net barrage in the western entrance of the outer mole, one passage open.

Baltic Sea:

Shipping unimpeded in the entire Baltic. After 4 April the pilot service through the Great Belt will be operating again. Traffic through the gap in the Sound barrage will be resumed within the next few days; southern entrance to the Little Belt still impassable because of uncertain mine situation. 100 per cent searching sweep of the passage through the Great Belt is being continued.

Submarine Situation:

Atlantic:

Unchanged.

North Sea:

U "7", "10", "19", "25", "30", "47", "48" and "49" are on passage to their positions for "Weseruebung".
U "22", "46", "51" are in the operational area.

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Disposition as per orders of Commanding Admiral, Submarines for "Weseruebung". (See "Weseruebung" file.)

Merchant Shipping:

After 3 April shipping to Scandinavia will be routed through the Baltic. Orders to this effect have been issued. Review of quantity of ore shipped via Narvik in 1938 and 1939 and comparison with ore shipments to Great Britain (see War Diary, Part B, V, 130.).

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Items of Political Importance

1. Chamberlain before the Conservative party:

"This is a war of will power, and the will to win must place us in a position to resist intensified warfare or even to hold out against a long and exhausting war."

2. Norway:

- a) The British assurance that the planned intensification of the blockade in the north will in no way lead to direct action in Norwegian territorial waters, is being discussed in Sweden. Here a fresh demarche by the Western Powers in Oslo is expected to be directly imminent. It is stated that Great Britain has no right to exercise any pressure whatsoever on Norway and Sweden on account of ore transports, especially since these transports were expressly recognized in the British-Swedish trade agreement.
- b) Great Britain's strikingly worded statements and assurances that no military action in Scandinavian territorial waters and no landing of troops in Norway are planned, strengthen Naval Staff's conviction that in reality just such a British action against Scandinavia is directly imminent. The previous handing of notes to Norway, and perhaps also to Sweden, can be expected. "Weseruebung Nord" is beginning to develop into a "race" between Great Britain and Germany for Scandinavia.

3. According to the B.B.C., Great Britain is engaged in forming a trading company with the aim of buying up raw materials in neutral countries. The chief problem is first to draw in the Balkans and Turkey.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items:1. "Weseruebung":

- a) Conference between Col. Piekenbrock of the General Staff and Minister of State Quisling in Copenhagen provides nothing new for the Navy's operations, but some valuable data for the Army and Air Force about troop strength, position of airfields, ground readiness, etc. With regard to the defensive readiness of the coastal fortifications, Quisling believes that the coastal batteries would hardly fire without previously asking permission from the Government again.
Six divisions are considered necessary for a total occupation.
Quisling generally gave evasive answers to precise questions.
- b) Group West requests that an order be issued that any soldier engaged in "Weseruebung" who is captured before "Wesertime" is to state when questioned that the formation is proceeding to Iceland.
- c) An order is issued at the direction of Armed Forces High Command, Group 21, that prisoners taken before "Wesertime" are to refuse to make a statement. If pressure is exercised Ireland (not Iceland) is to be given as the target of the operation.
- d) Group West is instructed that the BREMSE is to be used in Bergen for transport assignments in the skerries between Stavanger and Bergen. Requests for troops to be transferred from Stavanger to Bergen will be arranged by the Commander of the troops landed at Trondheim with Admiral, West Norwegian Coast. (See directive in reference file "Weseruebung".)

Special Reports on the Enemy

For disposition of enemy forces and activities of the main units during the last week of March according to radio intelligence, see Radio Monitoring Report 13/40.

Atlantic:

Supplementary to the observations reported on 3 April, air reconnaissance in the Channel also spotted several columns as well as troops and vehicles at the quays in Cherbourg. (Could not be ascertained whether disembarking or embarking.)

Otherwise nothing special to report.

North Sea:

Commander in Chief, Home Fleet who was reported at sea, might also be in Loch Ewe according to radio intelligence observations. Commanders, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons and the cruisers SHEFFIELD, PENELOPE, AURORA and CAIRO, also destroyers of the 2nd and 3rd Flotillas, are at sea.

Radio traffic generally very quiet (almost strikingly so), so that there is an extraordinarily small quantity of radio messages available for deciphering. We are thus only able to gain an insight into the enemy's measures very slowly and with difficulty, a circumstance which is felt to be very disadvantageous in view of the imminence of "Weseruebung".

Own Situation:Atlantic:

The KOENIGSBERG (Buenos Aires), scheduled as supply ship for the cruiser LUETZOW, received a preliminary order about routes

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and code words via the Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires. Sailing order to the KOENIGSBERG is to be issued from Trondheim after the LUETZOW sails.

(The KOENIGSBERG is proceeding at 9 knots and has 600 tons of heavy Diesel oil.)

(For order see War Diary, Part C, Vol.I Atlantic.)

North Sea:

No reports from Ship "16".

U "37" is directed to report Ship "16"'s last position 24 hours after she is dismissed. Ship "16" is directed by Group West to dismiss U "37" by 6 April, if the situation permits.

Ship "36"'s sailing had to be postponed for another day because of the weather, which promised unfavorable visibility.

No air reconnaissance by us.

Enemy bomber flights as far as the estuaries in the morning and afternoon. Bombs were dropped off Brunsbuettel and in the Jade, but fell in the water and did not explode, so that possibly mines or drift mines were dropped.

We must count on the possibility of the transport preparations in Hamburg and Stettin not having remained secret from the British and that the air reconnaissance and bombing attacks on Brunsbuettel were also directed against these preparations.

With regard to the provision of the steamers of the 1st Sea Transport Unit (see "Weseruebung" file), Naval Staff learns that some of these steamers in Stettin are just lying at the Hakenterrasse (Quay on the Oder, Tr.N.) and are exposed here to the unimpeded view of interested spectators. The Swedish consulate lies in the immediate vicinity. Some of the steamers are flying the State Service Flag. The cargo is unmistakably Army gear. Place and circumstances of loading must be regarded as most unfavorable for the secrecy of the whole operation. High Command, Navy/Naval Staff, Service Division instigates suitable changes at Naval Staff's request.

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Trondheim "export" unit (steamers SAO PAULO, LEVANTE, MAIN and the tanker SKAGERRAK) sailed from Brunsbuettel on 4 April.

Group West instructs Commander, Naval Air, West about aerial minelaying operations over the Thames, Humber, Dover and Tyne estuary, as soon as the situation permits.

Baltic Sea:

Nothing to report.

Ice Situation:

Shipping along the German coast unimpeded everywhere. At present only possible to leave the Baltic by day through the Great Belt. Still heavy drift ice in the southern part of the Sound. Heavy breaking up and floating of the ice to the north in the Little Belt.

Submarine Situation

Number of submarines on 3 April:

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a) Commanding Admiral, Submarines:

U "25", "26", "28", "29", "30",
 "31", "32", "34", "37", "38",
 "43", "64", "65", "46", "47",
 "48", "49", "50", "51", "52",
 "101", "122", "UA" = 23 boats.

b) Commander, Submarines:

U "56", "57", "58", "59", "60",
 "61", "62", "19" = 8 boats.

c) Submarine School:

U "1", "2", "3", "4", "5",
 "6", "7", "10", "13", "20",
 "22", "23" = 12 boats.

d) Submarine Training Flotilla, Warnemuende:

U "9", "14", "17", "18", "24" = 5 boats.

e) Anti-Submarine School and Research Purposes:

U "8", "11" = 2 boats.

Total number of submarines = 50 boats.

2. The following are to be used in "Weseruebung":

a) All submarines under Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Commander, Submarines which are ready.

b) All submarines of the Submarine School and Submarine Training Flotilla, Warnemuende. (17 boats.)

Atlantic:

Unchanged.

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North Sea:

Four submarines east of the Orkneys/Peterhead;
19 on passage to positions for "Weseruebung".

Merchant Shipping

The steamer ANTONIO DELFINO put into Gothenburg on 3 April.

"Weseruebung" transports:

See "Weseruebung" file.

The following order is issued in addition to those previously given to the supercargoes of transports which have not yet sailed:

"Neither enemy nor neutral may gain an insight into the camouflaged cargo.
If the Norwegians should take a special interest in the steamer and insist on examining the holds, the Captain of the ship is first to protest strongly and demand that the German representative (the nearest consulate (German citizen) and the Embassy in Oslo) be acquainted. Also communicate with them independently. Presume upon the fact that papers are in order.

Do everything possible to gain time.

If, however, the deck cargo should have to be unloaded, any offer of help is to be declined and not until the last minute, when investigation of the holds is directly imminent, is the German representative to inform the Norwegians that the cargo is bound for Russia within German agreed deliveries. Since Leningrad is ice-bound at present the cargo must, however, go to Murmansk. It was camouflaged so as not to violate Norwegian neutrality. Clearance to Norwegian ports was effected since the development of British attacks in Norwegian waters might have had to be awaited here."

Items of Political Importance1. Norway

- a) It is reported from Norway that British and French officers of the General Staff have been engaged for a long time in investigating the possibility of landing an expeditionary corps in Norway.
- b) Intensified British propaganda - obviously to prepare the way for British designs on the Scandinavian area - has begun in neutral countries in order to work on the attitude to the Norwegian problem. Strong emphasis is laid on the necessity for an alteration in the situation regarding respect for Norwegian territorial waters.

A comparison drawn between the British and German actions states that the Norwegian Government's attitude "in its helplessness regarding the ruthless sinking of Norwegian ships and the brutal murder of Norwegian seamen is in extraordinary contrast to its vigorous protests against technical violations of the three-mile zone by British warships, which caused neither loss of life nor property to Norway."

- c) The following is said to be the Dutch Admiralty's opinion about the British action in Scandinavian waters:

The movement of British destroyers in Scandinavian waters is aimed at provoking Germany to take counter-measures. Great Britain expects that Germany will then occupy Norwegian ports, which could effect the desired extension of the front at one blow. The British press would then lay the breach of neutrality at Germany's door.

The headlines of the Swedish press are mostly concerned with an article in the "Daily Telegraph" in which it is maintained that Germany has stopped all ore transports via Narvik. She is concentrating

a fleet in her Baltic ports with 400,000 men in readiness to be shipped to the Baltic zone immediately.

It is assumed in the North that at the same moment as Great Britain changes her plans for cessation of the Swedish ore supplies in-
to action, Germany would land in southern Norway.

A Swedish statement on the subject of an immediate German counterblow if Great Britain violates Norwegian territorial waters is worthy of note and perhaps significant as regards the Swedish attitude to coming events.

The present slight operational possibilities for the German Navy and Air Force would be materially improved by an occupation of southern Norway. Germany would be in a position to carry out such an operation speedily. The reason for it would obviously lie in the violation of Norway's neutrality by Britain and Norway's complete inability to repulse this violation.

- e) A most important and credible report has been received from Intelligence Center, Belgium:

British submarine blockade lines from the Lofotens to the Norwegian coast are said to have been formed or to be in process of formation. Blockade duties will be performed by five British and two French submarines. The island of Varoe will be cut off in Norwegian waters by mines. The Norwegian island of Vigten will be cut off by mines and submarines. Sule will likewise be cut off from Vigten. Constant patrol by seven destroyers will be instituted in the Skagerrak. Measures are to be carried out on 5 April.

Definite confirmation of this report is not possible at present. Naval Staff, however, considers it likely that Great Britain is planning such a measure within a very short time. This view is strengthened by a report from radio intelligence about the despatch or disposition of 15-20 British submarines (see North Sea).

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items:

1. Letter from Armed Forces High Command (WFA 22131 Gkdos Chefs):
 - a) The Fuehrer has ordered that the cruiser LUETZOW is to be drawn in to transport about one battalion to Trondheim, independent of her further assignment.
 - b) The Navy is responsible for the protection of the landing parties carried on warships, even after their disembarkation, against Norwegian and Danish forces. It may be necessary for this purpose to leave single naval vessels, not scheduled to remain permanently, in Norwegian ports until the Army troops landed can no longer be impeded in the fulfillment of their assignment by Norwegian naval forces.
2. Fuehrer's directive about operational cooperation with Italy:

Discussions with Italy on strategic and operational subjects are to be resumed. Conducted by Armed Forces High Command. The High Commands of the Services are not to commence discussions until the result of Armed Forces High Command's investigation is available.
3. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division on an Armed Forces High Command political and military memorandum on the situation in southeastern Europe.
4. The Naval Attaché in Moscow reports that the Russians are raising difficulties with regard to departure of the JAN WELLEM and do not desire the supply ship to return to the base again.

The Russian attitude cannot be understood. Since Naval Staff, however, attaches the greatest importance to the immediate despatch of the JAN WELLEM, the Attaché is instructed to give the Russians suitable assurances.

(The Naval Attaché reports on 6 April "that the Russian attitude is apparently motivated by political considerations and by a high degree of nervousness about the future Franco-British

attitude to the U.S.S.R. They are therefore at pains to avoid any action in the slightest degree non-neutral, which the enemy could use as a pretext for action. It appears that the Russians have therefore become over-anxious on account of Base North, and this means that its usefulness is decreased at present. This does not imply complete and final uselessness. As soon as the political situation is clarified for the Russians the Base can again be used to the full").

5. The Field Marshal of the Air Force has ordered that Scapa is to be attacked by one group each of bombers and aerial minelaying planes as soon as the weather permits.

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

Disposition of forces:

The WARSPITE was at sea on the afternoon of 4 April, probably en route for the Clyde. The repair ship RESOURCE, escorted by the DECOY and DEFENDER left Freetown on 4 April for Gibraltar.

The submarine depot ship MEDWAY and a number of submarines will be transferred from East Asia to the Mediterranean in the near future.

France:

Various convoys observed.

A Brazilian steamer reported:

On 19 March the steamer was stopped by a British auxiliary cruiser ("Blue Star Line") 55 miles northeast of Gran Canaria; on 20 March she met a French convoy escorted by a French auxiliary cruiser (FLORIDA) 150 miles north of the island. According to information from the ship's officers,

the convoys at present haul off far to the west between Gibraltar and Great Britain.

Neutrals:

According to an Italian report, the following arrived in Istanbul on 3 April: the steamer SAGITTAIRE (7,706 tons) coming from Marseilles with miscellaneous war material, the U.S. steamers EXPLORER (6,700 tons) and EXMOUTH (4,979 tons) coming from New York with planes and miscellaneous material.

North Sea:

British planes over Norderney and the Eastern Ems about noon; flights into the Heligoland Bight at night.

The PENELOPE, CAIRO and some destroyers are at sea in the northern Scottish area.

The submarine SUNFISH, SEALION, SWORDFISH and SHARK are operating in the North Sea.

Radio intelligence intercepts a British radiogram containing the order for submarine operation. Because of our inability to decipher much, only the position of one boat, the TRITON, at 57°....10°....E can be partially deduced. In the opinion of the Radio Monitoring Service it may be concluded from the length of the radiogram (188 groups) that it deals with operations by 15-20 boats. Some boats were possibly allocated special assignments.

Operations by so many boats and the length of this radiogram are in striking contrast to previous British submarine measures and lead us to conclude that there are very special plans afoot.

Following possibilities:

1. The enemy has knowledge of the German operational plans and his submarine measures are of a purely defensive character.
2. The enemy has his own offensive plans against Norway and is sending out his boats in order to suppress German ore traffic from Narvik, to lay mine barrages in Norwegian territorial waters (see also report from Intelligence Center, Belgium) and as protection against German counterblows.

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In both cases we must reckon on danger from submarines off the Norwegian coast, off the ports and especially in the Skagerrak.

Group Baltic is informed of Naval Staff's viewpoint and plans to put submarine-chaser units into operation in the Kattegat and Skagerrak in good time to protect the sea transport units and to have air patrol carried out.

The trawler GORSPEN (208 tons) is admitted as sunk during the air attack on 3 April.

Own Situation:

Atlantic:

Nothing to report.

North Sea:

"Weseruebung":

Readiness of forces for "Weseruebung".
All forces are ready to sail except the destroyers THIELE and SCHOEMANN (engine repairs), FALKE (remaining work by 8 April), and two torpedo training boats (dock work).

(See list of forces in readiness dated 5 April, reference file "Weseruebung").

The first three steamers of the "export" unit and the tanker KATTEGAT appeared in Norwegian waters today off the south coast of Norway.

Nothing special to report in the North Sea. Enemy air raids on Norderney and the Eastern Ems unsuccessful.

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Baltic Sea:

Great Belt navigable with day and night pilot service. Pilot service not yet instituted in the Sound and Little Belt.

Our air reconnaissance reports a Danish armed coastal vessel with two torpedoboats off Frederikshavn and one Danish armed coastal vessel north of the Danish Great Belt barrage. Lightships have not yet been put out on the Great Belt barrage; instead the northern pilot position is occupied by the Danish vessel INGOLF.

Submarine SituationAtlantic:

Unchanged.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

In the operational area: U "13", "22", "46", "51",
"58", "59", "25", "30",
"34", "47", "48", "49".

On passage: U "2", "4", "5", "6",
"7", "9", "10", "14",
"19", "56", "57", "60",
"62".

Supporting Ship "16": U "37".

On return passage: U "43".

Boats disposed as per orders for "Weseruebung".

U "52"'s brief report shows no successes but produces much reconnaissance data regarding air and sea patrol in the Orkneys-Faroes area and off the Norwegian coast.

(See War Diary, Part B, IV.)

Merchant Shipping:

Returning home from overseas:

According to a report from the Consulate at Trondheim the motor vessel SEATTLE (left Curacao on 5 March, reached Tromsø on 31 March) passed north of Iceland, apparently without any difficulty.

Norwegian run:

A German Captain of a steamer coming from Bergen reports as a striking fact that considerably more Norwegian patrol boats have lately been encountered along the Norwegian coast. These escort the German ships.

Adriatic:

The B.B.C. reports from Ragusa that the German steamer ANKARA has postponed her departure to Trieste because British warships are cruising in the Adriatic.

The information is correct. The supply ship ANKARA has postponed her passage for the present on account of reports of enemy forces. The ship is instructed via the Naval Attaché in Rome to continue on her way. The Attaché is to endeavor to obtain confirmation of the report that there are enemy forces in the Adriatic, since it seems untrustworthy.

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

British and French notes handed to Norway and Sweden. Contents not yet known; probably on the subject of the intensification of the blockade.

In Swedish opinion the notes give no cause to suppose that the Western Powers are contemplating direct measures, particularly against Norwegian ore shipments. Sweden and Norway are not required to reply immediately. The notes did not contain an ultimatum.

Speech by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, before the Storting, in which he emphasizes that "the maintenance of complete neutrality is the aim of Norwegian policy". (For particulars see Foreign Press (Naval News) No. 83.)

Increased tension in all countries about further developments regarding Norway; according to press statements at home and abroad, this will be settled in the immediate future.

Although it cannot be expected that the enemy is completely in the dark about "Weseruebung", there are all the same no definite indications that the Western Powers have recognized Germany's strategic plans. At least they are unaware of the great extent of the whole operation. Naval Staff's judgment of the enemy's actions is that he is just about to take steps himself in Norwegian waters or on Norwegian territory. Since, undoubtedly aware of German preparatory measures, he must expect immediate counter blows in any operations, his measure will take defense against German counter-operations into account. It cannot be ascertained how far advanced the enemy operations are or whether they are already in process of execution. Naval Staff, however, is of opinion that the greatest haste is necessary for the execution of "Weseruebung".

9 April appears to be the latest possible date. It would be desirable to advance this date, but that is no longer possible.

With regard to the present state of general political unrest in Scandinavia we must reckon on the possibility of the Western Powers and Norway being warned in advance when the naval forces commence their operations today.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items:1. State of "Weserübung":

For readiness see review in reference file "Weseruebung".

Fifteen destroyers in operational readiness (the SCHOEMANN is not ready).

For state of "export" and sea transport units see sketch of 6 April: The Narvik Group (the ALSTER, RAUENFELS, BAERENFELS, tanker KATTEGAT) is assumed to be between Trondheim and Bergen, the Trondheim Group (the MAIN, LEVANTE, SAO PAULO, tanker SKAGERRAK) off the south coast of Norway. The 1st Sea Transport Unit for Bergen (the steamers MARIE LEONHARDT, KURITYBA and RIO DE JANEIRO) is in the central Baltic. The Stavanger Unit sails from Swinemuende today (the TUEBINGEN, TIJUCA, MENDOZA).

The Bergen Sea Transport Unit comprises roughly 650 men, 184 horses, vehicles, etc, the Stavanger Unit roughly 750 men, 125 horses, also vehicles. The Kristiansand Unit follows this evening with 4 steamers (the WIEGAND, WESTSEE, KRETA, AUGUST LEONHARDT) and, tomorrow morning, the Oslo Unit with 5 steamers (the ANTARES, IONIA, MUANSA, ITAURI, NEIDENFELS).

The 1st Sea Transport Unit thus comprises a total of 15 steamers carrying roughly 3,900 men, 742 horses, 942 vehicles and 4 tanks.

The starting up of this whole transport operation cannot be kept secret. It will be an extraordinary stroke of luck if the immense transport set-up reaches its ports of destination without disturbance and incidents via the narrow passages of the entrances to the Baltic and the Kattegat and Skagerrak, and without the enemy receiving previous warning.

2. Group West proposes that minelaying operation "Skagerrak" should be carried out during the night of "Weserday" minus 1, and sees the following advantages in this connection:

- a) Danger from the enemy, alarmed by the appearance of the Narvik and Trondheim Groups, is eliminated.
- b) All Groups proceeding northwards will be able to withdraw if necessary.
- c) Possible to lay further barrage sections earlier.

The Group regards the disadvantage of isolated merchant ships striking the barrage as negligible.

Naval Staff declines Group West's proposal for the following reasons:

I. Execution is scheduled for the night before "Weserday".

- a) Possible detection of the minelaying unit in the Skagerrak on the evening of "W-2" endangers the Bergen and Kristiansand Groups on outward passage if the enemy attacks. The risk to the minelaying unit must take second place to this.
- b) As long as the barrage is not known, its deterrent effect is doubtful.

II. Any alteration in operations already fixed is if possible to be avoided.

3. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the projected ruling about the subordination of the naval, air and submarine forces remaining or operating off the Norwegian coast.

The principle that there should be only one independent operational headquarters in one theater of war is adhered to.

- a) Admirals, West and South Norwegian Coasts are subordinate to Commanding Admiral, Norway regarding defense in ports and coastal waters.

- b) Destroyers and supply ships in Trondheim come under Group West.
- c) The BREMSE, CARL PETERS, PT boats in Bergen under Admiral, West Norwegian Coast.
- d) Torpedo and PT boats in Kristiansand at first under Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic; later, after the Skagerrak has been secured against surface forces, operationally under Group West. Subordination to Admiral, West Norwegian Coast may be considered.
- e) No naval forces subordinate to Admiral, South Norwegian Coast. Assignments in this coastal area will be taken over by Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.
- f) Commanding Admiral, Submarines will control all submarine assignments. Commanding Admirals to make requests to Group West.
- g) Commander, Naval Air's units at first under the 10th Air Corps, later control of all reconnaissance by Commander, Naval Air, West.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees. For directive to Commanding Admirals and Commanders (l. Skl. I op 715/40) see reference file "Weseruebung".

4. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on Naval Staff's directive on the conduct of submarine warfare after the conclusion of "Weseruebung". (l. Skl. I op 713/40) see reference file "Weseruebung".

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Nothing special to report.

North Sea:

According to radio intelligence: apart from Commander in Chief, Home Fleet and destroyers, Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron (probably aboard the REPULSE) was in the outer Scapa area and the battle cruiser RENOWN in the inner Scapa area.

The old battleship WARSPITE is going into dock (possible bomb damage?)

The cruiser GALATEA is on escort duty with destroyers. Commander, 1st Destroyer Flotilla is ordered to return to Scapa with a convoy.

Reason unknown. This step appears extraordinary but may not necessarily be connected with any operations.

Own Situation

Atlantic: Nothing special to report.

North Sea:

Command: On his return from convalescent leave Admiral Saalwaechter resumes command of Group West on 6 April. Admiral Carls returns to his post as Commanding Admiral, Group Baltic.

Ship "36" (Lieut. Cdr. Weyher) sails according to plan as the second auxiliary cruiser.

For operational order see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I. The supply ship NORDMARK leaves for the Atlantic and proceeds via Route II.

"Weseruebung":

6 April, "Weserday" minus 3:

Naval operations commence as planned. Groups I and II (Narvik and Trondheim) sail at 2300 on 6 April under the command of Commanding Admiral, Fleet.

The cruiser LUETZOW dropped out of the Trondheim Group at the last moment.

In the afternoon the report is received from the LUETZOW about breakdowns caused by cracks in the auxiliary engine casings. Complete repairs will take several days. Provisional repair

is being carried out. Sailing for operations in the Atlantic is out of the question until full repairs are completed. The ship must therefore be restored as quickly as possible, since Naval Staff attaches the greatest importance to operations in the Atlantic in order to effect a strong diversion as soon as possible after "Weseruebung".

It is agreed with the 21st Army Group that the LUETZOW is not to operate to Trondheim because of her breakdown, but is assigned to the Oslo Group. The LUETZOW is ordered to proceed through the Kiel Canal and join the Oslo Group.

Composition of the units sailing today:

Commanding Admiral, Fleet: Vice Admiral Luetjens

Battleship GNEISENAU
Battleship SCHARNHORST

Group I: (Narvik)

Commander: Commodore Bonte

Destroyers:

WILHELM HEIDKAMP	DIETER VON ROEDER
GEORGE THIELE	WOLFGANG ZENKER
HANS LUEDEMANN	ERICH GIESE
ANTON SCHMIDT	ERICH KOELLNER
HERMAN KUENNE	BERND VON ARNIM

Embarked on the destroyers:

2,000 men of the 3rd Mountain Division. (1 regiment).

Group II: (Trondheim)

Commander: The Commander of the HIPPER, Captain Heye.

Cruiser:

HIPPER

Destroyers:

FRIEDRICH ECKOLDT	BRUNO HEINEMANN
THEODOR RIEDEL	PAUL JACOBI

Embarked on the HIPPER: 900 men;

On the destroyers: 800 men of the 3rd Mountain Division. (1 regiment). (For operational orders see "Weseruebung" file.)

Weather prospects:

Northern North Sea: wind south to southwest, 5-7, freshening to 8 off the Norwegian coast, mostly cloudy with frequent rain, ceiling 400-600 m, visibility 3-5 miles, about 10 miles on the south coast of Norway, deterioration in visibility setting in from the northwest.

The prevailing winds will permit the advance as planned, even for the destroyers. With following wind and sea the advance will, however, probably just be possible still off the Norwegian coast. Action, however, will be greatly restricted, especially for the destroyers. We must expect enemy reconnaissance with the present good visibility. The dull weather setting in from the west, with visibility dropping to two miles, will be in favor of the Groups' unmolested advance.

It is possible that the advance will be impeded in northern waters by a further freshening of the wind.

Naval Staff views with great confidence the operations of the units putting to sea. The readiness of the destroyers has reached the required standard by thorough overhauls of the engines and boilers. The thorough preparations made for the operation and the excellent spirit of the destroyer crews give assurance of a resolute and successful execution of the particularly difficult Narvik operation.

The Groups are led by excellent Commanders.

Baltic Sea:Shipping:

The Great Belt is the only navigable entrance to the Baltic. No pilot service has yet been instituted in the Sound and Little Belt, but the Sound can be navigated by all ships with aid

from mine-exploding vessels.

Check sweeping in the Great and Little Belts proceeded as planned. Check sweeping of the gap in the Sound barrage is scheduled for 7 April. The pilot service in the Great Belt is carried out in both directions during the day, at night only from south to north at present. The Danes have placed a torpedo boat at the southern entrance of the barrage as a pilot boat.

Submarine Situation:

Atlantic:

Unchanged.

North Sea:

After her return, U "38" reports heavy patrol in the Shetlands-Hebrides area and in Fair Passage. The boat sank about 19,000 tons on her return passage. U "43" suffered greatly from bad weather in the North Minch area and west of Fair Passage. No successes.

For brief reports see Part B, Vol. IV.

22 submarines are in position as per operational orders for "Weseruebung".

Also on passage: U "1", "50", "25", "57".

U "37" is with Ship "16".

Merchant Shipping

On 6 April there were altogether 579 ships over 1,600 GRT, = 68.3%, in home waters, of which 100 ships totaling 301,372 GRT are on the Scandinavian run; 57 of these ships are in Norway.

Items of Political Importance1. Norway:

Reuter states that the notes to Norway and Sweden contain no intimidating clauses, but that Great Britain reserves the right to take action against German attempts to use Scandinavian waters as a protected route in order to avoid the blockade.

The German Military Attaché wires from Finland that Swedish and Finnish circles are greatly perturbed about the ships concentrated in Pomeranian ports. It is concluded that Germany has hostile intentions against Sweden.

Telephone tapping intercepts telephone conversations between the Danish Naval Attaché and the Danish and Norwegian Ambassadors, in which he requests an immediate audience since he has communications to make of the highest political importance and bearing.

The Danish Naval Attaché has possibly gained some knowledge of the coming "Weseruebung" operation.

For further information see Foreign Press Report.

2. According to reports from German Consulates, a large number of reservists (all reservists according to some reports) have been called up to the Italian Navy for 1 April.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items:

1. Letter from the Naval Attaché in Oslo stating that 60% of all Norwegian shipping has been chartered to Great Britain since November 1939.

The Attaché reports that this statement can be taken as a fact.

2. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the progress of

"Weseruebung" and movements to date.

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

Disposition of forces: The WARSPITE is suspected to be proceeding to Portsmouth (?) because of damage, the NELSON and BARHAM to be still in southern England.

The RENOWN, REPULSE, VALIANT and RODNEY can be assumed to be in Scottish waters.

On 7 April the cruiser SHROPSHIRE is to proceed to Capetown; the GLOUCESTER is to proceed to Simonstown.

Task Force "H" and the auxiliary cruiser ALCANZARA put in to Freetown on 6 April.

Radio monitoring also intercepts convoy movements. Convoy "HS 25", comprising 23 steamers, is proceeding north from Gibraltar, 150 miles from the coast.

France:

A French destroyer or flotilla leader (large destroyer) has been drifting about 300 miles west of St. Vincent since 6 April.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

North Sea:

At 0948 (German Summer Time) enemy air reconnaissance reported 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 8 planes on bearing 90° 3 miles from 55° 30'N, 6° 37'E, course 350° (cruiser HIPPER). On the basis of this report the cruisers GALATEA and ARETHUSA with destroyers were sent out in an unknown direction. Further afternoon reconnaissance resulted in priority radiograms from 1630 from the Admiralty to Commander in Chief, Home Fleet

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and other Commanders (1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons) as well as to the submarines at sea.

It can be seen from the Admiralty's radiograms that at least 1 battleship of the SCHARNHORST type, 2 cruisers - one possibly a pocket battleship - and 10 destroyers are assumed.

The enemy has thus identified the operation directed northward and has ordered corresponding operational measures.

It may be assumed that the Admiralty has not yet drawn conclusions about a large-scale German action within "Weseruebung" from the air reconnaissance information, but rather expects a break-through to the Atlantic by a pocket battleship. In any case, as Naval Staff expected, the German movement has warned the enemy.

The cruisers SHEFFIELD, PENELOPE and CAIRO put in to Scapa on 6 April.

Enemy submarines are detected in the eastern Skagerrak and Kattegat, also near Utsire. Further submarine positions cannot yet be ascertained.

Own Situation:

North Sea:

The movements of the battleships and Narvik and Trondheim Groups continue as planned. Deterioration in weather and visibility in the area of advance. The destroyers can still just advance in the prevailing weather. The south to southwest winds are still blowing strength 7-8 in the northern North Sea. Action will be severely restricted in this weather. Rainfall and bad visibility will greatly hinder enemy air reconnaissance according to the weather forecast; southwest winds, strength 6-8 can be expected in the southern part of northern waters, decreasing to strength 4 to the north, so that conditions during the northern part of the advance will be more favorable.

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In connection with the battleship movements 24 Wellington bombers had an engagement with heavy German fighters at 1500 northeast of our declared area. Two British bombers were shot down in aerial combat in between two cloud covers at 2,000 m. altitude.

At noon a plane of Commander, Naval Air attacked an enemy submarine of the GRAMPUS class with two 250 kg. bombs, apparently successfully, 30 miles north of the northeastern corner of the declared area.

Air reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast detected nothing special.

The movements of the "Weseruebung" "export" units seem to have proceeded according to plan so far. According to Naval Staff's calculations the Narvik "export" Unit must already be in the area off Trondheim, the Trondheim Unit a little to the north of Bergen. Since the ships appear to have passed the Haugesund "cliff" without incident, it may be assumed that the Norwegians are so far unsuspecting.

Today the sea transport units are in the following areas:

<u>Bergen Unit</u>	(3 steamers)) north of the Great
<u>Stavanger Unit</u>	(3 steamers)) Belt.
<u>Kristiansand Unit</u>	(4 steamers)) in the central
<u>Oslo Unit</u>	(5 steamers)) Baltic.

(See also Situation, Baltic.)

The tanker JAN WELLEM, which is particularly important for Narvik's supplies, left Base North on 6 April. She is expected to arrive promptly in Narvik.

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Atlantic:

Nothing special to report.

Baltic Sea/Kattegat:

Shipping:

Unimpeded in the Baltic. Great Belt passable by day and night. Still ice difficulties north of the German barrage when passing through the Sound.

"Weseruebung":

The 17th Submarine Chaser Flotilla left for an operation in the area east of Skagen.

The Oslo Group, which embarked forces on the evening of 6 April, sailed as planned from Swinemunde on the evening of 7 April.

Composition:

Commander: Rear Admiral Kummetz

Cruisers:

BLUECHER
LUETZOW
EMDEN

Torpedo boats:

KONDOR
MOEWE
FALKE

2,000 men embarked, parts of the 163rd Division.

During the night of 7 April there also put to sea as planned (at present in waiting positions):

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a) Schleswig Holstein Group

with Training Flotilla of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic (with 1,840 men for the operation against Korsoer).

b) Rugard Group

with submarine chasers (with 400 men for the operation against the bridge over the Belt at Middelfahrt).

c) HANSESTADT DANZIG

(with 1 reinforced battalion for Copenhagen).

Air reconnaissance was flown over the Kattegat as far as the line Skagen-Paternoster. No enemy forces or submarines were sighted.

The steamer KURITYBA, belonging to the 1st Sea Transport Unit (Bergen Group) ran aground four miles north of Helsingborg and requires help from tugs. The 17th Submarine Chaser Flotilla and the tugs PREUSSEN and WOTAN have been sent out to help her.

The fact that the steamer ran aground at the border of Swedish territorial waters gives rise to the danger of the enemy being warned in advance if the camouflage of the vessel carrying material, horses and men is not maintained successfully. Naval Staff's objections to the sea transport units appearing before "Wesertime" have already been confirmed. It can also be stated that the steamers of the 1st Transport Unit should have been better camouflaged and that the soldiers and men in charge of the horses on board should have worn civilian clothes.

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Submarine Situation:

Atlantic:

U "37" reports, time of origin 1930:

"Left Ship "16" in grid square AD 2957
(Denmark Strait) in northeasterly storm.
Hove to. Cannot reach post "Nero"
(Narvik) in time."

The break-through of the first auxiliary cruiser (Ship "16",
Captain Rogge) can thus be regarded as successful.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Unchanged; 26 submarines in position or on passage, also
U "37" in the Denmark Strait. U "64" with Ship "36" as escort

Merchant Shipping

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, reports:
Minesweeping started in the Sound barrage gap. Will
probably be finished by noon on 8 April; barrage gap
ice-free. Great Belt: Danish barrage gaps - lightships
North and South in position.

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"Weserday" minus 1Items of Political Importance1. Norway:

Statements from the British and French Governments to Norway about Allied minelaying in Norwegian territorial waters.

"The Allied Governments have decided to exclude their enemy from the unimpeded use of parts of Norwegian territorial waters which are obviously of the greatest use to him. They have thus resolved to prevent the unhindered passage of ships carrying contraband through Norwegian territorial waters. They therefore announce:

"Some parts of Norwegian territorial waters have become unnavigable because of mines. Ships which traverse these areas do so at their own risk. It is quite clear from the list already published that the free approach of Norwegian ships to their own ports and villages is in no way impeded by minelaying. In order to avoid the slightest possibility of Norwegian and other ships unintentionally traversing the areas before it is possible to warn them against mines, arrangements have been made that the limits of these areas are patrolled by British ships until 48 hours after the first mines have been laid in the areas concerned. The safety of shipping is guaranteed by this measure, together with the warning given on the radio." (For position of barrages see under "North Sea").

The Western Powers have now flagrantly violated Norwegian neutrality officially by laying mines inside Norwegian waters. The Fuehrer is of the opinion that these measures are only the first step in the Allies' strategic plan to gain a footing in the Scandinavian area, suppress supplies of ore from Norway, exercise pressure on Sweden to stop deliveries of ore to Germany, dominate the Shetlands-Norway passage and extend the war to Scandinavia.

The necessity of carrying out the German "Weseruebung" operation is confirmed by the Franco-British measures.

Today's statement by the Western Powers is politically welcome since it gives excellent grounds to the outside world for German action as a counter-blow to the British violation of neutrality.

On the afternoon of 8 April the Norwegian Government lodged a protest, referring to the Norwegian-British agreement of 11 March 1940, which permits exports to Germany even of contraband, and demanded the removal of the mine barrages and the withdrawal of Allied forces from Norwegian waters. In spite of the protest, which is not very vigorous, it is quite possible that far-reaching secret verbal agreements have been reached between the Norwegian and British Governments.

The U.S. Naval Attaché (Commander Schrader) visited High Command, Navy (Naval Attaché) in the afternoon and informed us that he listened to the British announcement about mine-laying in Norwegian waters at noon today. He considers this an extraordinarily serious incident and asked for High Command, Navy's comments.

He was informed that no statements can be made yet but that the events are regarded in a most serious light.

2. Reuter report:

The Allied offensive is divided into three parts:

1. The notes to Norway and Sweden about intensification of the blockade;
2. the conferences between Ministers Monnet (Blockade Minister) and Cross on the same subject;
3. the conferences beginning on 8 April between Lord Halifax and the British Ambassadors in the Balkans, probably with reference to the Norwegian and Swedish answers to the British note.

3. The "General Netherlands Import Center" has started work officially. It is a Government control, standing surety to the Western Powers that certain export and import goods will be for Dutch use only and will not reach other countries. Great Britain requested this and gave assurances in return that Dutch ships would be less strictly searched.

4. The German Ambassador in Tokio reports:

Japanese naval spokesman gave notice of suitable severe countermeasures if Great Britain undertakes blockade measures in the Sea of Japan. On the other hand the Naval Staff let it be known most confidentially that the Navy would greatly welcome the appearance of German naval forces, especially submarines, in Japanese waters, would suffer operations by them from Russian ports and would afford them every possible support (ports in the South Sea). The people would be most enthusiastic about any successes.

(The Naval Staff's opinion, but hardly that of the Admiralty.)

1100

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. Report on the movements of the individual groups and on the situation in Norwegian waters after the declaration of the British mined areas.

Naval Staff is not yet assured of the fact that mines have actually been laid. It is considered possible that this is a bluff to scare away German merchant shipping. On the other hand, it is quite certain that British forces, (destroyers and submarines) - as per the British declaration - are at the positions indicated within or at Norwegian territorial limits in order to capture or sink passing German steamers, thus violating Norwegian waters. German steamers proceeding on the former route will, therefore, undoubtedly run into the arms of the British patrols even if mines have not yet been laid.

From a military point of view, therefore, this anticipatory step by the Western Powers creates very unfavorable and difficult conditions for the execution of the operation, which

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primarily involve severe risk for the "export" unit steamers carrying guns, material, supplies, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition and food supplies which are urgently required in the northern bases of Narvik and Trondheim.

Immediate re-routing of the "export" steamers therefore appears desirable. Retention in southern ports or fjords, the only safe step at present, is not possible since every endeavor must be made to get the steamers to their ports of destination to time. Putting into port later, after "Weserday", would be hopeless because enemy countermeasures would then definitely be in force off the ports.

Naval Staff therefore orders the "export" steamers and tankers to avoid the areas endangered by mines but otherwise still to make for their ports of destination.

For orders to other shipping see under "Merchant Shipping".

2. Question of flag to be set when entering Norwegian ports:

Naval Staff decides that the German flag should be flown or none, according to the situation. The previous order is canceled; the British ensign is not to be flown since the advantages of flying the British flag are not seen and are at least doubtful.

Order to this effect is issued.

3. The Naval Attache in Oslo has suggested that if Norwegian patrols delay passage, the following Morse signal in Norwegian should be transmitted:

"Am putting in with permission of the Norwegian Government, have an escort officer on board."

The proposal is agreed to. Order is issued to Groups for further transmission.

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Situation 8 April

Weather

Northern North Sea/Northern Waters:

The south to southwesterly winds, strength 6-8, which rise to 9 in places along the Norwegian coast, will gradually decrease to strength 5-6, as the wind veers northwest, beginning gradually from the west so that the advance of the units as planned down to torpedo boats will be possible. Advance of PT boat flotillas is doubtful. Visibility of only 3 miles at present is having a prejudicial effect on air reconnaissance by both sides. An improvement in visibility up to 10 miles can be expected when the wind veers.

North of 65° the wind will drop to strength 3-4 and will no longer be an obstacle.

In the Baltic Sea, southerly winds 3-4, apparently freshening to 5; advance as planned can therefore be expected.

Enemy Situation

Reports on the enemy received during the course of the day show the following picture as a whole in the evening:

Light British forces off West Fjord (including 1 heavy cruiser), south of Trondheim and near Stadlandet in order to carry out the minelaying operations announced and in order to control shipping off the Norwegian coast. Various merchantmen have already been stopped and had to turn about.

The reports about mine barrages laid are confirmed in the afternoon by telephone calls from Norway. The mines are said to have been laid during the night of 7 April at the places indicated, possibly also near Karmoey (south of Haugesund) and near Halten (entrance to Trondheim). (Near Halten seems improbable.)

Part of an enemy main force, consisting of 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser and several destroyers, on northerly course about noon off Romsdals.

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Battle cruiser squadron and other cruisers at sea protecting light enemy forces. Position unknown. Light forces between Shetlands and Norway.

Strong submarine disposition in the Skagerrak and Kattegat and off the coasts of southern Norway and Denmark.

French forces (minelaying cruiser EMILE BERTIN and two large destroyers) detected in the North Sea in the Scapa area.

(For details see special appendix, radiogram file of 8 April.)

Own Situation

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Groups Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kristiansand and Oslo proceeding to their operational targets as planned.

The enemy is aware that the battleships are included in the Narvik and Trondheim Groups. Our own plans are not yet revealed, but it is possible that increased steamer traffic through the entrances to the Baltic may appear a most striking measure both to neutral Scandinavian countries and to the enemy in connection with the known concentration of transports in Hamburg, Stettin and Gdynia which took place some time ago. It cannot be ascertained how far the enemy has actually been warned or is acting on supposition.

Destroyers were reported west of Trondheim this morning by the enemy. Engagement between the destroyer BERNDT v. ARNIM and the British destroyer GLOWWORM. Result still unknown.

The enemy possibly concludes German operations against his measures in Norwegian waters. He may expect a pocket battleship sortie.

We fear that the British minelaying operations will affect our military operation unfavorably.

Naval Staff foresees danger in bringing the "export" unit and the tankers through. Re-routing to avoid encounters with British patrols has been ordered, but is made difficult

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as the actual positions of the steamers are not known.

The operations by our forces in the northern area run great risks from the superior enemy who, in pursuance of his own plans, is now in our operational areas at the same time to our disadvantage. The necessity of despatching battleships to protect our destroyers is fully confirmed by the enemy situation.

The 1st Sea Transport Unit is at sea comprising 15 steamers as planned; at noon the Bergen and Stavanger Groups were in the Skagerrak off the Norwegian coast, the Kristiansand Group roughly off Skagen, the Oslo Group in the Kattegat near the Danish coast. The steamer KURITYBA is still aground north of Helsingborg.

Great danger from submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak. The steamers are sailing alone, as merchant steamers, along the border of territorial waters.

During the afternoon the first news was received of steamers torpedoed in the Skagerrak. At 1815 the German Ambassador in Oslo reported that the steamer RIO DE JANEIRO of the 1st Sea Transport Unit (Bergen) was torpedoed and sank at 1420 near Lillesand between Grimstad and Risoer. Shortly afterwards the torpedoing of the steamer KRETA (of the Kristiansand Group) was asserted. She sent an SOS at noon. (Report is not confirmed later. The steamer was not torpedoed, but apparently managed to evade the enemy submarine in time.)

At 1815 the torpedoing of the tanker POSIDONIA (present name STEDINGEN, naval supply ship) off Staverne by the submarine TRIDENT was reported.

The enemy submarines were apparently directed today to proceed without warning against all German merchantmen in and outside neutral territorial waters. Under these circumstances it would have been better to camouflage the steamers of the 1st Sea Transport Unit as neutrals (Swedes, Norwegians, Esthonians).

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Naval Staff's objections to a premature appearance of the Sea Transport Unit in Norwegian waters are thus confirmed. The torpedoing of the RIO DE JANEIRO, the landing of the survivors and the dead in German uniforms must of necessity lead to a complete revelation of the German operation and to an advance warning of the Norwegians, precluding the element of surprise.

At 2030 Rueter was already reporting from Oslo:

"German troopship RIO DE JANEIRO with 300 men on board torpedoed in the vicinity of Kristiansand."

The movements of the naval forces have, however, also become known now and are leading to swiftly increasing unrest and tension in the Scandinavian and enemy countries in connection with the German transport movements. It is reported from Stockholm at 1400 that the Swedish Foreign Minister has information that a strong German fleet and transport unit passed northwards through the entrances to the Baltic. A Danish lightship reports isolated German forces. At 1800 Reuter gave out that 80-100 German naval vessels were proceeding through the Great Belt and Kattegat, escorted by auxiliary vessels and trawlers.

Operation "Weseruebung" has left the stage of secrecy and camouflage according to the impression prevalent in the evening. Our enemies have been warned. Since the element of surprise is lost we must now expect engagements at all points.

Attack by the 10th Air Division on Scapa on the evening of 8 April.

Results as follows according to the Air Force report:

Hits:

1 battleship from 1,300 m. altitude,
1 hit SC 250 amidships, 1 SC 250 close to the bow.

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1 cruiser from 5,000 m. altitude,
1 hit SC 250 on the stern, 2 SC 500
between 2 cruisers lying only a slight
distance apart.

1 battle cruiser, 1 SC 500 10-20 m. from
the ship's side.

1 single-engined plane shot down.

Forces identified:

1 aircraft carrier with superstructure,
5 or more heavy and light cruisers,
also destroyers and auxiliary vessels.

Own losses:

2 planes shot down.

Baltic Sea:

Advance by naval forces according to plan to their
operational objectives in "Weseruebung".

Atlantic:

Naval Staff assumes command of Ship "16" at 2400 on 8 April.
The NORDMARK is assigned a rendezvous within the scope of
the North Sea operation. U "37" is to relieve U "64" with
Ship "36" and then proceed as was ordered for Ship "16".

Submarine Situation

The defensive disposition of the submarines for "Weseruebung"
has been taken up as per operational order of Commanding
Admiral, Submarines; codeword "Hartmuth":

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The disposition of submarine groups is as follows:

- I. Submarine group in the Narvik area:
U "25", "46", "51"; U "37" is approaching from Iceland as the fourth boat.
- II. Submarine group in the area off Trondheim:
U "30", "34".
- III. Submarine group in the area off Bergen:
U "9", "14", "56", "60", "62".
- IV. Submarine group in the Stavanger area:
U "1", "4".
- V. Submarine group in attacking disposition north and northeast of the Shetlands:
U "47", "48", "49" and "50". U "52" and "38" are to continue operations in this area.
- VI. Submarine group attacking disposition east and west of Pentland Firth:
U "13", "57", "58" and "59".
- VII. Submarine group: Disposition in the southern North Sea only in case of need.
- VIII. Submarine group: Protective disposition west of Lindesnes: U "2", "5", "6".
- IX. Submarine group attacking disposition east of the Shetlands: U "7", "10", "19".

Merchant Shipping

The following directive is issued to the steamers off the Norwegian coast not engaged in "Weseruebung":

"British mine barrages off Norway probably misleading. Probable however that positions concerned are patrolled. Therefore remain

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north of Haugesund in fjords and ports.

Signed Naval Control."

The following is also wired to the Embassy in Oslo via the Foreign Office for all German Consulates (German citizens) in Norway for immediate transmission to all German merchantmen:

"Merchantmen to remain north of Stadlandet in fjords or ports because of British mine barrages in Norwegian territorial waters and probable patrols there. Merchantmen between Stadlandet and Kristiansand to return home on the former route."

The Ministry of Transportation has ordered that the merchantmen under its control which are bound for Norway west of Kristiansand may no longer sail from German ports.

The announcement by the French and British Governments of the mined areas in Norway was broadcast as a warning to mariners by the Deutschlandsender, coastal radio stations and by Plan A distribution. The following was announced towards the evening by radio message in clear:

"The possibility of British mines near Halten must be reckoned with."
(Halten/Norway, near Trondheim.)

The following further orders were radioed to ships in Norway (in code):

"Ships off the south coast of Norway keep a safe distance from the coast, since the enemy is attacking ships in territorial waters.

Signed Naval Control."

"Ships outside the skerries are to be camouflaged if possible immediately."

Regarding steamers of the "export" unit see under Situation 8 April.

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The steamers MAIN and BAERENFELS which, according to the Consul at Haugesund are still lying in Koppervik owing to lack of pilots, are ordered to proceed on to Bergen at once. The steamer SAO PAULO is likewise to put in to Bergen.

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"WESERDAY"

Items of Political Importance

0500:

The German Ambassador in Oslo informed the Norwegian Government in writing and verbally that Germany requests Norway to place herself under German military protection. A similar note was handed to Denmark at the same time. Assurances were given that the political independence and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark would be respected now and in future.

After thorough deliberation the Norwegian Government refused the German demand, since it signifies an attempt on her sovereign rights. The Danish Government decided to accept German military protection under protest.

At 0515:

German naval forces arrived in Norwegian and Danish bases, forces disembarked, the Danish frontiers were crossed. Denmark prohibited firing. The Norwegian Government, which ordered increased alert for Air Force flying and maintenance personnel and coastal defenses yesterday, states that Norway will offer resolute resistance.

According to a Reuter report, at 1300 the (British) Foreign Office stated officially that the British and French Governments have decided to give Norway full help at once with land, sea and air forces; the necessary steps are being taken.

During the day a second Government was formed in Norway under Vidkun Quisling (former secretary to Nansen, then leader of the Norwegian National Unity Party and from 1931-32 Minister for Defense).

The old Nyggardsvold Government has not resigned, however, but is issuing orders for mobilization and calling for utmost resistance and sabotage.

At 0800 the German Government handed a note to Sweden containing Armed Forces High Command's definite demands (see "Weseruebung" file). A verbal assurance was given

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that Germany's measures were in no way directed against Sweden. The Swedish Government has accepted the German proposals.

Chamberlain has attempted to prove in the House of Commons that the German action against Norway and Denmark cannot be regarded as an answer to the laying of the British mine barrages, since the German forces must have sailed much earlier. He emphasized that a state of war exists between Norway and Germany and that Great Britain regards herself as Norway's ally.

(For further particulars and impression made abroad by the German action, see Foreign Press and Political Review.)

Situation 9 April

Special Reports on the Enemy

North Sea/Northern Waters:

At 0500 there was an engagement between heavy British forces and our battleships west of the Lofotens. No information as to type and composition of the enemy task force; probably a battle cruiser of the REPULSE class with other heavy vessels and destroyers.

In the Shetlands/Norway area and off the Norwegian coast 4-5 heavy ships (possibly including heavy French forces), about 8 cruisers and several destroyer flotillas are operating on varying, latterly northerly courses.

The aircraft carrier FURIOUS left Scapa during the day, obviously to join Commander in Chief, Home Fleet.

A submarine reported enemy destroyers on southwesterly course in West Fjord in the afternoon.

A foreign submarine was sighted in Trondheim Fjord.

During the night of 9 April enemy cruisers and destroyers were 40-50 miles west of Bergen on southerly courses.

(For particulars see list in radiogram file of 9 April.)

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Own Situation

Naval Staff reviews the situation as follows on the evening of 9 April:

I. Norway:

The Norwegian Admiralty ordered increased readiness during the night of 8 April and the extinguishing of all radio and coastal beacons on the Norwegian coast from Lister to Narvik. In spite of this our forces advanced as planned.

Battleship Group:

At 0530 Commanding Admiral, Fleet reported an engagement with heavy enemy forces west of the Lofotens (67° 40'N, 9° 50'E). He apparently succeeded in shaking off the superior enemy after a short action.

The enemy was probably one REPULSE class and another battleship. Commanding Admiral, Fleet reported at 2017:

"Can only proceed at 25 knots, two heavy gun turrets out of action."

Naval Staff suspects that the damage resulted from heavy seaway. No action report has been received from Commanding Admiral, Fleet. A Reuter report on a great naval battle and the sinking of the GNEISENAU appears very unreliable.

Narvik Group:

Put in as planned except for the destroyer GIESE which did not arrive until some hours later. Landing accomplished without difficulty, resistance slight. The Commodore's action in sinking the armored coastal ships NORGE and EIDSVOLD is fully approved in view of the general Norwegian resistance. The JAN WELLEM is in harbor. The "export" unit and the tanker KATTEGAT, however, have not arrived. This has caused a difficult situation as regards supplies; ammunition is scarce.

Fuel supplies for the destroyers are assured by the JAN WELLEM. Refuelling will take until the evening of 10 April according to Commander, Destroyers' report, since the second tanker is not available.

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Enemy destroyers sighted in West Fjord; the Narvik Group must sail as soon as possible. Assumed that Commander, Destroyers will himself make every effort to hasten departure.

Enquiry to Group West about number of destroyers ready to sail today has not been answered yet.

Narvik submarines are assumed to be in inner positions.

Trondheim Group:

Put in as planned; slight resistance offered by coastal batteries. Disembarkation carried out. Situation regarding coastal defense guns not yet clarified, so that stronger submarine protection is requested. The Norwegians attempted to reinforce the crew of the battery at Hysnes by landing troops. "Export" unit has not yet arrived in Trondheim, causing difficult supply situation. The HIPPER's stock of fuel is only enough for her return without any detours. Two destroyers will not be ready to sail until tomorrow. Naval air squadron which has arrived is still without fuel. Airfield is heavily iced-over and probably unserviceable.

The HIPPER reports sinking the destroyer GLOWWORM by gunfire and ramming on the morning of 8 April while on passage.

Submarines are assumed to be in position.

Bergen Group:

Entry and disembarkation as planned; resistance slight. The KOENIGSBERG and BREMSE sustained damage in action. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that troops are concentrating in the hinterland, situation therefore still not clear. Attacks from the sea feared. Population passive.

The KOENIGSBERG, BREMSE, CARL PETERS and PT boats will remain in Bergen. The KOELN and two torpedo boats will try to put out tonight.

Submarines at inner positions.

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Egersund Group:

Assignment carried out as planned; forces then put out to join the KARLSRUHE. Bicycle troops ashore.

Kristiansand Group:

Operation made difficult by fog. Strong resistance from coastal defenses was broken by ships' guns and bombing attacks. At 1130 the KARLSRUHE put in and disembarked the troops. When putting out at 2245 the KARLSRUHE was hit by a torpedo and severely damaged. Endeavors made to tow her in. The TSINGTAU and PT boat flotilla remained in Kristiansand.

Arendal assignment:

Delayed by fog; carried out as planned about noon. Bicycle troops ashore; destroyed the cable to Great Britain.

Oslo Group:

Strong resistance from coastal batteries near Horten and in the Droebak Channel. Impossible to force the Channel. One motor minesweeper sank near Horten. Severe hits on the BLUECHER caused both engines to break down. The BLUECHER unable to move, sank near Askholmen north of the Droebak Channel at 1530 because of explosion inside or hits from mines or torpedoes. Troops disembarked in Moss and Sonsbugden. Resistance of coastal fortifications broken by bombing attack. At 1920 Droebak Channel was surrendered without a fight.

The LUEZOW and EMDEN have not yet put in because the mine situation is not clarified.

II. Denmark:

No resistance. Operations proceeded smoothly to plan.

Troops landed in Copenhagen by the HANSESTADT DANZIG. Ship sailed for Warnemuende.

Group "Rugard" landed troops near Middelfahrt to protect the bridge over the Little Belt.

Gjedser, Nyborg and Korsoer assignments carried out as planned. The SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN ran aground near Vengeance Gruns but was refloated in the afternoon. The Nyborg Group was disembarked as planned.

(See also evening report from Group Baltic, radiogram file of 9 April, 1800.)

"Export" unit:

So far no ships have arrived at their ports of destination. Positions unknown. Motor vessel RODA sunk by a Norwegian torpedo boat.

1st Sea Transport Unit:

Complete reports still outstanding. So far the steamer RIO DE JANEIRO of the Bergen Group has been lost. The steamer MARIE LEONHARD was stopped by a Norwegian torpedo boat. No report yet about the Oslo Group.

2nd Sea Transport Unit:

In the Great Belt on the evening of 9 April. Escort increased as planned. Scheduled to advance from Anholt close to the Swedish coast.

Air Situation:

See Air Force report on the day's events. (Radiogram file of 9 April, 2200.)

On the basis of reconnaissance and shadower reports, strong forces of the 30th and 26th Bomber Wings (Ju 88 and He 111) were sent out against forces of Commander in Chief, Home Fleet sighted. According to an Air Force report the following definite hits can be assumed:

1 battleship	3 x 500 kg.
1 battleship	3 x 250 kg.
1 battle cruiser	1 x 500 kg.

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1 heavy cruiser	1 x 250 kg.	
1 troopship	1 x 500 kg.	
1 troopship	1 x 50 kg.	
1 cruiser or) stopped, dense smoke, list
large destroyer	2 x 500 kg.)	
1 cruiser	1 x 500 kg.)	

In conclusion it can be stated: The passage of the naval forces into their target areas and the troop landing operations in Norwegian and Danish ports have succeeded in a bold break through the fortifications, thanks to the resolute action of the forces participating and favored by luck. Taking the enemy by surprise could not be guaranteed as the result of various advance warnings, in conjunction with a noticeable stiffening of Norway's attitude for some days. The losses which have been incurred, especially that of the newest heavy cruiser BLUECHER, are grievous; they are, however, in proportion to the risk run and anticipated and cannot be called excessively high.

The situation for the operations so far and for the most difficult part of the whole naval operation which is now beginning, the return passage, has been rendered much more difficult by the enemy's operations (minelaying in Norwegian waters and planned partial occupation of Norwegian bases) coinciding with the German operation. It must be concluded from the presence of enemy troopships with the battleship formation attacked by the Air Force that the enemy's preparations for a landing in Norway were already under way and that the enemy is resolved even now to land troops in Norway to combat the German occupation forces. A large number of strong and superior British and French naval forces is engaged in the northern North Sea up to the Lofotens and off all Norwegian ports in carrying out the enemy operations. Danger from the air in the occupied bases must be regarded as extremely high in view of weak anti-aircraft defenses and the enemy's probable use of aircraft-carriers. The great danger from submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak is acknowledged. It will render the task of protecting the transport and supply routes to Oslo extremely difficult.

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Naval Staff now regards the following assignments as urgent:

1. Break-through to home waters by the battleships and all operational forces in Norwegian ports as soon as possible.
2. Reinforcement of the Skagerrak mine barrage in order to protect the Skagerrak against enemy surface forces.
3. Concentration of submarine disposition off Narvik and Trondheim.
4. Submarine chase with all available means in the Kattegat and Skagerrak to protect the supply route to Oslo.
5. Protection of the sea transport units.
6. Request to the Fuehrer that supplies should be brought up via Swedish and Norwegian railroads, since they are impossible via the west Norwegian ports and naval supremacy in the Skagerrak and Kattegat cannot always be guaranteed owing to danger from enemy submarines.

Individual Items:

1. Disposition of submarines to protect the area off Oslo is examined and rejected, since operations by our submarines in an area where enemy submarines are suspected prevent any planned submarine chase.
2. The question as to whether it is necessary to free Commanding Admiral, Fleet from obligation regarding the destroyers, which will not be ready to sail until tomorrow, and to advise him to have the battleships return as soon as possible is decided in the negative. After consultation with Group West there is no doubt - because of the exhaustive discussions which took place before the operation - that Commanding Admiral, Fleet, who is in receipt of all information about our own and enemy forces, will take the right action in accordance with the situation.
3. The request of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast to leave the cruisers already in Bergen there, with regard to the

still uncertain land situation, is refused. The damaged KOENIGSBERG must of necessity remain in Bergen for the present. The KOELN, however, must return home as soon as possible.

4. The appearance of the French minelaying cruiser EMILE BERTIN and other French vessels makes it necessary to devote increased attention to danger from mines in the North Sea. The importance of the minelaying cruiser is specially pointed out to the Air Force.

5. According to Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark, the first discussions with the Danish Navy progressed very satisfactorily.

Result:

- a) The German Navy takes over patrol also on the north side of the Belt mine barrages. Technical maintenance of the barrages is still a Danish task.

Naval Staff is expected to issue instructions later about laying deep barrages in the barrage gaps.

- b) The Danish barrages remain switched on.
- c) Danish naval vessels are withdrawn from the neutrality patrol, inclusive of the west coast of Jutland. German naval forces take over the assignment.

The Danish Government will presumably publish a demobilization law. The Danish Navy intends to send most of its personnel home. Consent is given to this.

Most Danish warships will be moved to the Arsenal in Copenhagen for this purpose.

- d) Dimming lights as a part of the total blackout ordered has not been carried out yet. The Danes have been requested to submit a plan for switching off the lights by areas.

- e) The Danes have made the following urgent requests:
1. Resumption of traffic with Bornholm. (Granted).
 2. Permission for Danish packet steamers to proceed between Copenhagen and Aarhus. (Granted).
 3. Permission for fishing vessels to put out. (Granted with limitations.)
-

Submarine Situation

Submarines in position for "Weseruebung". The boats in the Shetlands Passage and off Pentland Firth have been ordered into attack groups in the vicinity of the positions of the heavy enemy forces reported several times.

Merchant Shipping

Losses:

The motor vessel SEATTLE was set on fire and destroyed by our own bombs while breaking down resistance in Kristiansand. The following Information Report No. 109/40 has been sent to all representatives abroad concerned, except in Russia, Japan, U.S.A. and Italy, for immediate transmission to all merchantmen:

1. Danger of enemy attacking German ships in neutral ports.
2. Be prepared for destruction.
3. Be ready to sail on call.

Signed Navy.

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

Political situation in Oslo still obscure. Quisling Government has no response from the Norwegian people. The old Government has not resigned. Hamar, seat of the fleeing Government, occupied by German troops. Further flight by the Government. Discussion between the King of Norway and German Ambassador Brauer fruitless. King not prepared to yield. Nyggardsvold, the head of the Government, declared before the Storting that Norway is resolved to continue the struggle for her integrity. Hambro, the President of the Storting, gave a speech over the radio in Sweden, calling for action, and is recruiting volunteers.

The Norwegian people's resistance has been stiffened by British propaganda and assurances. Young men fit for military service are apparently prepared to offer the most stubborn resistance and to commence sniping activities. The population is everywhere passive, negative.

Denmark:

No resistance, effort to comprehend the German action. Statement by Prime Minister Stauning

"The King and his Ministers have resolved, relying on Germany's assurance that she does not plan to infringe Denmark's integrity and political independence by the steps taken, to attempt to order conditions and the occupation. This course has been selected in order to spare land and people the consequences of war."

Survey of the SituationSpecial reports on the EnemyAtlantic:

The Naval Attaché reports on a communication from the

Japanese Admiralty that British naval forces from Hongkong and Singapore appear to be concentrating in the Dutch East Indies.

France:

The priority radio traffic, mostly concerning orders to return etc., continues. A fairly large vessel, probably a cruiser, is to be escorted from an African port to Brest by a large destroyer.

In the Mediterranean an unidentified vessel was hastily sent out on guard duty in the Strait of Bonifacio. Twelve planes took off from Berre (Rhône) for Mentone (Riviera); further transfer to Corsica is possible.

It is not out of the question that Italy's present attitude is occasioning doubts and making security measures by Franco-British forces necessary.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

During the day very little could be ascertained about the exact enemy situation.

The battle cruiser REPULSE and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla are suspected to be in the Lofoten area and the battle cruiser RENOWN on her way there.

The southern Task Force reported several times yesterday between the Shetlands and Norway was not intercepted again today. It remains to be seen whether the heavy ships moved off westward or northwestward as the result of hits in yesterday's bombing attacks. It was not until the late afternoon, at 1700, that a battleship with two heavy and two light cruisers was sighted east of Fair Passage on southwesterly course. Radio intelligence intercepted the arrival reports of the cruisers MANCHESTER, SOUTHAMPTON and GLASGOW in Scapa. The cruisers are possibly putting in to refuel, if damage from yesterday's air attacks does not render any repairs necessary. Damage to the SOUTHAMPTON and GLASGOW can be assumed according to the Radio Monitoring Service. The cruiser BIRMINGHAM was north of the Orkneys in the afternoon.

The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and one heavy cruiser participated in the destroyer actions with German forces of Commander, Destroyers in West Fjord. The Admiralty reported the sinking of the destroyers HARDY and HUNTER, also severe damage to the HOTSPUR and another destroyer. At noon the

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RENOWN was in radio communication with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla. The aircraft-carrier FURIOUS is still at sea. The dive-bombers which successfully attacked the forces lying in Bergen at 0800 probably took off from her. Only destroyers on westerly courses were reported in the Shetlands Passage during the forenoon.

Very great danger from submarines is still to be reckoned with in the Skagerrak and Kattegat.

Own Situation

Norway:

Military situation outwardly quiet on the west coast. The mobilization ordered by the old Government is arousing resistance.

Railroad communications to Bergen and Trondheim destroyed, telephone lines interrupted. Norwegian naval forces hostile and prepared for actions. Groups and Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore ordered to destroy Norwegian forces not in our hands or laid up in port. Further, it is pointed out to Commanding Admiral, Norway (Admiral Boehm) that it is urgently necessary for the new Government at once to recall the Norwegian forces at sea. Appropriate safety measures in view of our submarine positions are to be arranged with the Norwegian Government.

The directive is issued - because of an inquiry from the Group - that all captured Norwegian naval vessels are to be commissioned with German crews.

Situation in Narvik:

At 0651 a corrupt "Most Immediate" radio message in clear was received from Narvik about an attack made by British destroyers on Narvik.

Later reports, still incomplete at first, show that in the early hours of the morning, in fog and drifting snow, enemy destroyers protected by a heavy cruiser carried out a surprise

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attack on our destroyers lying in Narvik. The attack was warded off; three enemy destroyers were sunk or destroyed (HUNTER, HARDY, HOTSPUR).

Our losses the HEIDKAMP and SCHMITT. Commander, Destroyers, Commodore Bonte, was killed. The ROEDER sustained severe damage, LUEDEMANN, KUENNE and THIELE are able to proceed with limitations, the ARNIM has slight breakdowns. Return passage for the ZENKER, GIESE, KOELLNER and ARNIM appears possible.

Enemy destroyers withdrew after heavy losses. Narvik is firmly in our hands.

As a result of damage sustained during the British attack and difficulties in oiling, only the destroyers GIESE and ZENKER are completely ready to proceed and put out.

Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla attempted to put to sea during the night of 10 April, but had to turn back since the five destroyers reported by U "51" in Brenes Fjord, reinforced by cruisers in the rear, are watching the fjord entrance and a break-through appeared hopeless because of the bright night.

Situation in Trondheim:

Military situation outwardly quiet. Every aspect of the supply question difficult. Transport by rail from Oslo not possible. Fuel situation critical for the 1st Naval Air Squadron of the 506th Group. Seaward defense by coastal guns not yet settled. Port Commander therefore requests reinforcement of the submarine disposition off Trondheim. Airfield still unserviceable as the result of icing.

The cruiser HIPPER and the destroyer ECKHOLDT are in readiness to sail. The RIEDEL is not ready to proceed and is being used as a barrage battery. The HIPPER sailed in the evening; the ECKHOLDT had to turn about for an unknown cause.

Assessment and Steps taken:

We owe it to the strong defensive action of the Narvik destroyers, which obviously used all their resources and whose regrettable losses can probably be ascribed to the enemy's taking them by surprise in bad visibility, that an enemy landing in Narvik could be repulsed with very heavy losses to him. The death of Commodore Bonte, who had always

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proved himself an excellent Commander, and especially so as Commander, Destroyers, is a heavy loss for Naval Staff and the entire Navy, especially the destroyers.

The destroyer attack on Narvik confirms what dangers are entailed for our forces detained in the ports because of delayed refuelling or waiting for the arrival of tankers. The order is therefore issued to all forces lying in readiness to proceed in Narvik, Trondheim and Bergen to commence return passage as soon as possible and regardless of vessels remaining behind. If necessary they may call at intermediate ports. The Narvik destroyers under Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla are, as per operational order, to join the fleet which is presumed to be west of the Lofotens (radio silence being maintained).

Independent return passage is left to the discretion of the cruiser HIPPER with her force.

The situation of the destroyers in Narvik is judged to be very serious in view of further expected attacks by superior forces. It is to be hoped that the break-through from Narvik with the destroyers which are ready to proceed will take place as soon as possible. Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla is undoubtedly endeavoring to carry this out with all the means in his power.

Further speedy protection of important positions in Narvik and Trondheim is necessary. An attempt must be made to relieve the destroyers. Naval Staff has therefore ordered Commanding Admiral, Submarines to reinforce the submarine disposition off these ports and to increase the number of large boats off Narvik to 8, off Trondheim to 4. The boats may be expected to arrive in 2-3 days.

Since the steamers of the "export" unit have not arrived in Narvik and Trondheim, the troops landed are facing a very difficult situation as regards equipment with guns and supplies of ammunition. The Fuehrer has therefore ordered investigation into the possibility of supplies by submarines, in addition to the immediate supply service by the Air Force.

The result of the investigation is:

The following will be ready to carry out this assignment within a short period:

- U "43" from the evening of 11 April,
- U "26" on 13 April,
- U "29" on 15 April.

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The weight of the supplies is allowed for by the boats only carrying the torpedoes in the tubes. They can then carry:

U "43"	18-20 tons
U "26"	12 tons
U "29"	9 tons.

Naval Staff has sent a directive to this effect to Group 21, Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group West.

The question of the use of the large boats U "A", U "101", U "122", which will be ready for operations in the immediate future and the possibility of converting the boats suitable for transport ("103", "104", "105", "106", "123", "124") to carry mixed cargoes and aviation gasoline is under review.

Naval Staff also proposed to Armed Forces High Command and Commander in Chief, Air Force the immediate use of a Zeppelin, as a further means of supply. Investigation revealed, however, that the Zeppelin is not in readiness.

Because of the importance of air transports, the Trondheim Group has been ordered to make ready the airfield with all available means.

Commanding Admiral, Fleet has reported position west of 6° E north of 68° N; he plans to break through near the Shetlands from the northwest and requests that the HIPPER may operate to the east. Heavy guns will be ready for action again on 11 April, except for "A" turret on the GNEISENAU.

Commanding Admiral, Fleet's plans are approved. The speedy return of the ships is desirable. Operations against light enemy forces in order to gain tactical and strategic successes are not possible as the enemy situation at present shows no chances of operations against such enemy forces. The question of battleship operations in West Fjord in order to bring the destroyers out of Narvik is rejected, since such an operation offers no prospects of success in view of the presence of superior enemy forces, including the aircraft carrier, and in view of the danger from submarines and torpedoes in the fjords;

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jeopardizing the battleships without prospects of strategic success is not justified.

The maintenance of the battleships is of the greatest strategic importance just now.

Situation in Bergen:

Bergen firmly in our hands. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports the laying of the planned mine barrages in both entrances to Bergen. Dive-bomber attack by enemy planes at 0800. The cruiser KOENIGSBERG was set on fire by two bombs and had to be abandoned. Ship capsized at 1100. Crew incorporated in coastal defense.

Urgent need for supplies of anti-aircraft guns and light anti-aircraft ammunition is reported. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has been given the assignment of seizing and reporting all oil stocks ashore and in tankers.

Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force is scheduled to sail tonight with the KOELN and two torpedo boats.

Situation in Stavanger:

Torpedo boat SKARV seized.

Stavanger airfield and seaplane base attacked by British bombers in the evening. No particular damage done.

Situation in Kristiansand:

The torpedoed cruiser KARLSRUHE could not be saved. The ship

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was sunk by torpedo on the night of 9 April. Nothing special to report in Kristiansand.

Two 21 cm, six 15 cm. guns ready for use with very simple fire control.

Situation in Oslo:

The island of Bolerne, which was still firing in the forenoon, fell into German hands in the afternoon. The last resistance in Oslo Fjord has thus been broken.

The LUETZOW and EMDEN put in to Oslo. The LUETZOW is to return to Kiel tonight to be made ready for operations in the Atlantic as soon as possible.

The torpedo boat ALBATROS ran aground at the entrance to Oslo Fjord and is probably lost.

Such losses must be expected in the waters off the Norwegian coast, to which we are unaccustomed and which are difficult to navigate.

Commanding Admiral, Norway, Admiral Boehm, flew to Oslo on the afternoon of 10 April, and took up his duties.

The 2nd Sea Transport Unit (troops and material) crossed to Oslo in convoy. In spite of strong submarine protection and air patrol the steamers FRIEDENAU, WIGBERT and patrol boat "1507" were torpedoed west of Gothenburg. Casualties appear to be high.

The steamer ANTARES of the 1st Sea Transport Unit was torpedoed (west of Uddevalla Fjord).

Unsuccessful submarine chase.

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It is necessary to concentrate anti-submarine defenses in the Kattegat and eastern Skagerrak because of the acute submarine situation in these areas. At the request of Group Baltic, the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla and Ships "35", "40", "37", "26" and "47" have been placed at its disposal. Group West is at present considering the transfer of a further submarine chaser flotilla.

Denmark:

Nothing special to report in Denmark. (Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark, Vice Admiral Mewis, in Copenhagen.) Occupation proceeds according to plan. Good understanding with Danish authorities.

According to the order of Armed Forces High Command (Operations Division), command of the forces of Staff, 31st Special Duties Corps (General Kaupisch) operating in Denmark will pass to Commander in Chief, Army on conclusion of military operations in Denmark. The 21st Group, Oslo will remain directly subordinate to Armed Forces High Command.

Staff, 31st Special Duties Corps will remain in Denmark. The Commanding Officer is the Commander and representative of the German Armed Forces in Denmark. He is authorized to issue orders to all German forces in Denmark in order to avert dangers.

Great Belt:

We have occupied the control positions of the Danish mine barrages in the Great Belt.

Bornholm:

The HANSESTADT DANZIG landed a battalion at Roenne on Bornholm in the afternoon.

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(See also situation report of Group Baltic, radiogram file 1945.)

Air Situation:

See Air Force report on day's events.

Air Force Operations Staff asked Naval Staff in the evening whether, on the basis of the survey of the situation in Narvik, a fresh British attack there to wipe out the destroyers and capture the town is considered probable, so that all-out use of a bomber group on 11 April appears to be justified. (Planes would land at Narvik after the attack but could not fly back because of fuel shortage.)

Naval Staff considers a British attempt to force Narvik early on the morning of 11 April possible, perhaps even probable. All-out use of a whole bomber group to attack, however, appears too much to Naval Staff.

A bomber squadron is considered sufficient to repulse such an attack.

Naval Staff, however, considers the use of a few long-range bombers (5-6), which can return, to be a better solution.

Air Force General Staff (Naval Liaison Officer) was informed to this effect by telephone.

Naval Staff, in agreement with Commander in Chief, Air Force, has issued regulations to prevent losses to ourselves caused by our own actions. (See War Diary, Part B, Vol. V, page 131.)

Submarine Situation

Nothing special to report.

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Disposition as per operational order "Hartmuth". At 0800 a directive was sent to Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group West based on the survey of the situation in Trondheim:

"Increase number of submarines off Trondheim to 4."

The order was amplified later by the following:

"Increase number of large submarines off Narvik to 8, off Trondheim to 4, at once because of the decisive importance of these two ports for the whole operation."

Commanding Admiral, Submarines has dispersed Submarine Group V north of the Shetlands and assigned the boats as follows:

To Narvik: U "47", "48", "49", "38".
To Trondheim: U "50", "52".

Merchant Shipping

Own Shipping:

Stavanger Sea Transport Unit (3 steamers) put in; Kristiansand Unit (3 steamers) put in; steamer KRETA still missing. No news to date from Bergen.

Armed Forces High Command orders with reference to the "export" units:

1. Transport steamers which have passed Bergen to the north are to proceed to Trondheim for unloading.
2. If Trondheim has been passed to the north, let them proceed.
3. Transport steamers in Bergen or south of it to unload at the nearest port, regardless of destination of cargo.

Losses:

The steamer RODA of the "export" unit was sunk off Stavanger

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by a Norwegian torpedo boat. According to a statement by Chamberlain, the steamer RAUENFELS and five other German merchant steamers were sunk in West Fjord during the attack on Narvik.

Foreign Merchant Shipping:

With reference to a radio monitoring report that the British Commanding Admiral, Mediterranean has instructed all Danish and Norwegian ships in his area to put into British Mediterranean ports, since the ships are under British protection, the Foreign Office was requested to have the Norwegian and Danish Governments issue counter-orders. The Foreign Office then made arrangements in Copenhagen and Oslo for Norwegian and Danish ships to receive instructions through the radio to put in to neutral ports in the Mediterranean, preferably Spanish or Italian ones, or to endeavor, as the situation permits, otherwise to escape seizure by the British and to return home. Simultaneously the Embassies in Rome and Madrid were instructed to endeavor - by means of our Consulates and by pressure on Norwegian and Danish Consulates - to hold Norwegian and Danish ships which may be in ports there for the present. The Italian and Spanish Governments are to be informed of these measures. A communication has also been sent to the Ministry of Propaganda to be broadcast by the German foreign radio service.

At noon on 10 April Commander in Chief, Navy was in the Chancellery to report to the Fuehrer. Conference on the situation.

(For memorandum of Commander in Chief, Navy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.)

Items of Political Importance

1. Norway:

Still difficult to assess the political situation. The King firmly rejects the new Quisling Government. General impression: population indifferent around Oslo, resolved to resist in the interior because of orders from the old Government and propaganda calling for action.

Foreign Minister Koht declared:

"We are at war with Germany and consequently allied to all countries which are at war with Germany."

2. Denmark:

Situation continues quiet. An audience granted by the King to the Ambassador and military leaders has confirmed the impression that the King and Government are striving to stress their wish for friendly and correct relations.

3. Lord Halifax states that any readiness by Norway to negotiate with Germany would have no effect on the Allies' decision to oppose the German penetration into Norway. Great Britain could not possibly suffer an extension of the German strategic position into the North Sea and Atlantic.

4. Sweden:

Is resolved to maintain her neutrality and is determined to keep out of the conflict.

5. Russia, Italy, Spain and Finland declare their attitude of strict neutrality towards the German advance against Norway and Denmark.

6. Roosevelt has issued a proclamation forbidding U.S. ships to enter all Scandinavian waters. The war zone laid down in the Neutrality Law is extended by the decree. According to it, U.S. ships may not traverse Scandinavian territorial waters from Bergen along the west coast of Norway up to the point 44° E, 77° N. Archangel and Murmansk are also included in this zone.

(For individual reports on Norway and speeches by Churchill and Reynaud on 11 April, see Foreign Press and Political Review.)

Survey of the Situation

Political and military situation in Norway still unchanged. Our forces are assembling for action against Norwegian troops. Supply situation very strained, especially for the equipping of air bases. No enemy troops have landed in Norway so far, but landings are assumed to be imminent.

(See situation report, 21st Group of 11 April. Radiogram file 2225.)

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

Disposition of forces: Aircraft carriers GLORIOUS and ARK ROYAL,

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also 1 "C" class cruiser and 2 destroyers, left Alexandria on 9 April, in all probability to proceed to home waters.

The RESOLUTION has been detected in the area to the west of the Channel, the REVENGE and DISPATCH in the Canada area. The HAWKINS is in Montevideo, the HERMES in the Freetown area, the RAMILLIES still in Australia.

France:

Hasty assembly of naval forces in Brest continues. Three large vessels (cruisers or old battleships) from Toulon to Casablanca on 11 April. The battleship formation DUNKERQUE, STRASSBOURG proceeding into the North Sea? (See below).

North Sea/Northern Waters:

During the course of the day, U "48" several times reported an enemy task force west of Trondheim, consisting of 3 battleships, several heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 5 destroyers. At 2200 U "48" reported a heavy cruiser out of control for some time 60 miles northwest of Trondheim Fjord. This could be the cruiser reported by the Air Force as twice hit with 50 kg. bombs.

Radio intelligence detects at sea Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, Commanders, Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, also the 3rd, 4th and 6th Destroyer Flotillas.

The presence of the aircraft carrier FURIOUS with the main force led by Commander in Chief, Home Fleet west and northwest of Trondheim was confirmed by our air report and by the Radio Monitoring Service. Planes attacked Trondheim harbor during the morning.

The former Polish steamers CHOERI (11,500 tons) and BATORY (14,500 tons), now being used as troopships, have arrived in Scapa.

An agent's report from Intelligence Center, Belgium, states that there was a French squadron consisting of the battleships STRASSBOURG and DUNKERQUE and the aircraft carrier BEARN, escorted by two destroyer flotillas and one submarine flotilla (DAUPHIN class), in the entrance to the Channel early on 10 April en route for the North Sea. Time and position are considered improbable according to our radio monitoring. In spite of this, the presence of the French forces in the North Sea or northern waters must be reckoned with.

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Radio intelligence intercepted a British radio message from which it appears that an operation against the Norwegian coast between 58° and 59° (area Lindesnes to Skudesnes Fjord) is planned on 12 April, probably in the afternoon because of the weather.

All offices concerned have been informed.

A landing at the points indicated is not considered probable. In Naval Staff's opinion, this is probably a minelaying operation off the south coast of Norway or a large air raid on Stavanger/Bergen.

Survey of our own Situation

Battleships and HIPPER:

The HIPPER sailed from Trondheim during the night of 10 April. Movements so far as planned. No reports. Forces should be roughly off Egersund tomorrow morning.

Situation in Narvik:

Four destroyers are in complete readiness to proceed, 3 in limited readiness. The DIETER von ROEDER is not ready. (ROEDER's radio station has been set up ashore as Narvik Naval Radio Station, guns are being dismantled for use as a barrage battery.) Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla reports that he does not consider a break-through out of West Fjord possible as long as there are superior enemy light forces (cruisers and destroyers) lying in West Fjord. He considers return passage close to the coast to be unfavorable because of the joint British and Norwegian patrol activity.

The tanker KATTEGAT was destroyed in Ofot Fjord by British forces. Torpedoes were fired on two British destroyers by U "25" near Baroy. Effect not observed.

Further steps taken on land to protect Narvik.

Elvenes on Gratanger Fjord was occupied. The greater part of the population has left Narvik. Business is at a standstill.

Narvik's primary requirements from Germany are supplies of heavy armament (mountain guns, machine-guns, mortars) and ammunition. Armed Forces High Command and Commander in Chief, Air Force have issued orders accordingly.

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Long-range reconnaissance planes, type Do 26, are to operate as transport planes for all goods which cannot be dropped. They are therefore not available for long-range sea reconnaissance.

Situation in Trondheim:

Attacked in the morning by land planes (aircraft carrier) with bombs and torpedoes. No success. Scouting raid by British destroyers repulsed by Hysnes Battery.

British landing suspected south of Storfosna and in Namsos Fjord. Air reconnaissance is planned. The sighting report on the British battleship and cruiser formation west and northwest of Trondheim assumes greater importance in connection with possible British plans for a landing.

Situation in Bergen:

Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force, sailed from Bergen on the evening of 10 April with the KOELN, LEOPARD and WOLF.

Situation otherwise unchanged. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast, reports that the British dive-bombers carrying out the air raids on 10 April had German markings.

The railroad line from Bergen to Voss and trunk cable connections have been destroyed.

The Norwegian torpedo boat BRAND was commissioned.

Group West requests the destruction of Aalesund radio transmitter as it is in constant radio communication with Wick radio.

Situation in Kristiansand:

Unchanged; two Norwegian submarines seized.

Situation in Oslo:

Unchanged. The King declines to give the German Ambassador another audience. No success yet in arresting the former Government. Lines of communication and railroad lines in the hinterland interrupted.

Oslo troops further reinforced with two battalions by air and by the main body of the 2nd Sea Transport Unit, 10 steamers of

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which arrived in Oslo in the forenoon. Two steamers (FRIEDENAU and WIGBERT) were torpedoed and lost. The steamer IONIA (1st Sea Transport Unit) carrying horses and ammunition was torpedoed off Oslo Fjord. Attempts are being made to tow her in.

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, has put submarine-chasers into action to combat the great danger from submarines in the entrance to Oslo Fjord. At 1800 a submarine-chaser reported the alleged destruction by depth charges of a submarine at the southern entrance to Oslo Fjord. (No definite proof available.)

One Norwegian submarine seized in Horten.

The cruiser LUETZOW, which had been recalled from Oslo to be prepared for the Atlantic, was torpedoed and severely damaged east of Skagen during the night of 10 April. She is unable to move and is being picked up by forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and towed off by tugs.

The fact that the LUETZOW, although unable to move, did not receive a second torpedo hit, makes it possible that she struck a mine. Against this there is the fact that the ship was hit aft. (Later investigations detected no mines in the area in question.)

The torpedoing of the LUETZOW is the most severe loss the Navy could suffer at the present moment. The ship's elimination for some time results in the abandonment of pocket battleship warfare in the Atlantic at the very moment when a strong diversion would have been most useful. The ship's incorporation in "Weseruebung" and her despatch to Oslo have therefore turned out to be definite strategic errors. Naval Staff feels this all the more because it always recognized the despatch of the pocket battleship to the Atlantic as a strategic necessity and indicated it as such. The original plan of sending the ship into the Atlantic from Trondheim after executing her transport assignment could not be carried out since at the last moment she was reported not to be ready for the Atlantic because of trouble with her auxiliary engines. Armed Forces High Command's request that the troops already en route be brought to Oslo had to be fulfilled by Naval Staff, although with great misgivings. The fulfillment of this demand has proved a mistake strategically, from the point of view of naval warfare. It must be admitted, with regard to the execution of the Norwegian operation, that the presence of the troops embarked on the LUETZOW was of the greatest value for the Oslo operation in view of the BLUECHER's breakdown.

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It can be stated in retrospect that both the use of the LUETZOW and of the latest cruiser BLUECHER in Oslo have led to extremely severe losses in naval fighting strength. It might also have been possible to carry out the landing in Oslo with a large number of small vessels (torpedo boats, escort boats, etc.) without great losses. A very large number of such vessels would, however, have been necessary for the troops to be transported. In Naval Staff's opinion the incorporation of powerful ships in the Oslo operation can on no account be judged as an operational error. The use of heavy ships' guns was considered a basic requirement to break down resistance in Oslo and to cover the landing. Naval Staff also previously considered the use of the old battleships in Oslo. Apart from the fact that one of these ships was limited regarding maneuverability and ability to proceed and the other was operating on the Korsoer assignment, their fighting qualities as opposed to the coastal batteries were estimated as very slight. (Pencilled marginal note by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: But surely greater than BLUECHER and LUETZOW?) Finally, the question of the possibility of intimidation by a modern representative ship played a part in the decision to send the BLUECHER.

Losses had to be expected in any case. They had to be taken into account in the interests of the magnitude of the assignment to be carried out.

Special Questions

1. In order to increase the safety of troop transports to Norway and to avoid further losses of personnel, Group Baltic suggests that large torpedo boats make the crossing together with fast steamers. The boats are to act as anti-submarine protection for the fast steamers which, for their part, will only cross in favorable weather. It is proposed that these load in Hamburg as before. Group Baltic also considers mine-exploding vessels well suited for carrying out transport and requests an allocation.

Naval Staff has consented to the separate transportation of men and material. Because of the length of the route to be protected, Hamburg is considered unsuitable as a point of departure.

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The question of further transport has been thoroughly discussed with Armed Forces High Command, whose attention was drawn to the difficulties of protecting transports in view of the great danger from submarines and mines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak and to the necessity of transporting troops by air as far as possible. Armed Forces High Command is well aware of the difficulties but cannot forego speedy continuation of transports by sea in view of the urgency of carrying out transport assignments. Losses must be accepted.

The following is therefore ordered in agreement with Armed Forces High Command:

- a) Troops to be transported from Frederikshavn on fast naval vessels and small, fast ships (AHRENSBURG, ANGELBURG from the Submarine School, free minelayers).
- b) Material to be transported as before, plus additional ammunition, material and provisions from Skagen on drifters and fishing smacks.

The immediate seizure is ordered of such vessels in German and Danish ports.

The more the transports of material can be switched over to the greatest possible number of such vessels, the safer they will be.

The Fuehrer at present absolutely declines to carry out transport of troops by Swedish railroads, in order to place no burden on Sweden's neutrality. Only transports of clothing, provisions and medical supplies to Narvik come into question for the present.

(For Naval Staff's preliminary order see radiogram file of 11 April, 1800; for executive order of Group Baltic see under 2301.)

2. The Fuehrer's order, which was received in the evening, on the urgent assignments for the branches of the Armed Forces (see "Weseruebung" file) states, regarding the Navy:

- a) Most important task is protection of the Kattegat and Skagerrak against submarines.

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- b) Do 26's of the Navy are at once placed under the 10th Corps to carry supplies to Narvik.
- c) Narvik to be supplied by submarines.
- d) Transports of material via the Trelleborg-Sweden railroad to Narvik can be expected within a few days.
- e) Troops to cross from east Jutland to Oslo with light naval forces.
- f) Single guns etc., to be transported on trawlers and other small vessels to Oslo.

Groups receive this order with instruction to take the necessary steps, if necessary in agreement with Group 21.

3. Group Baltic has been ordered to carry out at once its proposed protection with nets of the southern outlet of the Flint Channel, including Danish territorial waters, up to the border of Swedish territorial waters. The Group is also to submit suggestions for the protection of the northern outlets of the Great Belt and the Sound north of the Nyborg-Korsoer and Helsingoer-Helsingborg ferries.

4. In view of the appearance of the battleships and the HIPPER in the Air Force operational area, the Fuehrer and Field Marshal are very anxious about the danger to our own ships during attacks by the 10th Air Corps on British naval forces. The attention of the Navy and Air Force is again particularly drawn to the question of identification and exchange of recognition signals.

Group West was instructed by telephone to ensure that the 10th Air Corps is clearly informed of the positions and movements of the battleships and the HIPPER. Ships are also to be familiar with German Air Force formations and the necessity is again to be pointed out to them that the markings ordered can be clearly made out and that recognition signals are also to be fired at latest with "Open fire" (if not definitely identified as enemy).

4. Stavanger area: U "1", "4".
5. Proceeding to the following positions:

U "59"	to	grid	square	7870
U "58"	"	"	"	7810
U "57"	"	"	"	7850
U "13"	"	"	"	7890
U "37"	"	"	"	7830
U "19"	"	"	"	7940
U "10"	"	"	"	7980
U "56"	"	"	"	7920

(Grid squares lie north to northeast of the Shetlands.)

6. Proceeding to the Skagerrak: U "5", "6" to position south of Lister, U "2" south of Lindesnes.

(For order to Narvik submarines see radiogram file 11 April, 2315.)

Special Reports from Submarines

U "25" reports two destroyers torpedoed in West Fjord near Baroy. Effect not observed. (May have been prematures).

At 1230, U "48" reported a spread of three which missed or failed on the cruiser CUMBERLAND; at 2115, a spread of three which missed and failed (through non-firing) on another cruiser.

U "51" had two misses, (one a safety range detonator) when firing on a large destroyer.

Merchant Shipping

The following have arrived in Bergen:

The steamer BAERENFELS of the "export" unit. (Was bound for Narvik.)

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The steamer MARIE LEONHARD of the 1st Sea Transport Unit.

The transport steamers for "Weseruebung" can now be reviewed as follows:

1. "Export" Unit:

Narvik: No steamers arrived. 2 steamers with material and 1 tanker lost, 1 steamer with material put in to Bergen.

Trondheim: No steamers arrived. 3 steamers and 1 tanker probably lost, 1 steamer still en route.

2. 1st Sea Transport Unit:

Bergen: 1 steamer lost, 1 arrived, 1 in Oslo.

Stavanger: All 3 steamers arrived.

Kristiansand: All 4 steamers arrived.

Oslo: 3 steamers and 1 Bergen steamer arrived, 2 lost.

3. 2nd Sea Transport Unit to Oslo:

9 steamers arrived, 2 lost.

(For particulars see review in reference file "Weseruebung".)

Items of Political Importance

Situation in Oslo not yet clarified. The Quisling Government is endeavoring to govern but probably cannot last since support from the people and Armed Forces is too slight. Position rendered very difficult by the first Government's continuous counter-orders and orders to resist.

For world opinion's reactions to the German offensive in Norway, see Political Review No. 84 and Foreign Press.

The German action has undoubtedly evoked the greatest consternation in Holland and Belgium, where anxiety about a German invasion has again come to the fore. In spite of this there is no inclination to accept the requests of the Western Powers to put themselves under their protection.

It is reported from the U.S.A. that the news of the German action was received calmly. Special importance was undoubtedly attached here to the fact that the British breach of neutrality by mine-laying in Norwegian waters preceded the German operation.

The publication of the German White Paper from the Polish documents is also contributing to lessen the Government's inclination to be biased against Germany. It is confirmed that the European situation cannot lead America to deviate from the maintenance of her neutrality.

In a broadcast speech the Swedish Foreign Minister emphasized that Sweden was still firmly resolved to pursue a course of strict neutrality. Demands from a belligerent to utilize Swedish territory for its operations would have to be refused. Extension of defensive readiness was necessary for the purpose of defending Swedish neutrality.

The Danish Government has granted Iceland complete independence for the duration of the present emergency. The Faroes have been occupied by Britain.

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Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

It has now been established that the WARSPITE was to proceed to the Mediterranean at the beginning of April as a reinforcement and was apparently on her way there, but was recalled again on 6 April. Priority radio traffic predominates in the Mediterranean and indicates that naval forces are being redeployed.

France:

The Attaché in Madrid states that according to a report from Intelligence Center, Spain, a French squadron of eight large ships passed Gibraltar westwards during the night of 11 April.

Increased patrol activity by light forces and patrol vessels in cooperation with planes was detected in the Dunkirk area.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

The area off the Norwegian coast as far as 60° N, 4° E and the entire Skagerrak and Kattegat are declared to be a mined area. A passage to Gothenburg has been left roughly in the middle of the channel.

Narvik area:

The blockade position off Narvik is being extended; searchlight barrages were reported at the entrance to West Fjord; the bringing up of supply ships (tankers) under destroyer escort was detected. The WARSPITE, REPULSE and one aircraft carrier, which sent her planes to attack Narvik, are obviously in the area off Narvik.

The vessels mentioned, plus a number of destroyers, were assembled into a Force "B" and sent to carry out an operation "Attack against defenses".

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According to a report intercepted by radio intelligence, the attack on Narvik will probably take place on the afternoon of 13 April.

Commander, 2nd Cruiser Squadron detailed two destroyers as escort for the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON, which is sailing from Scapa Flow at noon today for Vaags Fjord (north of Narvik).

This information, in conjunction with the sailing of the troopships BATORY and CHOBRI on 12 April from Scapa, indicates that troops will be landed in Vaags Fjord. According to a further report the landing is planned there for 15 April.

Trondheim area:

First British troops obviously landed in the neighborhood of Indre Follar (about 64° 50' N) in the afternoon. Commander, 1st Cruiser Squadron reported operation carried out and the suitability of Namsos and Mosjoen for further landings according to reconnaissance by one destroyer.

Stavanger-Bergen area:

A destroyer flotilla was given a minelaying assignment in the area of Skudesnes Fjord at about 59° N, 5° E. Execution not yet detected.

No fresh reports of the British battleship formation.

It follows from the steps so far taken by the enemy that he is at present ignoring ports occupied by us from the point of view of landings and is limiting himself to alternative points and accepting strategic disadvantages on land. From his almost undisturbed landing places the enemy obviously plans to out-flank the German strategically important points of Narvik and Trondheim and to attack them after preliminary raids by planes from the carrier. He plans to destroy in advance the naval forces still lying in the harbors. Troops are being carried on large, strongly escorted transports.

Simultaneously with the landing, the blockade of supply and approach routes for our naval forces will be commenced on a large scale by the combined Franco-British naval forces.

Own Situation

Battleships and HIPPER:

In the morning the returning ships were at approximately 59° N

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and from 0645-1040 were continually reported by British reconnaissance planes. Reports were passed on to nine British bomber squadrons, which were, however, unable to attack because of deterioration of visibility. The battleships and HIPPER put in to Wilhelmshaven in the evening.

For brief report from the forces see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V, page 132.

Situation in Narvik:

Three destroyers in complete readiness to proceed, two destroyers in limited readiness. The ZENKER and KOELLNER damaged through touching ground; the KOELLNER is to be used as a barrage battery. West Fjord is still blocked.

Situation on land unchanged. The ore railroad has been slightly disrupted by the Norwegians. The troops request infantry guns and mortars since they are opposing an enemy with artillery.

Some of the submarines off Narvik were assigned dispositions in Vaags Fjord in view of a possible enemy landing there. They received permission to attack all ships encountered.

Situation in Trondheim:

The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN are ready to proceed. The JACOBI and RIEDEL have damaged turbines. Questionable whether the RIEDEL can be repaired. Destroyers ready to proceed are to commence return passage from 13 April.

Blocking of the harbor entrance near Agdenes has been commenced. The Norwegian torpedo boat LAKS has been commissioned to guard the harbor entrance.

Vernes airfield is again serviceable because of the frosty weather. The steamer LEVANTE alone of the "export" unit put in to Trondheim on 12 April.

Situation in Bergen:

Further harbor barrages laid. Bergen coastal radio station put into service. Dive-bomber attack on Bergen in the afternoon. Result still unknown.

The absence of labor is causing great difficulty in unloading the transports lying in Bergen.

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Situation in Stavanger)
) Nothing special to report.
Situation in Kristiansand)

Situation in Oslo:

Nothing special to report. Coastal fortifications comprising Battery Rauoe (4 x 15cm.) and Battery Droebak (2 x 21 cm.) are ready for action. Horten dockyard still out of action. Oslo radio station working.

Anti-submarine patrol by motor minesweepers started in Oslo Fjord.

Transport situation:

Still great danger from submarines in the Kattegat, Skagerrak and Oslo Fjord, forcing the use of all available forces on defense assignments. No submarine-chase successes reported so far in spite of numerous depth charge attacks.

Losses by torpedoing:

Tanker MOONSUND sank. Ship "40" damaged. The steamer AUGUST LEONHARDT sank on 11 April while returning from Kristiansand. Crew saved.

Group Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic are making the necessary preparations for the planned transports of troops from Frederikshavn. At present transport is planned on old torpedo boats, motor minesweepers, escort boats, the SAAR and the steamers ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG. Group Baltic requests allocation of the small Norwegian torpedo boats (KJELL, LOM, HAUK, KVIK, BLINK, LYN) as the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla and requests the immediate seizure of Norwegian trawlers for a patrol flotilla. Group Baltic also requests immediate expansion of air defense. (See radiogram file, 1545.)

The cruiser LUETZOW, proceeding in tow through the Kattegat, was in the Great Belt on the morning of 13 April. She is being taken to Kiel.

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Conference on the situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the situation:

- a) Every endeavor must be made to have the destroyers return. The necessity for this is again pointed out to Group West by telephone.

(Group West issued the following order in the afternoon to the destroyer commanders in Narvik and Trondheim:

"Destroyers in complete readiness to proceed to utilize any favorable opportunity, especially misty nights. Sub-division the smallest unit. The NORDMARK and SKAGERRAK are at known positions".)

b) Battleships:

Chief, Naval Staff has issued an order that the operational readiness of the battleships is to be restored at top speed, since at present favorable possibilities for operation are foreseen from southern Norway to Stadtlandet. Operations Division is at once to consider operational use in view of the enemy situation.

2. Chief, Naval Staff has drawn attention to the necessity for altering and speeding-up the destroyer construction program in view of destroyer losses.

Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Naval Staff, Service Division are to undertake the necessary investigations.

3. Since the units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic are not sufficient to carry out their assignments, the Fuehrer is to be asked whether Danish naval vessels may be taken over and used by us to protect Danish neutrality.

4. Group Baltic has received instruction, based on the Fuehrer's order, immediately to render the cable from Marstrand to Great Britain unserviceable outside territorial waters by means of Special Group vessels. (Assignment will be carried out by Ships "26" and "37".)

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Situation in the Atlantic:

No reports from Ships "16" and "36". It is assumed that both auxiliary cruisers have succeeded in breaking through to the Atlantic.

The tanker WINNETOU sailed from Las Palmas on 10 April as supply ship for auxiliary cruisers.

Enemy forces were informed of the sailing by the French intelligence service, with an exact description of the ship.

The auxiliary cruisers and the tanker WINNETOU have been informed that Great Britain claims the protection of Danish and Norwegian shipping, probably also later of Swedish and Baltic shipping, so that camouflage as Scandinavians is therefore impracticable. The WINNETOU was also instructed to avoid any encounter with vessels so as not to be reported.

Submarine Situation

The disquieting fact of numerous torpedo failures in the past few days has caused Commanding Admiral, Submarines to issue the following order:

1. In zone zero and further north hold ready 3 torpedoes with switch-setting A, one torpedo with magnetic-firing setting.
2. Fire at ships only with setting A, depth - draught of target minus 2 m.
3. Always fire a double shot at destroyers at first setting A depth 3 m., then magnetic-firing setting, depth-draught plus 1 m. - interval if possible 8 seconds.

Based on its assessment of the enemy situation, Naval Staff has ordered Commanding Admiral, Submarines immediately to dispose one boat each:

1. In Namsen Fjord (railroad line Namsos - Trondheim).

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2. In Romsdals Fjord (railroad line Aandalsnes-Oslo) to prevent enemy landings.
 3. Number of boats according to the situation in Asta Fjord, north of Narvik, off Gratangen and Lavangen Fjord.
 4. Leave the Trondheim boats where they are.
-

Commanding Admiral, Submarines has disposed the boats as follows:

- U "52" Romsdals Fjord at 7° 20' E.
- U "65" Namsen Fjord at 11° 8' E.
- U "38" Vaags Fjord northeast of the island of Aakeroy.
- U "47" Vaags Fjord south of Kjoetta.
- U "49" Vaags Fjord northeast of the island of Sandsoey.

Boats in Vaags Fjord are ordered to make quite sure that their appearance is a surprise. Attack only warships, transports and supply ships.

U "64" reports putting in to Narvik and on the situation in West Fjord. (See radiogram file, 2000.)

Merchant Shipping

Commanding Admiral, Norway has received orders to take over and prepare for speedy departure all ships in Oslo suitable for purposes of transport. High Command, Navy will also charter suitable shipping in Copenhagen and other Danish ports.

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The following directives regarding neutral merchant shipping are issued:

Offices are directed to prevent neutral shipping leaving German waters (i.e. east of the Skagerrak barrage and ports in the Heligoland Bight). Excepted are the U.S.A., Japan, Italy, Russia and Spain.

Danish shipping east of this limit, i.e. inner Danish traffic with German ports and other Baltic States, is permitted. (Group Baltic orders, in agreement with Naval Staff, that Danish ships may only leave German Baltic ports if their destination lies south of the line Aarhus Bay-Sletterhage-Hesseloe-Kullen. They may call at Aarhus.)

Permission for out-bound Swedish ships to use the shipping channel left by Great Britain for Swedish shipping in the Skagerrak inside the new British declared area will not be given until it is established that the British will also permit Swedish ships from overseas to go in to Sweden by this route.

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Items of Political Importance

Norway:

Political situation unchanged. It can be stated that the manner in which the new political order in Oslo has been handled diplomatically and the early proclamation of the Quisling Government have made the situation very much more difficult. Quisling is regarded as the leader of the Norwegian Fascists. His appeal to the people to cease all resistance against the German troops and not to follow the instructions of the old Nygaardsvold Government is so far finding very little response. Hopes set on Quisling and his influence in Norway, based on his own statements in the conferences with Commander in Chief, Navy, (see memoranda, Commander in Chief, Navy, War Diary, Part C, VII) have so far not been fulfilled. It cannot yet be seen how far this can be ascribed to the unfavorable development of political conditions in Oslo, to a lack of skill by our diplomatic and military offices in Norway or to Quisling's unsuitability.

(See Foreign Press for message from King George VI to King Haakon of Norway.)

The Dutch Government has issued a statement in which it repudiates expectations expressed abroad that Holland would be ready to enter into agreements with the Western Powers about possible assistance in the event of a German attack, and describes them as completely unfounded.

Sweden:

The Embassy in Stockholm reports:

Military Attaches report that Sweden has ordered no mobilization measures or strategic concentrations. Military measures in progress are to increase air and coastal defense, defensive readiness of present fortifications, safety of

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bridges and other installations. The Attachés are convinced that Sweden will try to keep out of the Norwegian conflict. Vigorous armed defense against any violation of neutrality from either side must be expected.

(For British radio propaganda calling for the organization of Norwegian resistance see radiogram file of 13 April, 2330.)

Survey of the Situation

Situation on land assured in southern Norway. Sea transport and supply situation not yet certain in view of great danger from submarines and insufficient number of efficient locating vessels. Trondheim-Narvik area threatened with imminent large-scale enemy landings. Skagerrak mine barrage reinforced. Situation in Denmark still calm and quite secure.

Particulars

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

The Naval Attaché reports: During the visit of the cruiser HAWKINS to Montevideo it was ascertained that the British South Atlantic Squadron at present consists of the HAWKINS, FROBISHER, DORSETSHIRE, CUMBERLAND and two "D" class. Contrary to details known to us, the HAWKINS is armed with 20.3 cm. guns.

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France:

Intelligence Center, Belgium learns from a trusty agent: The 1st French Squadron consisting of the 3rd Light Cruiser Division, the 5th and 7th Destroyer Divisions, the 3rd Torpedo Boat Division, 7 submarines, the carrier TESTE or BEARN and 4 troopships with parts of two infantry regiments (65th and 137th Infantry Regiments) and two artillery regiments (35th and 355th Artillery Regiments) sailed from Brest during the night of 11 April. Further troopships and destroyers are said to have left Cherbourg and Dunkirk on the same day.

Confirmation of these statements is impossible. Naval Staff, however, expects operations in the Allied Norwegian campaign by a strong battleship and transport formation.

Intelligence Center, Spain reports convoy movements near Gibraltar and San Sebastian.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Narvik area:

The attack on Narvik, detected beforehand by radio intelligence, took place at 1300. According to radio monitoring, Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron is in command aboard the REPULSE.

Forces have been assembled into "Force B" and consist of: the FURIOUS, WARSPITE, PENELOPE and nine destroyers of the 3rd and 6th Destroyer Flotillas (including the COSSACK, BEDOUIN, PUNJABI, FOXHOUND, FORESTER, HERO). Minesweeping gear will be used when putting into Narvik.

British reports in the evening mention the destruction of all German destroyers in Ofot Fjord, off Narvik and in Rombakken Fjord; 3 British destroyers are said to be damaged.

Trondheim area:

A Swedish report mentions the appearance of British destroyers in Folda Fjord north of Trondheim.

Increased enemy activity is to be seen in Romsdals Fjord south of Trondheim. In the afternoon a plane west of Aandalsnes reported off Romsdals Fjord 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer flotilla and probably 1 battleship standing on and off on varying courses. Evening reconnaissance revealed 7 British destroyers in Romsdals Fjord, one of them at Andalsnes quay.

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Scapa area:

The netlayer PROTECTOR, two Polish troopships and escort destroyers have sailed from Scapa.

Cooperation between the Norwegian radio stations at Aalesund and the enemy coastal radio station Wick Radio was again detected several times.

The enemy situation now shows clearly the three directions of thrust by the enemy:

Narvik - Folda Fjord (Namsos) -
Romsdals Fjord (Andalsnes),

of which the enemy's landing north and south of Trondheim must be regarded as specially dangerous from a strategic point of view, since we have still only a small number of troops in Trondheim and reinforcements and supplies can only be brought by air, as long as the Oslo-Dombas-Trondheim railroad is not in German hands. Since we do not possess naval supremacy in the whole area off the west coast of Norway, the landings by the Western Powers can be made without any interference from German surface forces.

Since also the enemy's landing places are not occupied by German troops, defense against attempts to land rests alone on the shoulders of the submarines and the Air Force. Submarine torpedoes, however, have so far not come up to expectation because of technical failures. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff is therefore doing its utmost to move Air Force bomber formations, fuel and bombs to the air bases available in Norway and to ensure supplies by air for them. Bad weather, unfavorable airfield conditions, lack of anti-aircraft defense and the extraordinary difficulties in supply resulting from the lack of any railroad and sea communications are delaying operations by the offensive Air Force and creating fighting conditions which can only be overcome by the greatest exertion on the part of all forces, by strain on personnel and material to the limits of their capacity and by strict organization.

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Own Situation

Battleships and HIPPER:

Wilhelmshaven dockyard reports the result of the investigations into the damage suffered by the ships. (See radiogram file of 13 April, 1625.) The battleships will be ready for operations again in a short time; the HIPPER has a 40 m.-long crack on the starboard bow caused by ramming the British destroyer GLOWWORM. Repairs necessary; will probably last three weeks.

The complete occupation of Norway and the holding of the area gained against enemy attacks still requires operations by the entire Navy. The situation in the Norwegian theater cannot yet be regarded as safe. It may therefore be necessary at any time for the heavy ships to go into action at short notice in order to weaken enemy pressure from the sea.

Naval Staff has therefore directed that the battleships are to be repaired with the greatest possible speed without total interruption of war readiness and are to be kept at 12 hours' notice. Naval Staff considers speedy use of the battleships as a most urgent operational necessity.

(For brief reports from Commanding Admiral, Fleet and Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force, see radiogram file of 13 April, 1750 and 2330.)

With regard to the proposed new operations by the battleships, the supply ship NORDMARK has been ordered to remain at the ordered position line in northern waters. The tanker SKAGERAK is still at a position line 200 miles westnorthwest of Trondheim as a fuel reserve for destroyers.

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Situation in Narvik:

Narvik, Elvegaardsmoen, Elvenes (on Gratangen Fjord) occupied by the German division. Norwegians bar the way east of Elvenes. The ore railroad between Hundalen and the Swedish frontier has been interrupted by Norwegians.

Message from the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander to the Narvik Group, Major General Dietl, in the forenoon:

"Defend the Narvik area against attack under all circumstances. Ensure landing facilities on the Hartvig See. Aid the Air Force, weather permitting. If necessary effectively destroy the ore railroad in the mountains."

Adolf Hitler.

An advance to Narvik, planned and under way by 22 bombers of the 10th Air Division (26th Bomber Wing) under Colonel Fuchs, unfortunately had to be broken off because of the weather. One FW 200 long-range reconnaissance plane succeeded in penetrating as far as Narvik and dropped supplies just at the commencement of the British attack there.

Reports received in the evening provide the following picture of the British large-scale attack, about the proposed execution of which it was possible to inform the Narvik Group in good time owing to the results of radio intelligence:

About noon nine British destroyers and one heavy ship (WARSPITE?) penetrated in to Ofot and Rombaken Fjords. Heavy destroyer engagement, the enemy using all his forces, until the destroyers - defending themselves and attacking to the last - were put out of action. Simultaneously air raids by carrier-borne planes from the aircraft carrier lying off West Fjord.

Enemy landing was prevented. The destroyer COSSACK was set on fire and beached. The destroyer ESKIMO severely damaged (forecastle torn off as far as the second gun by a torpedo), one other destroyer damaged. Details of our losses not yet known. The destroyer GIESE aground off Narvik. Commander requests she may be sunk by bombs or torpedo. According to available reports we must, however, expect the loss of all the destroyers still lying in Narvik. U "64" was sunk in Herjaenger Fjord by bombs. All the crew but eight ashore in Narvik. The JAN WELLEM scuttled herself in harbor; not yet reported whether cargo was saved or is still accessible. (At 2000 U "46"

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reported departure from Ofot Fjord of the enemy battleship and six destroyers.)

Our submarines in Ofot and West Fjords have obviously been unable to score any successes in consequence of very heavy defense from destroyers using hydrophones, and air patrol.

The 1st Squadron of the 106th Group, en route from Stavanger to Narvik with four planes, took part in the action in the evening despite unfavorable weather conditions and then landed in Narvik.

Narvik Group reported in the evening:

"Attack so far warded off. No landing. Mountain battery landed. Hundalen occupied. Enemy destroyers off Narvik. Urgent request from Group Narvik for submarines to attack destroyers near Tranoy and Rombaken."

(For Admiralty announcement see radiogram file, 2345 and 2400.)

This evening a serious and depressed mood marks Naval Staff's impression of events. Ten of our modern destroyers, half of our powerful and most urgently required destroyer arm, lie shot to pieces, damaged or sunk in Ofot and Rombaken Fjords. Narvik has proved a "mousetrap" for our forces. The tragic factors which have brought our destroyers to this fateful situation are: the unfavorable supply position caused by the absence of the second tanker and the delay in sailing caused thereby; the bad, unfavorable weather conditions; the fact that at the date of our "Weseruebung" the enemy's own operational plans caused him to be already in the Lofoten area. Further reports on the course of the action and losses in material and personnel are to be awaited.

Naval Staff does not doubt for a moment that the Narvik destroyers, with the superb spirit of their commanders, officers and crews, showed themselves worthy of their tradition and offered the most stubborn resistance to the enemy to their last shell and torpedo.

It is to be hoped that the action in the narrow fjords enabled the greater part of the crews to be saved after the battle and

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to be incorporated in the defense of the occupied area despite probably great difficulty regarding armament, equipment and supply. This sets the Air Force supply service new tasks, which are to be carried out with all possible means.

Situation in Trondheim:

The readiness of almost all batteries, also of some searchlights, is reported. All planes can land and take off from the airport north of the town (Jonsvatny).

The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN will not sail before 1100 on 14 April. Trondheim suspects British landings near Andalsnes. The minelayer FROEYA, beached off Trondheim, was blown up by U "43".

Situation in Bergen:

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the northwestern entrances are closed by a double-row mine barrage. Ship "111" was damaged by touching ground and is out of action. Allocation of a motor minesweeper flotilla, Ships "37", "47", "7", two PT boats and one submarine is requested.

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has been assigned the task of preparing submarine supplies and of instituting a pilot service for putting into port.

Situation in Stavanger and Kristiansand:

Unchanged.

Situation in Oslo:

Unchanged.

Commanding Admiral, Norway reports:

Batteries ready to fire:

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Oslo:

Rauoe: 4 x 15 cm.
Horten: 2 x 7.5 cm.
Droebak: 3 x 15 cm.
Kahol: 1 x 28 cm.

Kristiansand: 2 x 21 cm., 6 x 15 cm.

Stavanger:

Aeger 2 x 10.5 cm.

Trondheim:

Bettinges: 2 x 21 cm., 3 x 15 cm.
Hejwes: 2 x 21 cm., 2 x 15 cm.

Transport Situation and Situation Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Numerous submarine warning and location reports indicate no lessening of danger from submarines. No success in submarine-chase.

In connection with the expansion of anti-submarine defense in the Kattegat, Group Baltic has ordered the laying of UMA barrages near Halskor Rev lightship and in the deep channel east of Friedericia. Patrol is being instituted on either side of Sprogø and north of Friedericia.

On the evening of 13 April the 3rd Sea Transport Unit set out from Frederikshavn with torpedo boats, the SAAR and the steamers ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG, transporting roughly 2,000 men.

Group Baltic has requested the allocation of two destroyers to transport personnel from Frederikshavn to Oslo. Naval Staff had to refuse the request, since it is necessary to keep the few destroyers in readiness for immediate action. On the other hand, the Norwegian torpedo boats were allocated for defense assignments as requested and the seizure of Norwegian trawlers as patrol vessels approved.

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The cable from Marstrand to England was cut by Ships "47" and "26".

The 1st Group of the 1st Dive-Bomber Wing and the 100th Bomber Wing each report the probable sinking of a submarine in the Kattegat. (No proof).

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the situation in Norway.

The British landing operations make necessary the definite and immediate concentration of submarine operations in the Romsdals Fjord and Vaags Fjord areas and in the Orkneys-Pentland Firth area which is much traversed by convoys, transports and naval forces. For directives see Submarine Situation.

2. In view of the Fuehrer's order of 12 April that the Norwegian Armed Forces are now to be treated altogether as hostile, the commissioning of all serviceable Norwegian naval vessels - so far only seized - has been ordered with German crews. Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Naval Ordnance Division and Naval Staff, Service Division have received instructions accordingly. Attention is drawn to the necessity for and the possibility of seizing material and installations belonging to the Norwegian Navy.

3. Report on the possibility of supplying Narvik and Trondheim by submarines. (See letter from Naval Staff, Submarine Division (Technical) dated 13 April in reference file "Weseruebung".) Chief, Naval Staff is definitely resolved to fulfill the wishes of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff regarding supply operations. Boats must be withdrawn from operations for the duration of this activity. U "43" and U "26" are to carry out assignments according to schedule. U "29", "32", "122" and "A" are to be converted as quickly as possible.

4. The Fuehrer is to be asked to consent to a request

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to Sweden to put the extinguished outer lights on the Swedish coast into operation again immediately and to have the radio beacons work again in suitable weather if requested. (Fuehrer agreed).

5. The Foreign Office is to be requested to make possible the use of Danish naval vessels by the German Navy.

6. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has reported that, according to reports from the Commanders of escort vessels, enemy submarine attacks on German transports several times took place from Swedish territorial waters. Suitable steps are being taken with the Swedish Government to ensure respect for their rights as neutrals.

7. Groups Baltic and West have received the following order regarding defense of the Skagerrak and Kattegat:

After laying the anti-submarine barrage at Skagen:

- a) The Skagerrak declared area is to be reinforced to a certain extent.
- b) The southern barrage gap is to be protected by a deep (- 15 m.) anti-submarine barrage.

8. For distribution to date of military forces in the Norwegian and Danish area see reference file "Weseruebung", 13 April. According to a new Armed Forces High Command order, units of the troops stationed in Denmark are put under Group 21 for operations in Norway.

P.M.

Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Fuehrer

(Conference took place before receipt of the first combat reports from Narvik.)

Points discussed:

1. Supplies of aviation gasoline, coastal anti-aircraft guns, mountain guns and ammunition for Narvik and Trondheim

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carried by submarines. Special stress is to be laid on supplies of aviation gasoline. Conversion of boats U "29" "32", "A" and "122" is ordered.

2. Battleship operation and Battle of the Lofotens. Commander in Chief, Navy is in complete agreement with the action taken by Commanding Admiral, Fleet. In Naval Staff's opinion it would have been incorrect to commit the battleships fully against a superior enemy in the unfavorable strategic and tactical situation at the time.
3. Steps taken by the Navy to defend Norwegian positions. (Submarine dispositions, mine barrages, protection of transports.)
4. Political questions.
5. Recognition signal service between ships and planes.
6. Individual questions concerning the operation. (See Commander in Chief, Navy's memorandum of 13 April.)

Submarine Situation

The following order, based on an assessment of the situation, has been issued to Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines:

1. Effective immediately, submarine operations to concentrate on the area Romsdals Fjord to Vaags Fjord and the area from the Orkneys to Pentland Firth.
2. All large boats to be put into operation in Vaags Fjord and West Fjord-Narvik at once.

Exceptions: A large boat is to remain in Namsen Fjord until at least two small boats are there.

3. Allocate small boats as follows:

2 Romsdals Fjord,
3 Trondheim,
4 Folla and Namsen Fjord,
4 Orkneys-Pentland Firth.

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4. Resort to stores on the BREMSE and CARL PETERS in Stavanger and Kristiansand for supplies and replenishment.
5. Load the remainder of the small boats and keep them in readiness, including the boats set aside for Operation "Gelb", in Norwegian ports and in home waters at Group West's disposal.
6. Defer reliefs and Submarine School needs for the present because of the concentration of assignments in the north Norwegian area.

Commanding Admiral, Submarines then ordered U "65", "30", "34", "52" for the present also into the Lofoten area. U "50" has been assigned a waiting position in Folla Fjord, U "61" a patrol area in Namsen Fjord.

Special Events:

U "37" attacked a cruiser of the GLASCOW class north of the Shetlands. Destruction probable as explosion was seen and wreckage and oil patch observed.

Boats in Ofot Fjord and West Fjord report difficulty in attacking and remaining in the Fjord, because of constant destroyer patrol, planes and submarine-chase and nights almost as bright as day. (See also radiogram file of 13 April, 2349.) U "64" sunk by a bomb in Herjaenger Fjord. Officers and 36 men saved.

War against Merchant Shipping

Naval forces are ordered to regard Norwegian naval and merchant vessels as enemy.

Merchant Shipping

Transports to Norway:

Between 1400 and 1700 11 ships of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit sailed from Holtenau as planned for Oslo.

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Fresh appeal by Oslo radio to all Norwegian ships to make for neutral ports and on no account to put in to French or British ports.

In spite of the countermeasures introduced by us against the present British statements that Norwegian and Danish ships are placed under the Allies' protection, we must expect most of the Norwegian tonnage and a great part of the Danish to join the Allies.

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Political SituationSituation in Norway:

Political situation unchanged.

Inclination only to acts of sabotage in the occupied area, passive resistance here and there from the population. Sniping in Bergen.

For proclamation by Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, General von Falkenhorst, see Foreign Press Report No. 156/40.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. Report on the situation.

The situation in Narvik is regarded as very difficult. Armed Forces High Command is considering whether it might be necessary to give up Narvik because of the difficulty of bringing up supplies and great British superiority. It has been decided that for the present a delaying defense action is to be fought in Narvik. However, concentration of defense against British landings and attacks is now being transferred to the area around Trondheim, which must be held. It will be necessary to bring up further forces into the Trondheim area.

An extract from Armed Forces High Command's directive of 14 April states:

"British forces penetrated into Narvik. No landing reported so far. British landings in Andalsnes. Landings to be expected in Namsos Fjord."

Most important task is the defense of Trondheim and the destruction of the troops which have landed near Andalsnes.

Fuehrer's order:

- a) Group 21. Reinforce Trondheim garrison.
Destroy the railroad line from Dombas to

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3. So that our own naval forces may be guarded against confusion with those of the enemy by the German Air Force, the Fuehrer has ordered:

- a) Every German warship is immediately to regard any approaching plane as enemy and to attack without waiting to see whether recognition is possible.
- b) Every German warship is to make itself known to any approaching plane by searchlight signals and also by firing light signals (in addition to the permanent identification marking), even if the plane is suspected to be enemy. Light signal regulations are to be amplified accordingly.

4. Commander in Chief, Navy expressed his full appreciation of the success of the "Weseruebung" landing operation and of the readiness for action shown to Commanding Admiral, Fleet, Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force, Commander, Oslo Group (Rear Admiral Kummetz), the Commander of the HIPPER (Trondheim Group) and the Commander of the KARLSRUHE (Kristiansand Group), also to all ships and formations under their command.

(For teletype see radiogram file, 1424.)

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic

Great Britain:

On the evening of 13 April, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Fleet gave the order for half-hour readiness, and the order for ships at sea to get up steam for maximum speed.

Light British forces on a northeasterly course, moderate speed, are west of Casablanca.

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Andalsnes far to the west.

- b) Navy: Concentrate submarine defense in the area off and on either side of Trondheim and Aalesund-Vikma Island, even though it means weakening the reinforcement previously scheduled for Narvik.
- c) Air Force: Destroy the British troops which have landed near Andalsnes, prevent further landings. Attack enemy forces north of Aalesund. Occupy Dombas with parachute troops and take steps to protect it. Use every endeavor to bring reinforcements to Trondheim by air.

Group 21 to use every means to seize the Oslo-Hamar-Dombas railroad as far as Andalsnes. The 181st Division to be brought up at top speed, also the mobile troops to be furnished by Group 31.

Because of this directive a concentration in submarine disposition is also effected towards Trondheim. The boats already in the Narvik area remain there. Boats proceeding to the Lofotens are to go on if they are already close to their objective. Boats whose positions are nearer to Trondheim, however, are to be disposed in the area Romsdals Fjord-Trondheim-Indre Folla.

(For Naval Staff's order, see Submarine Situation.)

2. The small number of our forces in comparison to the enemy's much greater superiority at sea demands operations of the highest efficiency and the avoidance of all unnecessary losses of time through approach and departure or delays during taking on supplies. The greatest importance is therefore attached to the organization of supply facilities. The Groups, Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway are directed to promote the expansion of supply facilities and defense in the area Trondheim-Bergen-Kristiansand-Oslo with all means in their power. Trondheim and Bergen are the most important supply points. Steps are to be taken first to ensure supplies of fuel and provisions for submarines, also repair facilities for minor damage. Supplies of torpedoes are to be arranged.

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France:

Nothing special to report.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

The Admiralty announces that mines have been laid in the Baltic and its entrances in the following area:

57° N, 10° 26' E
57° N, 12° 24' E
55° 30' N, 14° 20' E
55° 30' N, 21° 6.5' E.

This declaration includes practically the whole area of the entrances to the Baltic, the southern Kattegat and the southern Baltic to the latitude of Memel. It must be regarded for the present as a deterrent measure for the neutrals. Practical considerations exclude an effective and quick mining of the whole area. On the other hand, the increasing use of mines by submarines in the Kattegat must be expected. According to a radiogram intercepted by radio intelligence, there will be 12 submarines in the Kattegat/Skagerrak this morning according to plan, one a minelaying submarine PORPOISE (120 mines), which is to carry out her assignment in the area near Lasoe.

The use of aerial mines by the enemy has not been detected. In connection with the British announcement of a declared area in the Baltic, the possibility of the first use of aerial mines must, however, be taken into account.

The following were detected at sea: Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, Commanders, Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 3rd and 6th Destroyer Flotillas, also the carrier FURIOUS, the cruisers GLASGOW, AURORA, SOUTHAMPTON, PENELOPE, CAIRO and the netlayer PROTECTOR. At midnight Commander in Chief, Home Fleet was about 60 miles west of the Lofotens on northeasterly course, speed 15 knots.

Reconnaissance by the 506th Group from Trondheim detected six destroyers on northerly course, high speed, southwest of Kristiansand at 0500. A large tanker lay at anchor in the skerries north of Kristiansand.

Destroyers putting in were reported in Namsen Fjord in the evening.

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During the evening radio intelligence added to the information gained. The FURIOUS was despatched to Tromsø, the destroyers HOSTILE and IVANHOE ordered to Narvik in the evening. The destroyers BEDOUIN and ESKIMO (the latter severely damaged in Rombaken Fjord on 13 April) plan to arrive in Skjel Fjord (Lofotens) on the morning of 15 April.

The anti-aircraft cruiser CURLEW was brought up to reinforce the Lofoten squadron.

U "47" reports cruisers and destroyers in Vaags Fjord. Submarine-chase and location by fishing vessels and steamers. U "38" reports light cruisers and destroyers north of Vaags Fjord.

The battle cruiser REPULSE and the cruiser PENELOPE plan to put into Scapa on 14 April.

The destroyers NUBIAN and FORTUNE left Scapa on 12 April in the direction of the Lofotens.

Command:

Lord Chatfield is flying his flag in the cruiser AURORA. It may be assumed that he is in supreme command of the entire north Norwegian operation.

Appreciation of the enemy situation:

Main drive of the enemy landing into the area north of Narvik (Vaags Fjord). Landings under way in Namsen Fjord and Romsdals Fjord. Preparatory operations and landings by light forces here. Fairly large troopships not yet detected but are expected.

Own Situation

Situation in Narvik:

According to information now available, there is no longer any doubt that all the eight destroyers still in Narvik (GIESE, ZENKER, KUENNE, LUEDEMANN, ROEDER, KOELLNER, ARNIM,

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THIELE) were destroyed or scuttled in the heavy fighting on 13 April. About 1,000 men from the destroyer crews are in Hundalen. Enemy destroyers off the port and in Rombaken Fjord are blocking communication between the different separated groups; reinforcements and supplies for the battalion in Elvegardsmoen especially cannot be brought up at present.

Now that the destroyers are lost, coastal defense comprises only infantry weapons, so that defense against the blockading destroyers is impossible.

The Commander of the GIESE reports that British destroyers fired machine-guns on survivors in the water, causing further loss of life.

The ore railroad north of Hundalen is still occupied by the Norwegians.

Norwegian planes several times attacked the landing field on the Hartvig See.

Steps have been taken to supply Group Narvik, including the rescued destroyer crews, by air and railroad. (Undertaken by High Command Navy, Naval Staff, Service Division, (Organization Branch)).

Group Narvik requests transfer of guns and bombers and asks for air reconnaissance.

Situation in Trondheim:

Port Commanders are instructed to seize quantities of fuel of all kinds and to report them, together with the available quantities of dry provisions.

The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN sailed from Trondheim in the evening to return to Wilhelmshaven.

Situation in Bergen:

Another dive-bombing attack in the morning. The steamer BAERENFELS set on fire and sunk. Two enemy planes shot

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down. Four submarines put in to Bergen to refuel.

PT boats S "23" and S "25" from Wilhelmshaven put in to Bergen at the disposal of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast.

Situation in Stevanger, Kristiansand and Oslo:

Nothing special to report.

Battleships and HIPPER:

The periods of readiness for the battleships are now fixed at: GNEISENAU: 12 hours, SCHARNHORST: 72 hours and HIPPER: 8 hours (with regard to engine construction).

(For HIPPER's brief report on the Trondheim operation see radiogram file, 14 April, 2045.)

Situation in the Skagerrak and Kattegat:

Still great danger from submarines. Only one definite success (Torpedo Training Flotilla, 10 April) and two probable successes (11th Submarine Chaser Flotilla, 10 April, sub-chaser "J" 13 April) have been scored in attacks on submarines by defense forces. Since so far only very occasional use of periscopes has been detected, it is possible that the British submarines are firing only according to hydrophone, without periscope. (The Italian Navy also uses such procedure.)

In the afternoon the steamer FLORIDA, carrying ammunition and material, was torpedoed and later sank west of Maseskaer at the same spot where the attack took place on 10 April on the 2nd Sea Transport Unit. (The shot came from territorial waters.) Ship "35" was hit by a torpedo and lost east of Skagen. Submarine warnings were given at several other places in the Skagerrak.

Transport Situation:

The 1st Troop Transport on fast vessels put in to Oslo Fjord

at noon; 11 loaded fishing smacks, escorted by 2 submarine-chasers, are proceeding from Aarhus to Oslo via Frederikshavn with material.

The 2nd Troop Transport aboard the BRUMMER and escort boats (812 men) sailed from Frederikshavn in the evening. Parts of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit off Oslo in fog; one group went aground in the skerries off Oslo Fjord.

Since it is impossible to show the lights in Oslo Fjord, the convoys must be picked up off Bolaerne and Rauoey by the 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and escorted on to Oslo.

Situation in Denmark:

Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark reports that the majority of Danish naval vessels are at present in Copenhagen, the remainder in various other ports. Inability to proceed is ensured by removing vital parts of the engines. The work necessary to transfer them to the final harbors where they are to be laid up is to be carried out as soon as the submarine and mine situation indicates no further danger for Danish ships.

Submarine Situation

Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have received the following new order based on the Fuehrer's directive regarding concentration in the area Trondheim-Namsen Fjord-Romsdals Fjord:

1. At once increase defense of Namsen Fjord-Romsdals Fjord by means of submarines.
2. U "65" to proceed. Other boats to operate, in conjunction with small boats already provided, off Namsen Fjord, Trondheim, Romsdals Fjord.
3. Prepare supplies for submarines in Trondheim.
4. Boats with supplies for the Army to proceed to Trondheim, not Narvik, for the present.

In view of this order Commanding Admiral, Submarines has disposed the boats withdrawn from the Romsdals-

Andalsnes-Trondheim-Namsos area as follows:

Namsen Fjord: U "34", "61".
 Romsdals Fjord: U "30", "52".
 Folla Fjord: U "50".

U "65" is proceeding on to Vaags Fjord as ordered. As reinforcement: U "38", "47", "49". In West Fjord: U "25", "46", "51", "48". U "43", "26" proceeding to Trondheim with supplies for the Army.

In Bergen area: U "9", "14", "7", "60", "62".
 In Stavanger area: U "1", "4".
 In Lister-Lindesnes area: U "5", "6".
 North of the Shetlands: U "10", "13", "19", "37",
 "56", "57", "58", "59",
 "61".

On passage: U "17", "23", "24".
 On return passage: U "2".

Merchant Shipping

Own Shipping:

The tanker SKAGERRAK, which was still at the rendezvous for the Trondheim Group destroyers, sent an S.O.S. at 1026. A British cruiser was in the vicinity. The ship must be assumed lost.

The supply ship NORDMARK was moved away farther north to 70° N, longitude 0°.

The steamers LEUNA and BUENOS AIRES sailed from Stettin to Copenhagen at 2000 with a cargo for the Air Force. The steamers CORDOBA and CAMPINAS will sail from Swinemuende tomorrow morning to carry out further Air Force transports from Aalborg to Oslo. The transport groups will proceed

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according to the instructions of Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic.

The following reply was given to the enquiry from Group
Baltic about the use of Swedish territorial waters for the
trip to Oslo:

1. Passage of transports through Swedish territorial
waters, even carrying war material and men,
permissible without Swedish consent.
 2. Naval Staff is requesting mine-free routes
inside Swedish territorial waters, also lights
and escort.
-

(For Air Force events of the day see radiogram file of
14 April, report 2400.)

On 12 April Commander in Chief, Air Force set up the 5th
Air Force Command to conduct all air operations in Norway
and Denmark. General Milch is Commander 5th Air Force,
and Commander, North. Subordinate to him are:

- a) The 10th Air Corps with all present subordinate
units, including transport units and transport
units (seaplanes).
 - b) Local Air Force Commanders in Norway.
-

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

In a radio address King Haakon exhorted the Norwegians to do their utmost to defend Norway's freedom and independence.

Since Quisling's Government in its present form is not regarded as suitable, it resigned in the evening at the instigation of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway. Administration was taken over in the German-occupied areas by an administrative committee directed by the head of the Oslo Town Council, Christensen.

Since the formation of this committee if the rightful Government collapses is laid down in the constitution, it is hoped that this arrangement will effect pacification of the Norwegian people and hasten appeasement with the prospect still of bringing about an agreement with the King, who still rejects the Quisling Government.

In a radio address the Norwegian Ambassador in London exhorted his fellow countrymen to hold out and pointed out that French and British help was on the way.

In an official announcement Holland again stated her desire for neutrality and her readiness to defend herself against attack from any quarter. A state of siege was declared in Holland on 13 April owing to fear of action by Germany or the Western Powers. Coastal batteries have orders to open fire independently in case of any attack. Four German steamers were directed to put out from Delfzyl by the Dutch Government. (Order was later rescinded.)

Great Britain denies rumors about British landings. Internal unrest caused by the Fascist Mussert movement is feared.

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Belgium is also experiencing great anxiety about action by the Western Powers. Transfer of three divisions of troops to the southwest front is confirmed. There are therefore only 13 divisions on the northeast front at present.

Italy's attitude supports the German action in Norway by appropriate statements in the press and on the radio. Rumors speak of an Italian plan to penetrate to Salonica and of an imminent occupation of Corfu.

For reactions to the Norwegian campaign in the U.S.A. see Political Review No. 86 and Foreign Press. Roosevelt condemns the German invasion in a radio statement.

It is not considered out of the question that in the course of further developments the U.S.A. will endeavor to place Greenland under their protection. Germany has declared that she has no interest in the administration of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

1. The critical situation in Narvik has caused the Fuehrer to review the question of abandoning our Narvik position in order to avoid further waste of forces - especially of the Air Force - for a doubtful success, and of undertaking a concentration of force in the Trondheim area. A determining factor in further considerations is the state of supplies and equipment for the rescued destroyer crews. If the members of the crews, more than 2,000 according to available reports, can be equipped with the necessary items of clothing, hand and automatic weapons as well as food, this addition represents such considerable

reinforcement of the fighting strength of the Narvik Group that the Narvik Division can be expected to hold out for a long time, considering the difficult terrain which favors defense. The more heavily and the longer the enemy is tied-down in the northern area, however, the greater must be the effect of the resultant relief on the situation in the endangered Trondheim area. Naval Staff therefore takes up the attitude - conditional on further news and deliberations - that it is correct to hold the Narvik position as long as possible and to fight a delaying defense. The Navy has the additional conviction that the great sacrifice of ten modern destroyers demands that the Narvik position hold out as long as supplies permit.

2. The assignments now falling to the Navy can be summarized as follows:

- a) Defense of sea communications with Oslo by obviating the great danger from submarines. Increased defense against mines in the Skagerrak/Kattegat. Sealing the Skagerrak off against penetration by surface forces. Building up a strong air defense against bombing and aerial mine attacks. Speedy expansion of Denmark's coastal and anti-aircraft defenses.
- b) Expansion and reinforcement of coastal defense at Trondheim and Bergen.
- c) Equipment of Trondheim and Bergen with vessels with minesweeping gear for the purpose of keeping the entrances clear.
- d) Defense of the Baltic against danger from enemy submarines and mines in order to maintain the vital Baltic Sea trade communications.
- e) Submarines to attack enemy supply lines to Norway, make war on merchant shipping in the Atlantic, disrupt enemy supplies and attain considerable diversionary effect.
- f) Demand for increased use of aerial mines on the southeast coast of England, in Scapa Flow and Kirkwall Bay and in the Clyde (Glasgow) to hamper the enemy's Norwegian campaign.

- g) Thrusts by the battleships against light forces in the triangle Shetlands-Stadlandet-Skagerrak in order to disturb the enemy; prevention of enemy thrusts into the Skagerrak and relief of the central and north Norwegian area.

3. The Fuehrer has ordered an investigation into the possibilities of protecting the entrances to Trondheim, Bergen and into some important fjords (Sogne Fjord, Hardanger Fjord) by the speedy establishment of torpedo batteries. The intention is sealing off at those points which coastal batteries cannot reach or at which they are not available, and where it is not possible to dispose naval forces all the time.

The best torpedo batteries, ready for immediate action, for the intended purpose would undoubtedly be the PT boats; these are, however, urgently required for other assignments in the south Norwegian area, for defense and escort purposes and for operational use and there are not nearly enough of them available.

Three torpedo tubes each have already been dismantled in Trondheim from the THEODOR RIEDEL and PAUL JACOBI and these are to be used as a torpedo barrage battery. The setting-up of further shore torpedo batteries at favorable, well camouflaged and easily defended spots in the fjords is to be investigated speedily by the Torpedo Branch in cooperation with Commanding Admiral Norway. Naval Ordnance Division sees possibilities of setting-up such makeshift batteries with the simplest facilities in a very short time by making launching ramps out of wood.

4. The Embassy in Stockholm states that the Swedish Government plans to lay a mine barrage with passage gap inside the three mile zone in Swedish territorial waters near Falsterboe. Passage by surfaced submarines will be forbidden and will be quite impossible for submerged submarines. The measure is directed against British submarines slipping into the Baltic.

Naval Staff welcomes the Swedish plan. It is, however, suggested to the Swedish Government that the barrage should be laid not at Falsterboe but at the southern entrance to

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the Kogrund Channel. The Swedish barrage would then be incorporated in our barrage system. The proposal by Group Baltic that our own barrage be moved to a location north of Helsingborg-Helsingoer and Sweden's assistance be requested in minelaying is rejected for the present.

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

The two aircraft carriers ARK ROYAL and GLORIOUS put in to Gibraltar on 13 April. The ARK ROYAL is definitely still there on 15 April and the GLORIOUS is probably still there.

France:

Nothing special detected apart from some warship movements. The usual convoy activity seems to have been resumed off the west coast and in the eastern Atlantic.

North Sea/Northern Waters

West Fjord/Vaags Fjord area:

Air reconnaissance and submarine reports reveal the commencement of the landing by enemy troops in Vaags Fjord near Harstad. So far only cruisers and destroyers sighted in West Fjord. On the other hand, U "65" reported from Andoye Fjord, time of origin 0829, the arrival of 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 troopships and destroyer escort. Planes of the 4th Bomber Wing also reported 1 cruiser, 16 merchant ships and 5 troopships off Harstad. The old battleship WARSPITE is still said to be in the area off Narvik.

As early as 14 April the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON reported the carrying out of landings in Salangen to the Flag Officer aboard the cruiser AURORA (Lord Chatfield). A Norwegian Division is obviously in communication with these troops.

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The AURORA and SOUTHAMPTON were to meet at 2000 on 14 April in Skel Fjord (Lofotens).

Tromsø-Kirkenes area:

Reconnaissance is being carried out in the Tromsø area. No landings so far detected.

It appears from a report by the destroyer IMOGEN that a Norwegian liaison officer will arrive in Kirkenes, whence the heavy cruisers DEVONSHIRE and BERWICK are bound.

Area around Trondheim:

Namsos:

It appears from radiograms that the transports CHOBRY and BATORY are obviously bound for Namsos and are escorted by the cruiser GLASGOW and destroyers of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla.

Andalsnes:

Molde Fjord and Andalsnes were covered by air reconnaissance. No enemy forces or troopships were sighted.

Submarines report cruisers and destroyers on varying courses in the Shetlands Passage. U "13" sighted a heavy cruiser on southerly course north of the Shetlands (possibly the cruiser damaged by bomb hits on 13 April west of Trondheim).

Enemy submarines off the southwest corner of Norway, in the Kattegat and Skagerrak.

Three French submarines east of Orfordnes at noon on 14 April.

Own Situation

Situation in Narvik:

On the evening of 14 April British destroyers also in Gratangsbotten west of Elvenes. The destroyers in Rombaken Fjord broke off communication with the unit in Elvegaardsmoen. Deep new snow hinders movements by the unit and reconnaissance of

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landing fields for planes. Air reconnaissance detected 16 merchantmen, 5 transports and 1 cruiser near Harstad. Apparently large-scale troop disembarkations. The Mountain Division expects an attack by Anglo-Norwegian forces on Narvik and Elvegaardsmoen.

Possible for the enemy to operate undisturbed from Rombaken on the ore railroad. British destroyers put to sea at noon and returned in the evening for a fresh bombardment. About 2,100 members of our destroyer crews - so far scantily armed and supplied - are engaged in defense on land. According to this a considerable part of the destroyer crews was saved. So far no news about the crews of the KUENNE and KOELLNER.

Enemy carrier-borne planes and Norwegian planes from Bardufoss airfield carried out bombing attacks on Narvik and the Hartvig See. No success.

For disposition of forces in the Narvik area see radiogram file of 15 April - radiogram 1725. Group Narvik requests:

Air support.

Closing of Rombaken Fjord by submarines.

Mining of the channel in Rombaken Fjord near Stroemen.

Air Force bombers could not carry out the supporting night operation as scheduled because of the weather. Army supplies were successfully transported and ammunition and clothing dropped.

The use of submarines in West Fjord and Ofot Fjord is proving more and more to be a complete failure. Very severe depth charging, air patrol and unfavorable light conditions, combined with numerous torpedo failures, prevent the boats having any chance of success. (See also Submarine Situation.)

Closing of Rombaken by a minelaying submarine must also be rejected because of the difficult tactical conditions. The possibility of planes operating with mines is under review.

Group Narvik received the following directive from Armed Forces High Command in the evening:

"If the situation forces you to abandon present positions, set up a base in the mountains, near the ore railroad if possible, and defend yourselves with supplies dropped by plane. Thoroughly destroy ore

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railroad forward of own base."

Situation in Trondheim:

Naval Commander, Trondheim (Commander v. Pufendorf) reports his plan for a surprise raid on Oerlandet with the aid of the patrol vessels commissioned.

Conditions at the airfield near Trondheim still leave much to be desired. Intermediate landing on the Jonsvatnet See airfield possible.

Situation in Bergen:

Patrol and pilot service has been instituted. Outer light extinguished. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the weak forces in Bergen urgently require the prevention of outflanking enemy landings in Samnanger and Soer Fjords, also in Hardanger and Sogne Fjords. Since minelaying is not possible for the present, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests that three submarines should patrol the entrances. Commanding Admiral, Submarines has detailed submarines accordingly (U "17", "23", "24").

Planes and PT boats are on their way from Stavanger to Bergen with an Army battalion.

Situation in Kristiansand:

The situation on land is cleared up by breaking the resistance of a Norwegian regiment.

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Naval and Transport Situation in the Kattegat/Skagerrak:

Group Baltic still regards the submarine situation in the Kattegat and eastern Skagerrak as extremely serious. Submarine sighting reports have come in from off Oslo Fjord, north and east of Skagen and at the northern entrance to the Little Belt. Submarine-chase and depth charging unsuccessful. The BRUMMER was torpedoed southwest of Oslo Fjord during the night. Success of attempt to tow her in is questionable.

In Naval Staff's opinion the failure to date of anti-submarine defense and location is due to the lack of practice in look-out duties and servicing the location gear and to the apparently great liability of the sets to break down, according to reports to hand. From time to time so many sets are out of order that in individual flotillas only 1-2 hydrophone or echo-ranging sets are available. In addition to this, it has so far only been possible to equip a limited number of defense vessels with echo-ranging sets. The efficiency of the sets in the shallow water of the Kattegat must also be regarded as limited.

It can be stated that German anti-submarine defense does not take into account the demands made on it and in the long run this gives rise to great anxiety for the future.

Defense of the sea route to Oslo, one of the Navy's most vital tasks, stands or falls by the success in combatting the great danger from submarines and mines. The experiences of the last few days have shown that the enemy's submarine training is of a high standard, that enemy submarines have very good hydrophone and sighting gear at their disposal and know how to score hits with their torpedoes. It is the duty of all responsible offices to bring anti-submarine defense and training, which right from the beginning of the war has always been a special anxiety for Naval Staff, to the necessary zenith with the greatest speed and maximum effort, and to ensure that all submarine-chasers and defense vessels are quickly equipped with efficient location gear.

Danger from mines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak demands the most careful consideration, even though there is no proof at present that mines have been employed on a large scale. The ferry between Nyborg and Korsoer was damaged on 14 April following an explosion. While Group Baltic suspects that it ran on one of our own UMA's, laid shortly before as a deep mine, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic points out the possibility that this was a British aerial mine, since a bomber was previously sighted.

The possibility that aerial mines are being dropped by British planes cannot be dismissed. It is known that large British flying boats can lay up to eight mines while taxi-ing over the surface of the water. Further observations in this direction are necessary. Operational offices have been notified of these discoveries.

Another mine warning report has come from mine-exploding vessel "11", which struck a mine when anchoring near Sprogoe. It is also a question here as to whether it was a mine in our own deep barrage or one laid by the enemy.

It is necessary that Naval Staff should prepare itself for the worst and from now on expect the use of mines by enemy planes, with or without magnetic firing. Even though large-scale use of aerial mines is at present improbable, the appearance of single mines in the practice areas for surface forces and submarines and at most widely separated traffic centers of North Sea and Baltic shipping sets Operations Division most difficult tasks - in view of the small number of minesweeping units - which force speedy review of all possible and necessary defense measures.

Transports to Oslo are still proceeding as planned. A great part of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit put in to Oslo during the day. The last group had to call at Frederikshavn because of the weather and will arrive in Oslo later. The 3rd Troop Transport Unit has been delayed in Frederikshavn because of the weather. The planned minelaying near Skagen also had to be postponed in view of the weather,

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Norway are at present investigating the possibility of calling at Larvik, Frederikstad, Arendal and other places near Oslo, also pilot service, emergency lights and unloading facilities there, because of the great danger from submarines in the entrance to Oslo Fjord.

According to Swedish press reports, Swedish territorial waters on the west coast from Halloe to Yttre Tistlarne have been mined and the approach buoys and entrance lights extinguished until further notice.

Submarine Situation

Because of reports from submarines about extremely difficult operational conditions in Vaags Fjord and inside West Fjord, Naval Staff has ordered the boats off Narvik and in Vaags Fjord to withdraw out of the narrow fjords to positions where there is less danger and where chances of attack still exist.

U "48" reports a vain attempt to break through to Narvik. Misses and failures at destroyers. For U "46"'s report, see radiogram 2100. U "14" had a miss or failure on the cruiser ENTERPRISE.

Submarine disposition otherwise unchanged.

Air Situation:

See radiogram file of 15 April, radiograms 1200, 2200, 2400.

Merchant Shipping1. Norwegian and Danish ships overseas:

No tonnage in the Black Sea at present.

The sailing of Danish and Norwegian ships from Italy is being prevented or delayed by technical difficulties as far as possible. Italy, however, declines to hold the ships if the captains protest, for fear of British reprisals against her own ships.

No Norwegian and Danish tonnage in Soviet ports.

It is reported from Washington that neither the official representatives of Denmark and Norway nor their shipping representatives have received instructions from home, and they are therefore mostly undecided as to how to act regarding merchant ships.

As the Embassy in Oslo reported on 14 April, the Norwegian Association of Shipowners has issued the following call to all ships under the Norwegian flag, which was broadcast by various means:

"The Norwegian Association of Shipowners hereby calls on all Norwegian ships to put in to the nearest neutral port immediately and to remain there until receipt of further instructions or to make for a Norwegian port if this is nearer. All ships proceeding to Norway or which are in other north European waters are to procure the best possible information about new mine barrages for themselves."

2. Murmansk run:

Negotiations are planned about the transportation of phosphates from Kandalaschka to Leningrad or German ports via the Stalin Canal on German lighters; reciprocal traffic-coal transports for Murmansk.

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

Situation unchanged. A radio appeal by the old Norwegian Government definitely shows that it has thrown in its lot with the Allies. Narvik and vicinity is said to have been recaptured; Norwegian pilots and officers are aiding the Western Powers' expeditionary corps; the people are asked to accept British and French money. It is the duty of all citizens to help the authorities and to report treachery and espionage.

The fact that the old Norwegian Government is still in a position to exercise certain functions, to influence the people and incite them to resistance, must be regarded as extremely regrettable. It was a definite mistake in the operation that we did not succeed by suitable preparatory steps in ensuring that the Norwegian Government was captured promptly and that a new and capable Government was set up right on the first day of the occupation.

Propaganda in the Swedish press is creating an anti-German atmosphere. The Government's desire to maintain strict neutrality is, however, shared by the people and the Government is not criticized.

The editor Ansaldo, who acts as a spokesman for Mussolini in certain affairs, gave a radio address to the Italian Army:

"Events show that no nation can remain outside the conflict. War could come to Italy as it came to Norway. Italy is preparing herself for this and will choose the most favorable moment, which is perhaps nearer than is believed."

Russia has handed to Roumania an aide memoire on various frontier incidents. Tension between Russia and Roumania continues. The Russians are making military preparations

and assembling troops.

The German Ambassador considers the situation threatening, a point of view which the Army General Staff does not share to the same extent.

The British Ambassador informed the Japanese Government on 13 April that in case of necessity Great Britain would take the Dutch East Indies under her control. If Japan consented to this, Japanese trade would not suffer. Japan has reserved comment.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items:

1. Conference on the situation: The great danger from submarines and mines on the sea route to Oslo forces us to consider asking Sweden to permit transport of material overland to Oslo. The subject is to be discussed with the Fuehrer. If such a proposal is not possible at present, designation and buoying of a skerries route along the coast of Sweden for material transports must be requested.
2. Brigadier General Bodenschatz has informed Commander in Chief, Navy about a conference between a Swedish delegation under Admiral Tamm and Field Marshal Goering. By personal order of the King, Sweden has stated that she will repulse any attack on her territory with armed force and is specially resolved to defend the northern Swedish frontier and the ore region with all the means in her power. The Field Marshal stated that the German operations were in no way directed against Sweden and that Germany desired a peaceful Scandinavia. Swedish wishes would be taken into consideration as far as possible.

"Everything to a friendly Sweden, nothing to a hesitant Sweden."

3. With reference to our submarines' lack of success in northern waters and fjords, Chief, Naval Staff is desirous of speedily returning the boats to waters offering greater prospects of success and especially of using some boats in the Atlantic for the resumption of war against merchant shipping.

4. With regard to the despatch of the next auxiliary cruisers in operational readiness for operations against merchant shipping, it has been decided that the ships are to remain in the home operational area for the time being, since the present enemy situation practically excludes the possibility of a successful break-through into the Atlantic. Naval Staff has their use overseas constantly in mind and if the situation develops favorably this is still intended at a later date.

P.M.

Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Swedish Naval Chief, Admiral Tamm

Points discussed:

Swedish wishes:

1. Continuation of Swedish merchant shipping, return of Swedish ships from Denmark and Norway to Sweden.
2. Transfer from Italy to Sweden of 4 torpedo boats bought from the Italians.
3. Safety of Swedish shipping in the Baltic, anxiety about British minelaying in the declared area in the Baltic. German Navy requested to inform Sweden at once of any mines detected in the Baltic.
4. Request for help in Sweden's armament, which will also benefit German interests. (Delivery of 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns especially requested.)

Admiral Tamm confirmed the great anxiety about German operational plans which existed in Sweden before 9 April. These were regarded as definitely directed against Sweden. He promised Sweden's strict legality of action and her readiness to conform with German wishes as far as compatible with neutrality.

German wishes:

1. Creation of a route for German merchant shipping, which is as safe against submarines as possible, in the skerries along the west coast of Sweden, with pilot service or buoys.
2. The extinguished outer lights on the west coast of Sweden to be put on and radio beacons operated when requested.
3. Prevention of enemy submarines using Swedish territorial waters; according to German observations, these have fired from territorial waters, disregarding Swedish neutrality.
4. Mining of the southern entrance to the Kogrund Channel by Sweden.

Admiral Tamm was also informed of Naval Staff's suspicion that several Norwegian torpedo boats have sought refuge in Swedish waters.

Survey of the SituationSpecial Reports on the EnemyAtlantic:Great Britain:

Of the cruisers operating earlier in the North Atlantic, the EFFINGHAM and ENTERPRISE which were probably in dock lately, appear in the North Sea. The ORION in the West Indies area was ordered at noon on 13 April to proceed to Gibraltar as quickly as possible after taking on fuel and provisions in Trinidad.

Apart from the netlayer GUARDIAN, some destroyers and the survey vessel FRANKLIN are patrolling the Faroes. They are supplied with food and ammunition by trawlers.

The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS has arrived in the Channel area from the Mediterranean.

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According to a report from Intelligence Center, Spain, the ARK ROYAL is said to have left Gibraltar, east bound. (Last report requires investigation.)

France:

Intelligence Center, Spain, reports:

Aircraft carrier BEARN and one destroyer passed Gibraltar on easterly course at 0930 on 16 April.

Vessels in the Bizerta and Algiers area received several priority radiograms containing movement orders which are to be carried out with the greatest speed.

North Sea/Northern Waters

Narvik-North Cape area:

The aircraft carrier FURIOUS and three destroyers put in to Tromsøe.

In the West Fjord-Vaags Fjord area:

The battleship WARSPITE, probably another battleship, several cruisers, including the cruiser AURORA with the Admiral of the Fleet (Chatfield), and several destroyers.

Troops appear to have been landed in Harstad and Saalangen. Particulars regarding this have not been received.

Area around Trondheim:

Two cruisers and five destroyers reported near the island of Vega (entrance to Mosjoen).

The cruiser GLASGOW with destroyers of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla and the transport CHOBRY in Namsos Fjord. General Wiart in command of the troops ashore.

Enemy destroyers are also still detected in Folda Fjord.

Three cruisers and four destroyers were reported by a submarine in Romsdals Fjord. Enemy forces are moving in the area Romsdals Fjord/Andalsnes. Strength of transport units not ascertained. Landings expected. Wick Radio sent very urgent radiograms via Aalesund to a cover address in Andalsnes. Destruction of the

Aalesund radio station is urgently necessary.

Destroyers and two large transports were reported in the Shetlands area.

For development of the enemy situation from 7-14 April, disposition of enemy naval forces and their movements, based on the results of radio intelligence, see Radio Monitoring Report No. 15/40.

Own Situation

Atlantic:

The situation in the North Sea and the strong concentration of forces along the Norwegian coast make the speedy appearance of the two auxiliary cruisers, Ships "16" and "36", appear necessary to effect a diversion. Naval Staff hopes that the appearance of the auxiliary cruisers will cause the enemy forces, at present very extensively ordered into home waters, to be re-disposed. The use especially of further aircraft carriers in the northern area for the purpose of constantly threatening our bases in Norway from the air must be regarded as highly undesirable. The auxiliary cruisers received the following orders with radiograms 1814 and 1849:

1. Speedy appearance desired to relieve situation in North Sea.
2. Ship "36" to operate in the North Atlantic for the time being. Expect delay of up to 14 days. Choice of operational area left to your discretion. If situation permits, simulate presence of pocket battleship by means of deceptive radio message to merchant shipping. Example: "Gunned pocket battleship" with corrupt position and name of a steamer sunk if possible.
3. Ship "16" speed up passage to South Atlantic. Appear as soon as possible on the Cape-Freetown route.

4. Both ships to carry on as per operational order after their first success or as soon as the enemy is aware of their presence.

North Sea/Northern Waters

Naval Forces:

After 17 April the battleships will be in 12 hours' readiness for operations. The HIPPER's repairs can be expected to last at least 14 days.

The tanker NORDMARK has been instructed to stand on and off, away from the enemy, in northern waters at her own discretion and to await further orders.

The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN coming from Trondheim put in to home ports. For brief reports see radiogram file of 16 April, 1735.

In order to prevent losses from our own action, the following procedure is to be adopted, according to the Fuehrer's order, the regulations previously issued being amended:

- a) Any German warship is to regard any approaching plane as enemy and to attack it at once without waiting to see whether recognition is possible.
- b) Any German warship is to identify itself to any approaching plane by day - apart from the permanent markings or those ordered from time to time (painting of turret covers and gun shields, painting on of Swastika flags, etc) - by long flashes from the searchlight and the firing of recognition signal cartridges, even if enemy planes are suspected; at night, by firing recognition signal cartridges, at latest when opening fire. Even after opening fire, flashes from the searchlight depend on the tactical situation.

Situation in Narvik:

Successful operation on land from Hundalen to the Swedish frontier has given us possession of the entire ore railroad. One Norwegian battalion taken prisoner, 200 Norwegians escaped over the frontier to Sweden. Bombing raids by French bi-planes unsuccessful. Supplies of heavy machine-guns and anti-aircraft guns for Narvik continue to be brought by air.

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In the evening two British destroyers were again patrolling off Narvik.

The supply submarines U "43" and U "26" were ordered to make for Narvik since Commanding Admiral, Submarines still considered it possible for the boats to break through to Narvik in spite of the known difficulties. Narvik Port Commander, however, reported in the evening that he had severe misgivings about submarines putting in to the defenseless harbor considering the close destroyer patrol and danger of espionage. The question of re-routng the submarines is again being investigated with Group 21.

Situation in Trondheim:

Situation on land still assured. Successful sortie along the railroad to Sweden as far as the Swedish frontier.

Seaplane base and airdrome are serviceable. The operational readiness of the planes so far brought up, however, is very slight owing to lack of ground staff and the great demands made on personnel and material. The seaplane base was unsuccessfully attacked by planes with German markings at noon. Trondheim Port Commander reports that Commander, Trondheim has taken over patrol duties and anti-submarine and mine defense. No mines detected to date. Two torpedo batteries, each with a triple tube (dismantled from the destroyers in Narvik) are ready for action near the batteries at Selven and Hysnes.

Situation in Bergen:

Hasty reinforcement of anti-aircraft defense has been ordered in the Bergen sector. The Navy and Air Force are to exploit every possibility for this. An 8.8 cm anti-aircraft battery is to be brought by submarines as the first step. Preliminary work is in progress by Admiral, West Norwegian Coast for the erection of torpedo batteries.

The submarines took on supplies in Bergen according to plan. Since it has been detected that Norwegian pilots are working with the British, the seizure of the main pilot station at Koppervik has been ordered. The operation is to be carried out by Army troops from Stavanger. These are to be brought up by seaplanes and naval forces.

Situation in Stavanger:

The airfield at Stavanger is at present completely obstructed by overcrowding, the effects of enemy bombing raids and numerous unserviceable planes. Not open for landings or supplies.

Situation in Kristiansand:

Nothing special to report.

Situation in Oslo:

Submarine warning in Oslo Fjord near Horten. Further progress was made in taking over and establishing readiness of coastal batteries. Torpedo battery South Kaholm ready to fire and manned. (The BLUECHER received two hits from this battery.)

Submarine and torpedo dockyard in Toensbjerg has been taken over and is in operation.

Situation in Skagerrak/Kattegat:

For further defense of sea communications with Oslo against submarines, Naval Staff has ordered:

1. Reinforcement of the Skagerrak barrage by adapted EMC mines with a long mooring rope and upper antenna (40 m.). Antenna buoy setting minus 15 m. Contact setting switched on. (400 probably ready for delivery on 20 April, 600 more being prepared.)
2. Taking over of submarine-chase in the Kattegat and Skagerrak by Commander Naval Air, Baltic under whom the 606th Group is placed for this purpose immediately. It is planned to bring up another squadron of He. 59's for anti-submarine operations.
3. Group Baltic received submarine-chasers "A - F" from Group West on request.

Sea Transport Situation:

Following the torpedoing of the BRUMMER, Group Baltic considers the limit of the justifiable use of naval forces so far for transport assignments to be reached and requests urgently a lull of several days to devote exclusively to submarine-chase and the laying of mine barrages. It proposes that collective transports be carried out by air in the meantime and that Sweden be pressed to allow material transports with pilots and warship escort to proceed through territorial waters. Group Baltic also considers that transports of personnel on torpedo boats in pairs proceeding at high speed to varying ports such as Langesund, Arendal, Krageron, Larvik, Toensbjerg and Sande Fjord can be advocated if necessary, provided there are unloading facilities and lights.

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Naval Staff agrees with Group Baltic in its appreciation of transport possibilities and the great strain put on naval forces. (See letter to Group 21, Transport Chief, dated 16 April, Reference file "Weseruebung".)

The priority of these transports was, however, so highly emphasized when examining the transport question with Armed Forces High Command and Transport Chief, Group 21, that Naval Staff is forced to order transport of material and personnel to continue as before. Group Baltic has been instructed accordingly.

Losses are to be avoided as far as possible by using all available escort forces.

Personnel to be carried from Frederikshavn on the fast vessels scheduled for this if the readiness of the vessels permits.

Transports of material as previously planned. Ships will also be utilized to a slight extent to transport personnel.

Urgent assignments are the transfer of the 13th Machine-Gun Battalion, the 40 Armored Battalion and transport columns.

In Oslo, Group 21 cleared up the subject of alternative ports. According to Commanding Admiral, Norway's report, only ports near Oslo can be considered because of the difficulties of transportation in Norway. Troops are now scheduled to be transported to Larvik for the present.

For assignments and positions of the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic see radiogram file of 16 April, 1200.

The extraordinarily great strain on all the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is apparent from this report. Rests, relief and overhaul periods are limited to the utmost.

Special difficulties arise from the lack of and liability to break down of the location sets on submarine chaser forces. Of 24 echo-ranging sets available 10 are at present out of order. It is urgently necessary to obviate these deficiencies and to do this as quickly as possible.

Submarine SituationVaags Fjord:

U "47" reports use of hydrophones and heavy depth charging by the enemy. One G 7a failure, three electric torpedo non-detonators. Boat is leaving Vaags Fjord. U "65" also reports most difficult operational conditions.

It is learned from radio monitoring that the destroyer FEARLESS has apparently sunk one submarine.

West Fjord:

U "46" and "51" have been assigned new positions in the area north of Trondheim. U "25" is to search the bays in West Fjord for enemy forces.

Romsdals Fjord:

Reconnaissance by U "52" without result. No enemy sightings.

U "13" sank a TRIBAL class destroyer north of the Shetlands.

Otherwise no special changes in disposition.

Air Situation

See events of the day, radiogram file, 2400.

Merchant Shipping

Group Oslo has requested permission for single transports returning from Oslo to return through Swedish territorial waters with the aid of pilots. The steamers would have to anchor at night because of the extinguishing of the lights. Permission has been given. Group Baltic was already informed some days ago that there was no objection even to the passage of troopships through Swedish territorial waters.

German Shipping in the Baltic:

The Ministry of Transportation permits shipping south of the line Cape Kullen-Hesseloe-Aarhus. Permission from Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is necessary north of this.

German Merchant Shipping Losses since 9 April:

32 ships totaling 166,411 GRT. Further, 7 ships totaling 26,684 GRT cannot be used at present as they lie north of Stadtlandet.

Danish and Norwegian ships in German ports:

9 Danish totaling 11,389 GRT, 7 Norwegian totaling 13,060 GRT.

Danish Shipping:

The Danish short wave transmitter again broadcast:

"Danish ships are again called on to make for neutral ports, ships in the Mediterranean if possible Italian or Spanish ports. If occasion arises, attempt to reach home ports."

The Danish Foreign Ministry has despatched a coded circular telegram to this effect to Danish representatives abroad.

Items of Political Importance1. Norwegian campaign:

Reynaud spoke in the Senate about the Allies' successes:

1. The first success lies in a severe and irremediable weakening of German sea power;
2. Germany is cut off from Swedish ore. Minefields lie all over the Baltic, cutting off also this shipping route to the ore;
3. Germany is forced to fight on a new front. She is squandering troops, guns, planes and fuel;
4. The fourth result is a colossal moral defeat. King Haakon was taken for another Herr Hacha from Czechoslovakia. Quisling's sham Government has collapsed.

2. The Swedish Government has banned a speech by Hambro, the Norwegian President of the Storting. It has also prohibited recruiting of volunteers for Norway. The Swedish Foreign Minister solemnly assured the German Ambassador on 15 April that all military measures taken by Sweden were directed exclusively to the defense of her neutrality. Units had to be reinforced to protect the lengthy Swedish-Norwegian frontier. It was the most earnest desire of the Swedish Government to meet Germany's political and economic wishes as far as possible; the deliveries of ore according to contract would be carried out to the extent agreed on.

3. The British Ambassador in Washington stated that neither Great Britain nor Canada planned to occupy Greenland or Iceland unless Germany planned to do so.

4. Halifax assured the Dutch Ambassador that Great Britain would respect the neutrality of the Netherlands.

5. According to a letter from Mussolini to the Fuehrer, the Italian Navy is mobilized and at full war strength. It could not be established to date whether considerable parts of the Italian Fleet have gone to the Dodecanese.

The Italian press states:

"The moment has come to review the situation in the Mediterranean with regard to the relations

between Great Britain, France and Italy."

6. Lively discussions in the U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan about the possible protection of the Dutch East Indies. Holland states angrily that she is strong enough alone to protect the Dutch East Indies with her own forces. In the U.S.A. it is declared that any Japanese action against the Dutch East Indies would come up against very strong U.S. resistance and might perhaps lead to the U.S.A.'s entry into the war.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

1. Report on future submarine operations. For result see under Submarine Situation.
2. For report from Lieut. Cdr. Gerlach, 2nd Staff Officer of Commander, Destroyers about the destroyer operation against Narvik and the actions on 10 and 13 April, see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. page 133.

The report fills Naval Staff with pride. It shows that the majority of the destroyers were not annihilated by the enemy but, after a heroic fight against overwhelming odds under the most unfavorable tactical conditions, scuttled themselves or ran on the rocks, after the last shell and torpedo had been fired. The crews' behavior during and after the action was excellent and in accordance with the spirit and famous tradition of the German torpedo arm.

Survey of the SituationSpecial Reports on the EnemyAtlantic:Great Britain:

The Admiralty announces the laying of mine barrages to protect the Clyde estuary in the following area, according to Rugby radio:

Between the lines connecting Dunningham Point (55° 19.5'N, 5° 33'W) and Scraigans Point (55° 3.5'N, 5° 3'W) and Rhoad Point (55° 21.5'N, 5° 31'W) and Bennan Head (55° 8.5'N, 4° 59.5'W). Patrol vessels are stationed at the southern end. Shipping is instructed to procure and follow directions from the Royal Navy and/or consular authorities.

France:

Four French submarines arrived in Harwich on 17 April.

According to bearings, the large destroyer MOGADOR and another vessel were detected northeast of the Firth of Moray in the afternoon.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Intelligence Center, Belgium transmits an agent's report, according to which the Home Fleet operating in the Norwegian campaign is to be regrouped by withdrawing six large British vessels and replacing them by six lighter French vessels. Admiral Forbes commands the French Fleet units. A new large-scale landing is to be attempted near Namsos. According to further agents' reports, French, Scottish and Canadian mountain troops are on their way to Norway.

Narvik-Tromsøe area:

Only incomplete information on the movements of enemy forces in the north Norwegian theater could be gained since our air activity

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had to be limited to the despatch of one FW 200.

One heavy cruiser was spotted off Harstad and one battleship (WARSPITE) and several destroyers in the fjord southwest of Andorja Island.

Radio intelligence detected the cruiser EFFINGHAM in the area off Tromsoe.

In the morning U "46" reported three troopships, probably returning, on southwesterly course northwest of Mosjoen.

According to radio monitoring, the transfer of the aircraft carrier GLORIOUS into the operational area along the Norwegian coast is to be expected.

Area around Trondheim:

In the morning air reconnaissance detected 2 cruisers and 5 destroyers southwest of Folda Fjord and another cruiser northwest of it. Reconnaissance of Ram Fjord and the road to the south showed no transports, naval forces or troops.

Shetlands-Norway area:

In the forenoon Stavanger was shelled by cruisers and a destroyer. The formation was detected 60 miles west of Haugesund at noon on westerly course proceeding at high speed. In the afternoon the cruiser SUFFOLK, damaged by air attack, urgently requested aid from tugs. The enemy succeeded in bringing her in. The battle cruiser REPULSE was 50 miles east of Fair Passage towards evening, probably to pick up the cruiser formation.

Own Situation

Situation in Narvik:

Destroyer patrol in Rombaken Fjord continues; this is apparently interrupted always for a short time only. A British attempt to land by means of cutters in Herjaengs Fjord was repulsed. British destroyers shelled German positions and batteries in the afternoon. Bardufoss airfield is occupied by Norwegians and there are some light planes there. About 5 cm. of snow until the end of May, then unserviceable for three weeks, therefore no possibility of bomber operations at present from here.

Supplies by plane for the destroyer crews have commenced. Attempts are being made to fly urgently required officers and experts home.

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Situation in Trondheim:

Port Commander, Trondheim (Captain Thiele) requests that men from destroyers, some of whom are manning the batteries, be relieved by coastal specialists. The coastal battery at Bettinges with 2 x 21 cm. and 3 x 15 cm. guns and the battery at Heysnes with 2 x 21 cm. and 2 x 15 cm. guns are ready for action.

Plans:

To restore readiness to proceed of the destroyers JACOBI and RIEDEL and to send them home. It is hoped to get the JACOBI up to a speed of 30 knots despite the stoppage of part of a turbine.

Situation in Bergen:

Reconnaissance of the seaplane base at Flatoey shows that it is suitable for use. The base was still occupied by Norwegians. Four runways. Use not possible until anti-aircraft defense is available.

Submarines supplied as planned.

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the town and country authorities will obey the orders of the Oslo Administrative Committee.

Situation in Stavanger:

Enemy cruisers and destroyers shelled the seaplane base in the morning. Buildings, material, ammunition and four seaplanes destroyed. Airfield not hit. All Stavanger's light and power installations out of action.

Strong forces of the 26th Bomber Wing and the 30th Bomber Wing contacted the enemy formation west of Haugesund.

Several hits were scored:

Stern of 1 heavy cruiser	1 x 500 kg.
	1 x 250 kg.

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1 destroyer	1 x 250 kg.
Amidships, 1 cruiser	1 x 1,000 kg.
1 cruiser	1 x 500 kg.
1 cruiser	1 x 500 kg.
	1 x 500 kg. just by the ship's side.

Radio traffic indicates severe damage to the cruiser SUFFOLK, which urgently requested aid from tugs and was able to reach her base. (After engine room and steering compartment under water.)

The need for the erection of a coastal battery in Stavanger is urgent, as shown by today's shelling.

Orders will be given accordingly.

Because of the shelling of Stavanger, Group West requests the transfer of available Army batteries to protect Tyboroen until the naval battery is set up.

Situation in Kristiansand and Oslo:

Nothing special to report. 2 x 21 cm., 6 x 15 cm. guns ready for action in Kristiansand.

Situation in the North Sea:

Ten planes of the 3rd Coastal Patrol Squadron of the 506th Group and eight planes of the 1st Group of the 126th Bomber Wing laid aerial mines in the area of the Downs and Edinburgh Channel; 24 LMB mines dropped.

In order to increase the enemy's impression of the effectiveness of the Skagerrak mine barrages it is suggested to Group West that a suitable vessel should pretend to have struck a mine in the deep channel through transmission of an S.O.S. on the steamer wave.

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Situation in the Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Danger from submarines as great as ever as far as the entrances to the Baltic. Two submarines sighted north of Schultz Grund. Submarine warning in Friedericia in the afternoon. Submarine chase unsuccessful. Another underwater explosion on the Nyborg-Korsoer ferry off the entrance to Korsøer while following a mine-exploding vessel. Minesweeper "12" checked the route on 17 April without any result. Possibly our own UMA barrage is faulty. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has therefore ordered the immediate sweeping of our deep barrages in the Great and Little Belts, 100 per cent searching sweep of the ferry route from Nyborg to Korsøer and laying of buoys.

In Naval Staff's opinion, the possibility of enemy aerial minelaying here must be taken into account.

Transport situation:

Fast troop transport and first fishing smack transport arrived in Larvik and Oslo. Other transports delayed by the weather.

Denmark:

Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark reports that 3 x 21 cm. guns are manned on the island of Flakfort east of Copenhagen.

Submarine Situation

It is necessary to fix present and future assignments for further submarine operations according to plan. The continuous fulfillment of tasks arising must be accomplished by a correspondingly smaller number of submarines on operation.

Naval Staff at present foresees the following assignments for submarines:

1. Occupation of the area Vaags Fjord-West Fjord in attack dispositions.
2. Occupation of the area from the Orkneys to the Minch.

3. Defense of the Trondheim and Bergen areas.
4. Transport of supplies to Narvik and Trondheim.
5. War against merchant shipping in the Atlantic with boats still available.
6. Use of boats for Operation "Gelb" if necessary.
7. Withdrawal of boats for submarine training.

Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have received an order to endeavor to fulfill these assignments by the use of the following numbers of submarines:

1. In the Lofoten area at present the large boats already there.
2. In the Orkneys-Minch area, always 3-4 small boats.
3. Defend the Trondheim area with 3 medium-sized and 3 small boats.
4. Defend the Bergen-Stavanger area with 2 small boats.
5. The 6 large boats scheduled are to be used for transport assignments and for temporary defense assignments in Norway.
6. The large boats still available to operate in the Atlantic.
7. For Operation "Gelb" boats to be taken from Bergen or from those resting.
8. Eight small boats to be made available immediately for training purposes, 9 more boats from May; Norwegian and Danish boats to be brought up for this if possible.

In view of Armed Forces High Command's appreciation of the situation that it is necessary to concentrate supplies on the Trondheim area, supply boats U "43" and "26" have now finally been diverted to Trondheim.

U "29" sailed for Bergen and Trondheim as an additional supply boat, carrying 5 tons of 2 cm. ammunition, alkali cartridges and distilled water.

Positions on 17 April:

Outer Vaags Fjord:	"38", "65", "49" (?)
Outer West Fjord:	"51"
Returning from the Lofotens:	"48", "46", "47"
Northwest of Trondheim:	"25"
Namsen Fjord-Folda Fjord:	"61", "34", "50" (?)
Off Trondheim:	"9", "14"
Romsdals Fjord:	"30", "52"
Bergen-Lister area:	"23", "24", "7", "60", "62", "17", "1", "5", "6"
Area around the Shetlands:	"59", "58", "57", "56", "13", "19", "10", "3"
On passage: Supply boats:	"26", "43", "29"
On return passage:	"37" and U "21", freed from internment.

Great anxiety is felt regarding the fate of U "47" (v. Gossler) and U "50" (Bauer). U "22" (Jenisch) is posted missing as from 17 April.

Air Situation

See Air Force Events of the Day, 17 April in Volume "Air Situation".

Merchant Shipping:

After further enquiry from Naval Staff, the Ministry of

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Transportation has issued instructions that German ships are to sail from Baltic ports as planned in spite of the British announcement of a declared area.

"Export" Unit:

There is now information about the steamer MAIN from the Admiralty, according to which the ship was sunk by a Norwegian destroyer. Of the 7 ships of the "export" unit only 1 (LEVANTE) has therefore arrived as planned; the greater part of the cargo of another (BAERENFELS) was unloaded in Bergen before her destruction by a bomb-hit. One steamer (ALSTER) has unfortunately fallen into enemy hands with her valuable cargo.

Norwegian Shipping:

The legitimate Norwegian Government has requested the British Government to broadcast the following telegram to all Norwegian ships:

"All Norwegian ships are warned that telegrams they receive from Norway, signed by the shipowner, are transmitted by the Germans. The only authentic orders are those of a Norwegian Embassy or statements by the B.B.C. Captains of all Norwegian ships are to get in touch with the nearest French or British naval office and to avoid putting in to neutral ports, except in the case of an authentic request."

P.M.

Lt. Cdr. Gerlach, from Commander, Destroyers, reported to the

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Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in the presence of Commander in Chief, Navy.

The Fuehrer asked for a full report on the Narvik operation, the situation at present and future prospects of defense, and then expressed his special satisfaction with the report and his recognition of the achievements of our destroyers.

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Items of Political Importance1. Norway:

The announcement that the new Administrative Committee under Christensen is entrusted with looking after the interests of the Norwegian people with the German occupation authorities has apparently been accepted peacefully and with satisfaction among large sections of the Norwegian population. The population of Oslo is slowly returning to the city. Shops are being opened, business is being resumed. However, the old Norwegian Government, which has fled and the whereabouts of which are not known, still possesses great influence in the areas not occupied by us, and is continually exhorting the people to resistance, pointing out the aid already being given by the Western Powers. This is making the execution of our operations much more difficult.

2. The British Ministry of Information is said to have given the press the following instructions with reference to the excitement in Great Britain about the German Norwegian campaign:

1. False report of the capture of Narvik is not to be withdrawn;
2. It is to be stressed that Narvik is the only important harbor in Norway in view of the ore exports;
3. It is to be emphasized that Germany has committed a great strategic, economic and political blunder by the Scandinavian action;
4. Losses to the German Fleet must be celebrated as a great victory for Great Britain;
5. Legality of action has now completely gone over to Great Britain.

The British press states that Italy's future attitude will be decided in the Norwegian fjords. Italy is at present bluffing in order to draw as many British ships as possible into the Mediterranean to relieve Germany.

3. The situation is still not clear about the transfer of Italian Fleet units to the Dodecanese. The Consul at Palermo reports that 4 light cruisers and 4 destroyers sailed from Palermo on 14 April, destination unknown.

The Western Powers and the U.S.A. are at present specially interested in Italy's attitude. Far reaching decisions are expected shortly in the Balkans or in the Mediterranean.

4. The Western Powers are attempting to influence Sweden against Germany by increased press and radio propaganda and speeches by various ministers. It is stated that Germany's next blow will be at Sweden in order to ensure supplies of ore for Germany. Great Britain is ready to help Sweden if attacked by Germany, but must insist that Sweden herself do everything for her own defense.

5. Reports from Sweden speak of the great disquiet at present felt by the Swedish public because of various flights over Swedish territory by German air formations. Captains of steamers report great expansion of Swedish coastal defense, control of steamer crews and harbor barrages.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

1. Report on Armed Forces High Command directive:

The Fuehrer has ordered:

- a) Group Narvik has the task of defending itself along the ore railroad, of tying down the enemy and of preparing thorough destruction of the ore railroad. It is being supplied with ammunition and food. Fresh forces will not be brought up.
- b) Trondheim is of decisive importance as a naval and air base. Occupying forces, as well as blocking the way northwards against landings, are to defend the railroad to the Swedish border and open up communications to the south. The Group cannot be made too strong for this.

- c) Commander in Chief, Air Force will provide increased air transports as far as possible.
- d) Commander in Chief, Navy, in conjunction with Group 21, is to take over the bringing up by sea of heavy weapons and ammunition required and carry this out even at the risk of losses.
- e) Severe steps are to be taken against passive resistance from the population.

(See under Situation in Trondheim.)

2. Operations by our battleships:

Naval Staff considers that a sudden appearance by the battleship formation in the Lister-Utsire-Krakenaes area is urgently necessary in order to relieve the west coast of Norway, where troop and supply transports of the Western Powers are constantly arriving under the protection of numerous British naval forces. The enemy disposition of forces, at present still showing a concentration in the Lofoten area, provides favorable conditions for such an operation. Prospects of success are expected from pushing through the Shetlands line into the area west of Stadlandet-Frohavet, according to reports on the enemy to date (primarily light forces in this area). The dangers of such sorties, the possibilities of which in Naval Staff's opinion should not be exhausted in isolated operations but must form a constant threat to the enemy, lie in danger from the air, submarines and mines, especially on the approach routes. These dangers can be reduced to a tolerable degree with suitable anti-mine and air escort (the effectiveness of air patrol and air escort has been materially increased by the newly acquired bases at Aalborg and Stavanger). It is necessary to use all destroyers in readiness for anti-submarine escort. However, the severe loss which the German Fleet has suffered from the ten destroyers out of action in Narvik makes itself particularly felt here. The number of destroyers still available in home waters is at present only eight, four of which are still being overhauled or urgently require repairs. Establishment of readiness of the remaining four still requires several days. The minimum number of destroyers considered necessary for the thrusts by the battleships is three.

Refuelling of the forces presents no difficulties. If necessary, the supply ship NORDMARK, in northern waters, is at the battleships' disposal. The destroyers can, if necessary, re-oil in Stavanger and Bergen.

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Naval Staff is quite aware of the dangers of battleship sorties in coastal waters. These, however, can on no account be regarded as so decisive that important operations cannot be carried out because of them. The battleships are no "fleet in being", exercising their strategic and operational effect alone by their presence in home bases.

Effective diversions can only be attained by their actual appearance in the enemy's operational area. Frequent operations in the area central North Sea-Shetlands-Krakenaes will also represent a very effective defense for the Skagerrak and the vital sea route to Oslo.

The supreme importance of a speedy and successful conclusion of the Norwegian operation necessitates battleship operations as soon as possible in accordance with Naval Staff's considerations. Group West was informed by telephone of Naval Staff's views on this matter.

3. It no longer appears necessary now for the cruiser EMDEN to remain in Oslo. Group Baltic has therefore been given permission to withdraw her. Group Baltic is to arrange with Commanding Admiral, Norway the possibility of release and the date of withdrawal, taking into consideration the enemy situation, submarines and mines. (The EMDEN will remain in Oslo for the present according to this arrangement. She is not scheduled to return until the situation changes or if Oslo is too dangerous and if anti-submarine escort is available.)

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Further transfer of forces is to be seen from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the North Sea and northern waters. Nine destroyers were transferred from Dover to Scapa. The former Polish destroyers THUNDERBOLT and LIGHTNING, operating in the Atlantic, are likewise in the northern North Sea. The aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL left Gibraltar during the night of 16 April and is in radio communication with Great Britain. The battle-cruiser HOOD is no longer detected in the Gibraltar area; her transfer northward can be assumed.

The French Mediterranean Fleet has been decreased by the

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allocation of vessels to the Atlantic Fleet. In the North Sea there are probably about ten French submarines, the mine-laying cruiser EMILE BERTIN, a few torpedo cruisers, including the MOGADOR, and possibly also the two DUNKERQUE class.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Radio intelligence reveals the following disposition of enemy naval forces:

Are North Cape-Kirkenes: The cruisers DEVONSHIRE and BERWICK.

Tromsøe to West Fjord: The old battleships WARSPITE, VALIANT, the aircraft carrier FURIOUS and the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON.

Trondheim area or north and south of it: The 2nd and 18th Cruiser Squadrons with the 4th and 6th Flotillas; the cruisers YORK, SHEFFIELD, GLASGOW and EFFINGHAM were detected individually.

Area Orkneys-Shetlands-coast of Norway: The RENOWN and the cruisers EDINBURGH, AURORA and CAIRO as well as destroyers of the 5th and 7th Flotillas.

In the Scapa area: The REPULSE and the cruisers BIRMINGHAM, ENTERPRISE, PENELOPE, CALCUTTA and CARLISLE as well as destroyers of the 8th Flotilla and the damaged cruiser SUFFOLK.

Positions of French forces are unknown. The vessels are fully incorporated in the British Fleet's radio service.

Towards noon air reconnaissance intercepted a British battle cruiser with semi-remote cruiser escort. This may have been the battle cruiser HOOD.

Submarines sighted various cruisers and destroyers in the Shetlands area without firing.

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Cruisers and destroyers were detected in West Fjord and And Fjord. There was a battleship off Harstad.

North of Trondheim:

At noon Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron passed on to Admiralty General de Wiart's report that the landing had been carried out (probably in the vicinity of Namsos). Daventry radio announces news of a British landing in the Namsos area.

It appears from another radiogram that a convoy plans to enter the Mosjoen area on the evening of 18 April.

South of Trondheim:

No new results from reconnaissance of Andalsnes and Romsdals Fjord.

Area off Bergen:

Submarine warning reports.

Survey of the Situation

Own Situation

Situation in the North Sea:

In order to protect shipping movements in the area off the Norwegian coast against air attacks, an increasing number of which must be expected as the season advances, Group West requests the speedy transfer of fighter and heavy fighter formations to Stavanger and Bergen as far as this is possible.

Commander, Minesweepers, West reports that after giving up all new minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas, Minesweeper "12" and almost all mine-exploding vessels he has now only four auxiliary minesweeper flotillas and one flotilla of old minesweepers available for mine patrol in the North Sea coastal waters. Concentration on route "Blau" and the coastal route as far as Hanstholm. The expansion of the bases of Esbjerg and Tyboroen is being pushed on. The final aim of Commander,

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Minesweepers, West is to advance mine patrol up to the Norwegian coast and Bergen as soon as the release of new minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas and the general situation permit.

The difficulties of mine control in the North Sea with the small number of flotillas available will have to be endured for the present, since the Navy's chief assignment, the safeguarding of the transports to Oslo, can only be fulfilled by definite concentration of anti-mine and anti-submarine defense in the Kattegat and Skagerrak.

Situation in Narvik:

Group Narvik reports that the day passed quietly. Dropping place for supplies was unsuccessfully bombed by planes, apparently French ones. After the merchant ships have been unloaded, food in Narvik will still be sufficient for 40 days.

The Group reports enemy landings in Salangen.

Our own armed reconnaissance successfully attacked town and harbor installations in Harstad. Attacks on a battleship on the roads off Harstad were apparently unsuccessful. Damage caused by heavy bombs exploding in the direct vicinity of the ship's side is possible.

Tromsøe power station was destroyed by a bomb.

Situation in Trondheim:

Railroad to Sweden in German hands. All forces urgently request supplies by rail via Sweden.

Facilities for this are dependent on the Fuehrer's decision. For the present, arms and ammunition can only be brought up by air or sea.

The urgency of transports of every type of gun to Norway, especially to Trondheim and Bergen, is apparent from the Fuehrer's directive today (see above). The prospects of getting

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supplies safely to Trondheim by sea are certainly slight. Every endeavor must, however, be made to get guns through to Trondheim because of the still very confused situation on land and of the severe threat to our important Trondheim position which is to be expected from the British landings in Namsos and Romsdals Fjord. Naval Staff thinks this might be possible by using Special Group vessels (camouflaged trawlers), which are in a position to score successes against naval vessels while carrying out the transport assignment, because of their torpedo armament. Group West was therefore instructed by teletype to despatch two of the Special Group ships to Trondheim as an experiment. Cargo of light field howitzers and first ammunition equipment. Their main assignment is safe transportation, the secondary one destruction of enemy naval vessels. Ships "26" and "37" were then ordered by Group West to carry out the transport assignment. Two guns plus ammunition can be safely loaded on each vessel.

Situation in Bergen:

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports the destruction of a Norwegian torpedo boat after an engagement with PT boats S "21" and S "23" in Hardanger Fjord.

In Bergen harbor there are 183 steamers which are not German. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has requisitioned 27 steamers, 16 of which are ready to sail. Owing to lack of personnel it is only possible to transfer very few steamers to Germany.

Unloading of the "export" steamer BAERENFELS was stopped because of the danger of overturning.

Only 3 x 10.5 m. anti-aircraft guns without ammunition have so far been set up. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast urgently requests ammunition and also allocation of a motor minesweeper flotilla because of danger from mines in the entrances.

The necessity for such an allocation is recognized. In spite of this Naval Staff finds it impossible to grant the request, since motor minesweepers are not at present available on account of urgent requirements elsewhere. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast must therefore make do with the means available in Bergen. Later allocation of a motor minesweeper flotilla will be reviewed.

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Group West has been instructed to this effect.

Situation in the Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Numerous submarine sighting and warning reports show that there is still very great danger from submarines. Submarine-chase is being carried out south of Oslo, in the Skagerrak north of Skagen, west of Maeseskaer, near Hisholm, south of Anholt, south of Samsøe and near Schultz Grund. Several reports mention "submarine probably destroyed"; there are, however, no proofs of actual sinkings. One ship reports twelve submarine sightings within four days and expresses the supposition, based on observation, that submarines are operating in pairs. Submarines have been identified several times by their periscopes about $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. above the surface.

Examination of mine-exploding vessel "11", which struck a mine, by the Chemical and Physical Experimental Station in Kiel reveals possible detonation of a small mine with long-range effect and magnetic type firing.

The first part of the Skagen anti-submarine barrage was laid according to plan with deep UMA mines by the HANSESTADT DANZIG group during the night of 17 April.

Transport Situation:

Transports of troops and material proceed according to plan. 950 men arrived in Larvik on torpedo boats and the steamer ANGELBURG; 1,000 men arrived in Oslo on two steamers.

Close escort by planes has turned out very well. Ammunition and material are en route in drifters.

The steamer HAMM was torpedoed and badly damaged north of Skagen out of a convoy of empty steamers returning from Oslo.

The hospital ship STUTTGART, escorted by Swedish warships, is proceeding through Swedish territorial waters to Oslo.

Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that he cannot defend the 50-mile long Oslo Fjord with only the 1st Motor Minesweeper

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Flotilla placed at his disposal and the inadequate newly-commissioned Norwegian vessels. He requests immediate allocation of one submarine-chaser and one patrol flotilla, each of at least eight boats. He also requests basic orders on command and that the limits of the defense areas between Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Norway be fixed (see 1943).

It is at present impossible to allocate further forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic or Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North to Commanding Admiral, Norway. Defense in the outer Oslo Fjord is also not Commanding Admiral, Norway's affair, but is part of the duties of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, who is responsible for the protection of the entire sea route to Oslo and assumes protection of transports against submarines and mines right into the inner Oslo Fjord.

Splitting up the few submarine-chaser and defense forces must lead to an impossible weakening of defense as a whole and cannot therefore be carried out at present. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic alone must remain responsible for commitment of and operations by the defense formations and he will in so doing take into consideration the wishes of Commanding Admiral, Norway or Admiral, South Norwegian Coast as far as possible.

Various applications regarding the use of the Norwegian naval vessels captured or commissioned have been received. Both Group Commands request the allocation of the minelayer OLAV TRYGVASON and of the Norwegian destroyers BALDER, ODIN, GYLLER. Group Baltic further requests the seizure of guard vessels, customs boats and trawlers for the protection of Oslo Fjord and of the ports in southern Norway, the allocation of the armed coastal vessels lying in Horten as floating batteries to Commanding Admiral, Norway and the assembly of the old second class Norwegian torpedo boats as harbor defense flotillas.

(See radiogram file of 18 April, 1148.)

The whole affair is at present under review by High Command, Navy/Naval Staff.

Submarine Situation:1. Vaags Fjord:

U "65" reports from And Fjord that the positions in the fjords can only be occupied for hours at a time since it is only possible to charge the batteries far out to sea.

U "47", coming from the Lofotens, has been assigned a waiting position from the North Minch to the northern tip of the Shetlands.

2. Trondheim area:

U "26", "43", put in to Trondheim with supplies.

3. Bergen:

U "14" is disposed off Bergen, U "13", "61" are replenishing their stocks in Bergen.

The following boats have been ordered to return:

By the direct route to Kiel:	U "9", "46", "51".
Via the Orkneys area:	U "10", "19", "56", "60", "62".
Via a point west of the Shetlands to Wilhelmshaven:	U "52".

Submarine Successes:

The British steamer SWAINBY (4,935 tons) was torpedoed off the north coast of Scotland.

Commanding Admiral, Submarines summarizes the results of shots fired during the past week in teletype 1725 (see radiogram file) and thus gives a shattering summary of the numerous torpedo failures, because of which most of the attacks carried out despite heavy defense on 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports were not successful. The Navy was thus deprived of material successes in decisive action. Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that, if the newly ordered ruling (percussion firing inside fjords, magnetic firing in the

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open sea) results in further failures, the German Navy does not possess any weapon for the submarines in northern waters.

Merchant Shipping

The following orders have been issued about control of neutral shipping:

1. Apart from Russian, Dutch and Belgian ships, only such neutral ships as are bound for German North Sea ports are to be allowed to pass westward through the Kiel Canal. Other neutral vessels are to be prevented by means of pretexts.
2. Over and above para. 1., ships of the three Baltic States are to be allowed to pass westward through the Kiel Canal if they have a convoy certificate for destination Delfzyl.
3. Ensure that neutral shipping neither leaves the Skagerrak westbound nor is able to turn off to the west from German and Danish North Sea ports, as well as from Delfzyl.

The German Ambassador in Copenhagen reports that direct instructions from Danish shipowners to captains do not come into question since Danish ships are not equipped for coded broadcasts and secrecy of position would not therefore be guaranteed. In any case, notification of ships by means of repeated radio instructions from the Board of Trade has attained the desired purpose, as is apparent from reports made by several captains.

Group Baltic has been instructed that Swedish ships are permitted to sail from ports east of the Skagerrak mine barrage if they are bound for a destination in our sphere of influence. Such ships are to be prevented from making off westwards under pretext of another port.

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The Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reports:

Danish ships are making for Brazilian ports as emergency ports and are lying there for the present, obviously on instructions from the Danish Embassy. Norwegian steamers are mostly adhering to their schedule. When a ship sails, her name and painted nationality marking are painted over. According to the newspapers, the Ambassador here has stated that the Government has given instructions to continue shipping traffic.

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Items of Political Importance

Norway:

Political situation unchanged.

Italy:

The Italian press treats events in Norway in a definitely pro-German manner. According to reports from trustworthy agents, Mussolini and his closest adherents are 100 per cent on our side. The Old Guard of the Fascist party demands that Mussolini fight against the enemies of the Italian people. In northern Italy, especially in the upper classes, there is, however, no true sympathy with Germany, but with racially akin France. Popular opinion in large parts of Italy is greatly averse to entry into the war; propaganda disseminated by the Roman Catholic Church plays a great part in this.

(See under report from Naval Attaché in Rome.)

The Netherlands Government has informed Japan that it has no intention of asking a foreign power for protection for the Dutch East Indies if Holland becomes involved in the war; the Netherlands Government would be just as little inclined to accept such help if it were offered.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

I. Group West's proposal for a battleship sortie and other operational plans:

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Group West regards as necessary conditions for battleship operations:

- a) Complete operational readiness of 3 destroyers, of which the SCHOEMANN and BEITZEN will be ready on 19 April. Date not yet definite for the HEINEMANN.
- b) Mine check on at least two routes out of the Heligoland Bight. This cannot be carried out until Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North again has a fast minesweeper flotilla.

The Group's plan is for a sortie into the Shetlands-Norway passage and beyond, either as a counter-thrust against enemy measures detected by radio intelligence or as a sortie not based on intelligence data. In both cases favorable weather when sailing, which as far as possible prevents enemy air reconnaissance, is desirable but not a prerequisite.

The Group reports further operational plans for the immediate future:

- a) Reinforcement of the Skagerrak mine barrage.
- b) Use of aerial mines on the east coast of Great Britain.
- c) PT boat minelaying operations on the east coast of England. (Group requests speedy return of four new PT boats of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla for this purpose.)
- d) Minelaying operation by Ship "11".

Chief, Naval Staff is in complete agreement with the plans reported by Group West. The date of the battleship operation is to be advanced as much as possible by pressing for the restoration of the destroyers' war readiness, if necessary also of the LODY and STEINBRINK, and by all-out operations by the minesweeper flotillas left. The return of the formations handed over to Group Baltic to the North Sea cannot be expected for the present. The request for PT boats is acknowledged but no decision can be taken until the situation in the Skagerrak permits.

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2. With regard to the possibility that the British are using aerial mines with magnetic firing, Chief, Naval Staff has ordered speeding up of provision with degaussing equipment and manufacture of magnetic minesweeping gear.

3. It was originally decided that the battleships' dockyard period should begin on 1 May and run concurrently for both ships.

With the war situation at the time, this decision was based on the view that a simultaneous dockyard period was practical because operations with only one battleship unfavorably increased the margin of the ratio of strength to the enemy even in a tactical relation, and - provided both heavy cruisers were in war readiness - the battleships' elimination for three months in the summer, when the Air Force has decisive opportunities of action, was quite justifiable.

There was then no strategic compulsion for battleship operations.

Since then the situation has been altered fundamentally by the Norway operation and the losses incurred as well as by the enemy's strong reaction.

Protection of the territory gained against the enemy pressing in by sea requires the use of any forces available.

The BLUECHER's breakdown also makes impossible a replacement of the battleships during their dockyard period by two heavy cruisers.

It does not therefore seem feasible to give up at present the possibility of operations by the most powerful vessels of our Fleet through the commencement of their dockyard period, and also to immobilize them in the dockyards shortly before the beginning of an expected intensification of warfare (air war).

A dockyard period for one ship at a time or an overlapping dockyard period can also not be proposed, since under present conditions in the North Sea and adjacent portions of northern waters, one single battleship can hardly be effective, while the two battleships together, thanks to their qualities and the possibility of tactical cooperation, can be conceded considerable prospects of success.

At Naval Staff's suggestion, Chief, Naval Staff has therefore

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decided that the commencement of both ships' dockyard period is to be postponed indefinitely for the present and made dependent on further developments in the situation in the North Sea - northern waters area.

1200:

Report from the Naval Attaché in Rome (Captain Loewisch) to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on Italy's present attitude:

Events which have lately exerted marked influence on Italy's attitude, are:

1. Ribbentrop's visit to Rome.
2. Brenner meeting between the Fuehrer and the Duce.
3. Norway action.

The effect of these factors on Italy's attitude should not be overestimated. Their main result lies in the increase of mutual trust, lessening of the Italian inferiority complex, open and more pronounced exposition of common policy and peace aims. Speeding-up of active Italian policy.

In the Attaché's opinion, Italy's present more positive attitude does not permit us to conclude that Italy will enter the war on our side within a short time. Great reluctance is still discernible on Italy's part, especially with regard to possible participation in an offensive against the west. Graziani's attitude is very cautious (statements that it will still be 1-2 years before Italy is equipped ready for a war. Sommigli's attitude the same).

The Fuehrer apparently made a concrete proposal for Italy's participation in a possible western offensive at the Brenner meeting. The Duce himself is 100 per cent pro-German, but is greatly influenced by the attitude of the Italian Naval Staff and General Staff. The Duce's answer to the German Ambassador was, it is true, basically positive, but in practice dilatory and hesitant.

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The Naval Attaché believes that at best Italy will enter the war actively when the Western Powers are so hampered that there is no longer any danger for Italy. The Attaché considers imminent intervention by Italy out of the question.

In spite of this, great preparations are being made for war. - New Defense Council created, naval mobilization complete, different necessities rationed, Red Cross measures. Numerous wishes are constantly being submitted to Germany regarding help with heavy guns, anti-aircraft guns, etc.

General attitude to Germany:

The Duce and his adherents are in favor of support for Germany, dissolution of all dependence on Great Britain, seizure of the most favorable moment to enter the war; they see the fulfillment of vital Italian interests only on Germany's side.

According to a statement by Prince von Hessen, the King and Crown Prince are now said to support Mussolini's attitude strongly and to be convinced of the necessity for cooperation with Germany.

Press: follows this attitude very strongly since the Brenner meeting and emphasizes Axis policy.

The people are constantly being influenced towards Germany by propaganda in spite of British counter-propaganda. Far-reaching conclusions should not be drawn from this. No enthusiasm for war.

General Staff: has constant objections; foresees many difficulties. Threat to Lybia is considered very serious.

The loss of Lybia would mean a severe setback. Its defense is by no means adequate.

Naval Staff: very cautious. Cavagnari is apparently seriously ill, his successor, Sommigli, follows Mussolini's lead but is very skeptical. Commencement of Italian operations would mean no great gain for German naval warfare, apart from the diversionary effect of the Italian Fleet.

In the Attaché's opinion there is no question of the 120 Italian submarines being thrown into the scales on Germany's side. Clear definition of mutual spheres of interest and

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operations is always mentioned.

The Attache ascribes the very objective and officially very cautious manner of the Italians to the Naval Attache to unsatisfactory reports from Peccori, the Italian Naval Attache in Berlin. Peccori is apparently embittered, unsympathetic and without the necessary interest in his post. He is probably reporting unfavorably on the German Navy and has no idea of the effect of his reports on the attitude of his Naval Staff and its general disposition towards Germany.

In spite of the Naval Attache's report, Naval Staff considers it quite possible that when a favorable time to strike comes, Mussolini will enter the war on Germany's side much earlier than his General Staff or Naval Staff consider desirable. Not in the form of participation in a general large-scale offensive in the west, but in the shape of a partial war to create a favorable basis for the attainment of later Italian goals in the Mediterranean. Naval Staff sees a sign that Italy does not intend to wait another one or two years before taking action in the strength of the present mobilization, which she can on no account keep up without results for any length of time.

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

The battleship RESOLUTION left Portsmouth at noon on 11 April and arrived in the Clyde on the afternoon of 12 April.

Intelligence Center, Spain confirms that the ARK ROYAL sailed from Gibraltar during the night of 16 April, course unknown.

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At 1400 on 19 April the ORION was 360 miles west of the Canary Islands on her way to Gibraltar.

Intelligence Station, Vienna reports:

2 British destroyers south of Salonica. At present 2 destroyers and 3 auxiliary vessels stationed in Corfu to control traffic in the Adriatic Sea.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Narvik-Tromsøe area:

1 heavy ship and 3 destroyers are reported off Narvik, in Ofotfjord. Lively boat traffic to Bogen Fjord is observed. North of Tromsøe, at about 70° N, 19° 20' E, 1 aircraft carrier and 2 battleships were spotted by air reconnaissance on 18 April.

Area north of Trondheim:

1 cruiser, several destroyers, 5 transports attacked by the Air Force in Folda Fjord. U "34" reports 2 battleships, 3 transports and light cruisers off Folda Fjord on southerly zig-zag course. The vessels reported may be a French formation, since French vessels were ordered to assemble northwest of Folda Fjord in the evening.

(Apparently to proceed to the Shetlands.)

About noon U "46" sighted a battleship and later a troopship with destroyer escort (southwesterly course, zig-zagging) about 100 miles northwest of Trondheim.

South of Trondheim:

One heavy cruiser with destroyers was detected west of Molde Fjord. Light cruisers near Andalsnes. Two destroyers at anchor and some merchant steamers in Andalsnes harbor. No landings by troops or unloadings identified.

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The enemy situation is amplified by various submarine reports (U "51", "14"). According to these, there were two cruisers, apparently the GALATEA and ARETHUSA, 80 miles northwest of Aalesund at about 1500 (proceeding to Rosyth). U "14" reported two light cruisers at noon 30 miles northwest of Stadlandet on westerly course.

Today's enemy situation confirms the impression previously gained: enemy operations, using battleships, are concentrated north of Trondheim, i.e. in the Narvik area and in Namsen Fjord. Lively traffic with light forces in Molde Fjord and near Andalsnes. Troop disembarkations here, south of Trondheim, do not, however, seem to be on a large scale so far.

According to an agent's reports the Franco-Polish expeditionary army is said to be 15,000-20,000 strong and to have started out for Norway during the last few days from Cherbourg and other Channel ports via Scotland.

Own Situation

The Fuehrer has ordered:

Places on the coast, except for points occupied by us, which are occupied by the British or are reported as occupied by British announcements, are to be destroyed regardless of the civilian population. The order applies first to Namsos and Andalsnes. The railroads and roads are also to be cut effectively here.

Narvik:

Night of 18 April passed quietly. No enemy destroyers in the fjord. Group Narvik again urgently requests minelaying near Stroemen in Rombaken Fjord and in the entrance to Beis Fjord.

The Group wishes hereby to prevent enemy forces penetrating into the inner fjords, to render shelling of the ore railroad more difficult and to increase the safety of the transport planes' landing place and of communications with the individual

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defense units. Closing of the narrows between Rombaken and Rombaken Bodden by means of block-ships is indicated as impracticable. Proposal for closing by mines is submitted.

Group West considers minelaying by submarines or planes impossible at present.

In the afternoon a landing and lively boat traffic from a heavy ship and three destroyers near Bogen, northwest of Narvik, were observed from Narvik.

According to an American reporter who arrived in Luba from Bjoernfjell, it seems that the British and Canadians have landed with ski troops and artillery north of Harstad in a fjord with relatively good shore communications (Salangen?) and are planning to attack Narvik from the landward side.

Because of the detailed verbal report made by Lt.Cdr. Gerlach, 2nd Staff Officer of Commander, Destroyers, Commander in Chief, Navy has sent the following telegram to the Commander of the Narvik destroyer formation, Captain Bey:

"2nd Staff Officer's report about the destroyer actions at Narvik has given me the greatest satisfaction. The destroyers' deeds are worthy to rank in our history. I am proud of my destroyers, which have fulfilled my expectations to the full, and I express my greatest appreciation to the Commanders and crews. I know that you will continue to do your duty.

Commander in Chief."

Trondheim:

Commander, Trondheim requests despatch of motor pinnace gear and minesweeping gear for fishing smacks and also hydrophones and depth charges. Equipment with these is specially urgent in view of the danger from submarines and mines in the entrances.

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Three stern tubes and one anti-aircraft gun C/30 each have been dismantled from the destroyers JACOBI and RIEDEL. Parts of the crews are allocated to guns ashore, communications posts and patrol boats, minesweeping and barrage vessels.

Group West and Fleet have been instructed to provide as soon as possible for the destroyers' return trip in favorable weather after readiness to proceed has been established as far as possible. Weapons dismantled are to be left behind.

Bergen:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla with one company of Army troops has arrived in Bergen from Stavanger. A combined operation with the Army against a light Norwegian battery in Hardanger Fjord is planned for 20 April.

The setting up of torpedo batteries is now planned and reconnoitered in Sogne and Hardanger Fjords.

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has given permission for small shipping to use the fjords and skerries again.

Stavanger, Kristiansand and Oslo:

Nothing special to report.

Coastal batteries at present ready for action in Norway:

Oslo:

Rauoe	4. x 15 cm.
Horten	2 x 7.5 cm.
Droebak	3 x 15 cm.
Kaholm	1 x 28 cm.

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Kristiansand:

2 x 21 cm.
6 x 15 cm.

Stavanger:

2 x 10.5 cm.

Trondheim:

Bettinges: 2 x 21 cm.
3 x 15 cm.
Heysnes: 2 x 21 cm.
2 x 15 cm.

Situation in the Skagerrak/Kattegat and Transport Situation:

Minelaying near Skagen (anti-submarine barrage) was continued as planned by the PREUSSEN minelaying group.

Enemy submarine situation: shows a certain relaxation. At three places submarines were sighted and attacked with depth charges without visible success.

The mine situation is not yet adequately cleared up. Our own anti-submarine barrage near Skagen shows some mines on the surface. A fishing smack struck a mine yesterday east of Skagen and is sinking.

Minesweeping and clearing off Korsoer and on the Kallundborg-Samsøe route without result.

Troop transports had to be canceled because of bad weather. Transports with material and empty steamers returning proceeded as planned. Sixty large drifters have now been seized for transports of material.

Because of discoveries made in our own submarine war against merchant shipping and experiences gained to date, the attention of Group Baltic and the offices responsible for carrying out transports and their defense has been drawn to the following points:

Line abreast, zig-zag courses frequently up to 40°. Troops on deck in area of special danger.

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Life jackets on. All life saving apparatus ready. Change routes in the open sea. Do not stop the whole convoy if there is a torpedo hit.

Air Situation:

See "Air Force events of the day".

Operations were severely hampered by the weather. During attacks on enemy forces in Folda Fjord a cruiser received a 500 kg. hit on the starboard deck, level with the after mast. Dense smoke. Two transports were damaged in Namsen Fjord and Nord Fjord.

Air Force formations for operations in Norway and Denmark are stationed as follows on 19 April: (see radiogram file, 0800).

Trondheim: 2 squadrons of the 506th Coastal Patrol Group.

Stavanger: 1st Coastal Reconnaissance Squadron of the 106th Group, 1 reconnaissance squadron of the Air Force, 1 dive-bomber squadron, 1 heavy fighter group.

Kristiansand: 1 fighter group.

Aalborg: 1 heavy fighter group, 1 long-range squadron, 1 bomber squadron of the 30th Bomber Wing, 2 bomber groups of the 26th Bomber Wing.

Westerland: 1 bomber squadron of the 30th Bomber Wing, 1 long-range reconnaissance squadron (Commander in Chief, Air Force).

Luebeck: 1 reconnaissance squadron.

Lueneburg: 1 bomber group of the 4th Bomber Wing, 1 bomber group of the 100th Bomber Wing.

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Submarine Situation

Again numerous reports of misses and failures. U "51" fired a double miss at the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON, U "47" two torpedoes which did not detonate at the WARSPITE, U "65" an unsuccessful spread of three at the cruiser EMERALD, center shot a premature. An unforeseen series of failures.

The continual failure of the torpedoes resulting from catastrophic technical deficiencies must be regarded as a calamity. The British would never have succeeded in landing troops in the north and central Norwegian area, with all our submarines which were in readiness sent out round them, if the submarine torpedo arm had had at its disposal a torpedo ready and operating perfectly. We cannot in the near future expect the rare occasion to repeat itself when radio intelligence is in a position to detect the enemy's movements promptly and it is possible to exploit the knowledge thus gained by sending out such a large number of submarines. The numerous sighting reports of heavy and light enemy naval forces and transports and the many firing reports show the extraordinarily favorable prospects of success which the German submarines continually miss by the complete failure of their torpedoes. The severity of this represents an operational failure of historical significance in German naval warfare at a time which is of decisive importance for the successful execution of the Norway action and possibly for the entire future course of the war.

The fundamental deficiencies in our torpedoes are known and every endeavor is being made to overcome them. The result of this work will not, however, unfortunately take effect for some time. New reasons for failures, which must be feared on the basis of recent experience, are at present the subject of thorough and speedy investigation.

For U "48"'s brief report see War Diary, Part B, IV.

Merchant ShippingBaltic Merchant Shipping:

Group Baltic to the Ministry of Transportation:

"Now no objection to German steamers north of the

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line Kullen-Aarhus Bay returning home, if Swedish territorial waters are used with the aid of Swedish pilots. Submarine attacks are to be expected even in Swedish territorial waters. No protection or escort can be furnished."

Preventing neutral shipping making off:

Group West has sent Admiral, West Norwegian Coast the following directive:

"Prevent any attempt by neutral shipping to leave the German sphere westwards. Only traffic to German ports and Danish coastal traffic permitted in the North Sea. Seize Norwegian ships, use them if occasion arises. U.S., Russian, Japanese, Italian, Spanish, Dutch and Belgian ships remain unconstrained. Permission for neutral steamers to sail to Danish North Sea ports and all Baltic ports not to be given until escort detachments can be provided as far as port of destination or as far as east of the Skagerrak declared area."

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The Birthday of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces

Commander in Chief, Navy issued the following order of the day:

"Men of the Navy, today on the birthday of our Fuehrer and Supreme Commander we renew the oath of unconditional loyalty and obedience we swore to him.

True to this oath we will pursue the fight forced upon us with unshakable courage, firm resolve and unbounded will to win and add new successes to those unexampled ones gained by the Navy in combat against overwhelming odds. With unshakable confidence we look to the man who is leading our people upwards to new greatness. We follow on the way he shows us in the proud consciousness that the goal set will be attained and final victory be ours. So let it be. Long live the Fuehrer!

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Items of Political Importance1. Norway:

An address by the King of Norway contains the following passage:

"The Administrative Council appointed in Oslo for the German-occupied territories is an emergency measure and is not a substitute for the Norwegian Government. It therefore does not represent the will of the people and has no legal basis according to Norwegian law. It goes without saying that the Council must relinquish its authority in areas where the Royal Norwegian Government regains its power."

In conclusion he stated:

"By our united efforts we shall win back our Fatherland and make the Norwegian people masters of their own country again."

2. Sweden:

The German Military Attache reports:

"The best Swedish troops, highly trained and familiar with the terrain, have been in the Swedish ore region near Kiruna for eight months. An attack against Kiruna via Norway would present great difficulty. - Almost unoccupied, roadless terrain with high mountains. No road beside the ore railroad. Ore railroad track can easily be destroyed at the many bridges, etc. Ore region's air defense adequate against restricted air attacks. Sweden will fire upon violation of her neutrality, primarily against Great Britain as far as the officers are concerned, if necessary also - though reluctantly - against Germany."

Netherlands:

Prime Minister de Ger stated in a speech:

"The Government refuses any help from a third party,

whether in actual fact or promised. This also applies to our possessions overseas. The Government has decided to extend the state of siege to the whole country."

4. Italy:

The Turkish Embassy reports from Rome:

"Count Ciano is said to have stated that Corfu is no longer of any great importance for the defense of the Adriatic after Italy's occupation of Albania. There is therefore no point in Italy's seeking adventure by an action to occupy Corfu."

5. Jugoslavia:

The Jugoslavian Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Berlin:

"The British Minister for Economic Warfare has stated in London that Great Britain does not desire a war in the southeast. The opinion in Great Britain is that Germany desires this just as little."

The German Embassy reports that Jugoslavia is resolved to normalize hitherto non-existent relations with Russia by stages, and first by the conclusion of a trade pact.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

1. Chief, Naval Staff has decided regarding the various requests for allocation of the Norwegian naval vessels commissioned as follows:

- a) It is necessary to reinforce Group West's coastal forces, since a large number of experienced units were handed over to Group Baltic and since coastal waters have been extended.

- b) The OLAV TRYGVASON at Group West's disposal. To be transferred in agreement with Group Baltic.
- c) The BALDER, ODIN and GYLLER at Group West's disposal after commissioning.
- d) Submarines at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Submarines.
- e) Armed coastal vessels at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Norway.
- f) Other vessels in the area of the south coast of Norway not at disposal of Group Baltic until relieved by harbor defense flotillas.
- g) Other vessels in the area of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast at Commanding Admiral, Norway's disposal.
- h) High Command, Navy (Naval Staff, Service Division, Organization Branch) will arrange commissioning at the earliest possible date.

2. The Fuehrer has ordered immediate investigation of quick, large-scale troop transports to Stavanger and Trondheim. Transports planned on fast passenger and freight ships. Under consideration: POTSDAM, GNEISENAU, HANSA, BREMEN, EUROPA.

Naval Staff's attitude to the operational aspect of the transport is as follows:

I. Crossing to Stavanger:

Transports can expect great danger from submarines and mines and from the air.

- a) Danger from submarines will exist throughout the entire crossing, which it will be practical to commence from a North Sea port; it will have to be met by anti-submarine escort consisting of destroyers and torpedoboats, and also close escort by planes. The risk of a

torpedo hit cannot, however, be completely excluded because of the close disposition of enemy submarines in the area to be traversed, especially off Stavanger (Skudesnes Fjord).

- b) Danger from mines can be partly obviated by previous exploratory sweeping of the outward route. Under certain circumstances it will be possible for a fast flotilla to go ahead with minesweeping gear, but this will depend on the number of light forces available as a whole.
- c) Threat from the air: Exclusion of this is the Air Force's affair. It is, however, to be borne in mind that according to wartime experience so far, British bombers have carried out their offensive assignments with dash and skill in the very weather that is unsuitable for fighters. Danger to the ships from dive-bombers while unloading in Stavanger deserves special consideration.

Accepting the considerable risks under a) - c), the assignment seems possible. Transport will best be carried out so that the last part of the outward trip (after about 58° N) and putting in to port and unloading will take place in darkness. Protection by the battleships is necessary. Departure as quickly as possible after unloading.

II. Crossing to Trondheim:

The long sea route (800 miles) and the passage through the Shetlands Channel, controlled by the enemy, offer no prospect of a successful break-through to Trondheim. German naval forces are not in a position to force the break-through to Trondheim against the much superior enemy. The success of the break-through to Trondheim and Narvik on 7/8 April was largely due to surprise, which can now no longer be counted upon since the area is strongly patrolled by the enemy.

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Such an operation would mean the certain loss of the transports and possibly of all the escorting fleet. However, after the loss of these powerful vessels, defense of the Skagerrak and Kattegat and of the decisively important sea communications to Oslo will also no longer be possible.

Naval Staff therefore sees no possibility of sending troops to Trondheim by sea.

3. Report by Chief, Torpedo Branch and Professor Cornelius on the torpedo problem, the speedy solution of which is regarded by Chief, Naval Staff as the Navy's most urgent problem.

Investigation into the causes of failure has been ordered and a committee of investigation including a representative of Commanding Admiral, Submarines has commenced work. The previous impression was that magnetic firing failures were partly caused by the very inconstant magnetic conditions in the fjords and along the Norwegian coast. The known fact that the G 7e has a greater undersetting than assumed is not actually regarded as the cause of failure but a final verdict is not yet possible. (According to Professor Cornelius' statement, experiences regarding the G 7e's depth-keeping are based on only 14 experimental shots at the Torpedo Experimental Station).

Undersetting of the target can be regarded as the chief cause of percussion firing failures. An increased number of experiments is being made at present. Long periods of ice greatly prejudiced experiments and systematic research before and made practical trial shots impossible.

Chief, Naval Staff again pointed out the decisive urgency of a solution of the torpedo problem and described the complete failure of the torpedo as a catastrophe for German naval operations in this decisively important part of the war.

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

The aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL is proceeding to the Clyde.

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France:

The minelaying cruiser EMILE BERTIN is likewise proceeding to the Clyde, possibly as the result of damage sustained in air attacks.

North Sea/Northern Waters

Narvik area:

In the afternoon there were light enemy forces off Narvik, including the cruiser PENELOPE which bombarded the harbor and railroad station.

North of Trondheim:

Two convoys with strong escort were detected from reports of submarines proceeding out of the Lofoten area towards the Shetlands. One convoy, escorted by a battleship and destroyers, was moving approximately 60 miles northwest of the Lofotens in the forenoon on northeasterly course (reported by U "65" and "38"); the other convoy was detected by U "47" about 120 miles northwest of Kristiansand, consisting of 10 steamers and numerous destroyers. One battleship and further destroyers are in the vicinity. U "47" is shadowing. The convoy is proceeding on course 60°.

A number of light forces and transports was reported by the Air Force and U "26" in the Namsos area. Further light forces and transports were sighted by the Air Force near Andalsnes and west of Aalesund. In the afternoon there were light enemy forces off Narvik, including the cruiser PENELOPE which bombarded the harbor and railroad station.

The Air Force's successes in the Namsos area were set out in radiograms from the Commander there, who described the situation at 1830 as "desperate" and requested help urgently. Namsos in flames. Forces were being continuously bombed by planes from 1100. Escort vessels seem to be very short of anti-aircraft ammunition. Heavy commitment of "C" class anti-aircraft cruisers during landings. The cruiser CARLISLE seems to have been off Andalsnes.

Home area:

The battle cruiser RENOWN probably put in to Rosyth early on 20 April.

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The cruiser YORK is in Scapa. The cruisers GLASGOW and SHEFFIELD sailed from Scapa in the afternoon. The cruiser CURLEW put in there.

The submarines SUNFISH and URSULA put in to their bases, Rosyth and Harwich.

Losses:

An unidentified vessel SKID struck a mine near Sunk lightship. Bow torn off, vessel sank during attempt to tow her off.

British steamers HAWNBY (5,380 tons) and MERSEY (1,037 tons) sank off the southeast coast of England.

Own Situation

Narvik:

At noon enemy forces, including the cruiser PENELOPE, penetrated into the Rombaken area and fired on the railroad station. The forces departed again about 1500.

Rombaken ferry, important for communication with Army units near Elvegardsmoen, and the ore railroad bridge near Forsneset were destroyed by the bombardment. It may be possible to repair the bridge.

Troop landing in Bogen Fjord to reinforce Norwegians is suspected.

Group Narvik has seized 8,000 rifles, 300 light machine-guns, 15 heavy machine-guns, 800,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition and 50,000 rounds of heavy machine-gun ammunition from Norwegian stocks, so that the arming of the destroyer crews with hand weapons is assured for the time being.

Trondheim:

Army troops received reinforcements by air. Port Commander

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reports 7,000 kg. of lubricating oil available for submarines.

Air Commander, Trondheim reports that on 19 April 1 light and 1 heavy cruiser as well as 2 transports were damaged by dive-bombers from Trondheim.

Bergen:

Unsuccessful bombing attack on the BREMSE in the morning. She is proceeding to Stavanger with four PT boats to take on troops.

The Army carried out operation "Uskadel". Ship "18" (Lieut (j.g.) Feldt), supporting the Army, brought in the Norwegian minelayer TYR as a prize after action with her and shore batteries. (1885, 260 tons, 10 knots, 1 x 12 cm, 1 x 7.6 cm, 2 x 3.7 cm guns).

Minesweeper M "1" operating on transfer of troops from Stavanger to Bergen.

North Sea:

With regard to the extension northward of the naval theater of operations and the necessity for improving the operational conditions of naval air forces, Group West requests the transfer of one long-range squadron each to Stavanger and Bergen. It regards ensuring of supplies and reinforcements and maintenance of tactical subordination to Group West as necessary conditions for this.

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During the night of 20 April:

Of the 9th Air Division the 3rd Squadron of the 506th Group and the 1st Squadron of the 106th Group carried out aerial minelaying operations in the Downs, in the Ramsgate-North Foreland area and Kings Channel. 26 LMB's dropped. Light anti-aircraft defense. Barrage balloons. (3 near Dover, 8 in Kings Channel in irregular formation at a height of 300-400 m.).

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Submarine alarm reports near Skagen, in the southern entrance to Oslo Fjord and at the northern entrance to the Little Belt. In the evening minesweeper M "7" reported the probable destruction of a submarine northeast of Skagen.

The mine situation is not yet cleared up. In the morning the first enemy mines were detected east of Aalbaeck Bay; one mine cut. A British mine with a brass cap was shot up east of Frederikshavn. The area is declared to be suspected of mines.

In the evening the Nyborg-Korsoer ferry, which was escorted by a mine-exploding vessel ahead, was damaged by an explosion and caught fire; apparently an enemy mine. Possibility of sabotage.

In the morning the WESER struck a mine north of Fredericia and was beached. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic suspects a wrongly placed mine of our own in the deep mine barrage there. Naval Staff inclines to the assumption that it was an enemy aerial mine.

Since the first British mine has now been discovered, Group Baltic considers further postponement of the equipment of all auxiliary ships and boats with efficient bow protection gear to be insupportable, since otherwise execution of transport

assignments is endangered. Further, equipment with bow protection gear of all steamers used on transport duties as well as tugs is requested. The Group's request is to be granted in full and speedy equipment as allowed by the facilities available will be started.

Transport Situation:

Fast troop transports carrying 2,500 men arrived in Larvik in the afternoon. (Steamers ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG escorted by torpedo-boats, PT boats and motor minesweepers). Further troops and material transported on steamers and drifters arrived in Oslo or are on the way. Close air escort with the transport groups and anti-submarine patrol day and night by naval air squadrons of Commander, Naval Air, Baltic.

Two torpedo boats have been temporarily put at Group West's disposal as escorts for minelayers.

Situation in Denmark:

Group Baltic reports:

1. Danish Navy agrees in principle to its own naval vessels taking over minesweeping duties in waters important to Danish economic traffic.
 2. The Danish Navy will at once begin overhaul of the Great Belt barrage. Relations with the Danish Navy are developing satisfactorily with a very favorable tendency. Chief, Naval Staff is anxious to spare as far as possible the national pride of the Danish Navy whose Commander in Chief has always shown the greatest loyalty to the German Navy's desires and demands, and to persuade the Danes themselves to cooperate in protecting and defending their own waters.
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Air Situation:

In accordance with the directive issued to it, the 5th Air Force concentrated on 20 April on attacking troop disembarkations near Namsos and Andalsnes. By the Fuehrer's order, the towns and railroad termini of Namsos and Andalsnes were to be destroyed without regard to the civilian population and railroads and roads effectively cut. Armed reconnaissance therefore also concentrated in the area Molde-Namsos Fjord. Attacks were made everywhere under the worst weather conditions. (Cloud only 200 m. high in the fjords). Considerable fires and hits in Namsos. 1,000 kg. hit on a cruiser off Andalsnes (heavy smoke), 2 x 500 kg. hits on a 15,000 ton transport, causing fire to break out. (For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)

Submarine Situation

Successes:

U "9" reports sinking a former Polish destroyer of the THUNDERBOLT class northeast of the Shetlands.

Disposition:

U "30", "34", "50" have been assigned positions northwest of the Shetlands. U "25", "65", "38" were sent out against the convoy reported by U "47".

U "52"'s position is between the Shetlands and the Hebrides.

U "57" and "59" may move their operational area by 70 miles to the northeast at their own discretion, since they were detected at their former positions by enemy radio direction finding.

Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have been given orders that supplies for Trondheim have top priority and

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transport submarines are therefore only to be used for supply assignments.

The previous order has been canceled and Commanding Admiral, Submarines himself entrusted with the loading of the submarines provided for transport. Order of priority is:

1. Aviation gasoline.
 2. 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns with accessories and ammunition.
 3. Ammunition for the Army if space still available.
-

With regard to fresh torpedo failures (U "47", "65"), which can be ascribed to failure of the magnetic firing, Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that, in spite of these results, even after advice from the Torpedo Inspectorate, he cannot go over to percussion firing. According to the latest experimental results the G 7e definitely keeps a depth up to 2.7 m. under that set, so that even with a torpedo depth-setting of only 2 m. (in good weather), normally, however, 3 m., targets of less than 5 or 6 m. can no longer be torpedoed. Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore states (see radiogram file, 0530) that the Navy has no torpedo for use in the area north of the Shetlands.

Merchant Shipping

In reply to a query, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast was informed that there is no objection to Swedish and Danish ships sailing from Norwegian ports to German waters, if steps have been taken to prevent these ships making off westwards. Swedish ships are to be prevented from sailing to the U.S.A. on various pretexts.

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For summary of instructions to date on the treatment of German, neutral and Norwegian ships in the Baltic, see radiogram file of 20 April, 1940.

Group Baltic gave orders as follows on 20 April for merchant shipping in the Kattegat:

The northern limit for traffic Aarhus Bay-Sletteshage-Hesseloe-Kullen must be maintained for military reasons. Traffic in Swedish waters, north of this line, with Swedish pilots is, however, permitted. Danish cattle and food transports may proceed from and to the east coast of Jutland. Passages are to take place close to the Danish coast at their own risk.

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

According to announcements by the King of Norway, there is no doubt that the whole of Norway is at war with Germany. Administrative Council in Oslo without influence. The Fuehrer has now therefore assigned General von Falkenhorst, Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway executive power. The latter will pass on to the base Commanders all powers in their area which are suitable and necessary to force the speediest subjection and pacification of the country.

France:

Reynaud spoke on France's foreign policy in southeast Europe before the Foreign Committee of the Senate. The aim of the policy was to maintain peace in the Balkans in loyal cooperation with Turkey. Italy had unfortunately not concurred with France's earlier proposals; France was trying to come to an agreement in the Mediterranean with Italy and Spain.

The Fuehrer awarded the Knight's Cross to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Schniewind and to Commanding Admiral, Submarines, Rear Admiral Doenitz.

1200:

Report from the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Lieut. Cdr. Schreiber to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:

The Attaché, now on the Staff of Commanding Admiral, Norway, gives a review of developments in Oslo from 8-11 April and of the present situation. (For period from 8-11 April see Naval Attaché's report in reference file "Weseruebung".)

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The Attaché is still of the opinion that almost unopposed occupation would have been possible given surprise. The stiffening of readiness to resist caused by the end of the Finnish conflict was correctly diagnosed beforehand. However, it was possible to keep the extensive agreements reached between the Norwegian and British Governments a secret from the Attaché. The Attaché states that he was surprised by the undoubtedly great bravery and fighting readiness of the Norwegian soldiers, which he had not expected. (A proof that the Attachés, since they of course only come into contact with certain circles of the people, can only receive a partial impression.) The Attaché is convinced that no revelation of the German operation actually took place up to the day before "Weserday". Norway's defensive readiness, even after the British violation of neutrality by minelaying, was still slight. The torpedoing of the steamers of the 1st Sea Transport Unit on 8 April, with the subsequent coming ashore of shipwrecked soldiers, was alone decisive for further developments. This alone made the Norwegian Government conscious of the presence of acute danger and led to the fateful order for defense and firing on the evening of 8 April.

The very slow penetration of meager German troop units to Oslo, which was delayed by fog (airborne troops), the resistance of coastal batteries and the loss of the BLUECHER, gave the Government time to escape and resulted in complete confusion amongst the population and authorities.

The Attaché considers the present political situation in Norway to be entirely confused. He has had violent disagreements with the Army and the Commanding General, General von Falkenhorst, on the subject of the treatment of the civilian population. The Armed Forces Command wishes to proceed as rigorously as possible and to carry out very severe measures such as taking hostages, in order to counter attempts at sabotage. The Attaché considers such draconic treatment to be incorrect from his knowledge of the mentality of the Norwegians as an old Germanic race. Commanding Admiral, Norway is also of the opinion that reprisals against hostages will not prevent acts of sabotage, but must lead to a general passive resistance and hereby injury to our

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German interests. The Attache has so far carried his point but fears, following General von Falkenhorst's assumption of executive power, the severest measures which he considers unsuitable for the treatment of the Norwegians.

In his opinion Norway will only be pacified if the Fuehrer directs that the "we come as friends to protect Norway" attitude and not the "Poland Scheme" is adopted.

The Attaché considers Quisling to be a prominent Norwegian national, inspired with good will; he would have been in an excellent position to take over the reins of Government if events had turned out favorably. His plan was to make it clear to the people immediately after the German troops moved in that the Germans came as friends, that the British had had plans to occupy the country and that the old Government had failed. As events have now turned out, Quisling could score no successes against the King, against the Norwegian army and against the German Armed Forces, which from the beginning put difficulties in his way.

The Attaché warns against too severe and rigorous action in Norway against the population of the occupied areas, since a general national rising would lead to incalculable difficulties for the German pacification. His proposal therefore runs: Clear order to occupying troops to act as peacefully, kindly and mildly as possible in the occupied areas, in the combat zone on the contrary to proceed as vigorously and ruthlessly as possible.

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Disposition of forces: the destroyer BULLDOG, escort destroyer of the carrier GLORIOUS, and another destroyer arrived in

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Devonport at 1300 on 19 April. According to this the aircraft carrier GLORIOUS has arrived in the home area.

Various alarm reports about the movements of Allied warships and transports in the eastern Mediterranean in the direction of the Dardanelles are considered untrustworthy rumors.

North Sea/Northern Waters

Area around Narvik:

Air reconnaissance sighted cruisers and transports off Harstad, 1 battleship, 5 destroyers in And Fjord, 1 cruiser, several destroyers off Narvik (see Own Situation).

Namsos/Mosjoen:

No clear picture of the situation on land in the Namsos area. According to Swedish reports, the strength of the troops landed near Namsos amounts to 2 British and 1 French division. On the other hand, Reuter gives the total strength of the expeditionary troops landed in the whole of Norway as 2 British and 1 French Division, with 50,000 men. The troops landed in the Namsos area are said to be in communication with Norwegian troops near Steinkjaer. Namsos harbor, bombed yesterday by the Air Force, is burnt out. Destroyers and merchant steamers were detected in the fjord. The trawler INDIAN STAR was despatched to Mosjoen by Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron, in order to investigate conditions with the landing troops regarding supplies and communications with Namsos.

Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron seems to be aboard the destroyer NUBIAN.

Anti-submarine units are proceeding to Namsos and into the Lofoten area,

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U "47" and "65" shadowed the convoy reported yesterday, which was last sighted about 120 miles northwest of Mosjoen on north-easterly course, speed 7 knots and is apparently steering for West Fjord or the Lofotens. Another convoy on southerly course was reported by U "30" at noon 40 miles north of the Shetlands.

Molde Fjord-Andalsnes area:

2 cruisers, 2 destroyers and several merchant steamers in Romsdals Fjord. The railroad line Andalsnes-Dombas has been cut by the Air Force.

Scapa area:

Radio intelligence showed that the cruisers DEVONSHIRE and BERWICK, also the French cruiser EMILE BERTIN, put in to Scapa. The cruiser BIRMINGHAM put in to Scapa on the morning of 20 April.

Southeast coast:

A British minesweeper reports discovery of mines near the South Brake Buoy. This lies between the Goodwin Sands and the coast in the Downs (aerial mines?).

According to radio intelligence, eight enemy submarines are at present operating in the Skagerrak/Kattegat, two of which are to commence return passage to Harwich on the afternoon of 21 April. Five more boats west of the Skagerrak as far as Marsten. Positions north of Norderney and north of Texel were again occupied.

Own Situation

Situation in the Atlantic:

Atlantic Ships "16" and "36" are being kept constantly informed about the situation and news of foreign merchant shipping. Enemy papers seized in Norway about the management of the convoy service, routing, points of departure, etc., make it possible to equip the ships with excellent data for the conduct of war against merchant shipping.

Narvik:

Commander, Armed Forces has assumed executive power. Local authorities have submitted under pressure.

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British cruisers and destroyers bombarded the town and destroyed the ore railroad bridge near Forsneset by gunfire.

Lively boat traffic from warships and trawlers to Bogen Fjord indicates further enemy landings on the north bank of Ofot Fjord.

Group Narvik requests air reconnaissance and air support. Four anti-tank guns with crews and ammunition are requested.

The evacuation of wounded via Sweden is requested.

Attempt to evacuate survivors from ships and neutrals via Sweden has so far failed, since Sweden refuses to permit trains to enter Norwegian territory again.

Negotiations on this have been commenced via the Foreign Office.

Group West has informed Group Narvik that minelaying by submarines is scheduled in about ten days.

Trondheim:

As opposed to Commander, Armed Forces, who considers Trondheim's land situation assured, the Port Commander considers the situation difficult because of the disembarkation of British troops in Namsos Fjord and Andalsnes. (According to prisoner of war statement, one British battalion is now in Steinkjaer). Sea and fjord reconnaissance still inadequate owing to lack of facilities; the Port Commander therefore requests allocation of two submarines.

Blocking of the important Steinkjaer Channel north of Trondheim by a combined Army/Navy operation has commenced.

Bergen:

Commander, Armed Forces has assumed executive power. Authorities are willing to cooperate.

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The BREMSE ran aground in the Parmsund on a transport assignment and is stuck fast. Troops on board were landed in Haugesund by PT boats.

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests that minesweeper M "1" may be left for special assignments (protection against mines, supplies for troops, bringing in merchantmen). He also reports that to an increasing degree the tasks arising can no longer be fulfilled without motor minesweepers. The PT boats are at present indispensable because of constant defense and transport assignments, also pilot duties.

The allocation of two minesweepers is requested for the operation against Voss, for which it is necessary to give up the Army battalion in Hardanger Fjord. This allocation is not possible, however. On the other hand minesweeper M "1" is left with Admiral, West Norwegian Coast until further notice.

Elimination of Boemen airfield is demanded, since enemy planes are suspected to be attacking from there.

Stavanger-Kristiansand:

Nothing to report.

Oslo:

No defense possible in Oslo Fjord because of the lack of units.

The Norwegian submarines A "3" and "4" were detected in Melsonvik at 10 m. depth by a diver. It may be possible to salvage them.

In a letter to Commander in Chief, Navy dated 19 April, Commanding Admiral, Norway reports on the present situation in Norway and especially in Oslo and reports his plans. In addition to looking after the Oslo area and all coastal defenses along the Norwegian coast, the Admiral also feels himself responsible for seaward defenses, insofar as they concern the skerries and fjord area.

Here he considers artillery defense ashore, patrol, reporting service and defense by suitable naval forces, as well as mine defense, an inseparable whole and summarizes his renewed request for:

1. Clear definition of spheres of responsibility.
2. Leaving Norwegians naval vessels in general for

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Norwegian coastal waters. Single ones to be given up only when requirements are met along the Norwegian coast. (For letter see reference file "Weseruebung".)

Naval Staff's attitude to the question of definition of spheres of responsibility and allocation of units is as follows:

1. The area east of the Skagerrak declared area is a complete operational area in itself, in which only one office can control and command.
2. This area is closely connected with the adjoining entrances to the Baltic to the south, in which Group Baltic is responsible. Responsibility for the whole area and operations by units in this area for the various assignments which arise here is therefore entirely that of Group Baltic.
3. There will probably always be a certain concentration of enemy submarine operations off the south coast of Norway. The danger is directed against the stream of traffic constantly putting in and out of the ports, that is, not against stationary coastal defense installations but against flowing traffic at sea, which therefore also requires not only stationary but constant escorting defense.
4. On account of its importance Oslo Fjord will always remain a dangerous area for supply traffic. It therefore seems advisable to institute permanent local defense here. Similarly to the way in which harbor defense flotillas exist at other places, everything is to be done here too - and at other spots along the Norwegian coast - to institute an effective, purely local patrol and defense under the command of the Port Commander in question. Seagoing units will on no account be considered for these duties.
5. The abundance of the assignments and the relatively small number of units demand their use by one office in order to guarantee equal strain and the greatest economy.

This does not exclude a temporary allocation for certain vital assignments. But this must also be

done by one office, i.e. Group Baltic.

Naval Staff's decision on the subject of definition of the areas of defense and responsibility therefore runs:

1. Group Baltic is responsible for the entire sea area east of the Skagerrak declared area, concentrating on anti-submarine measures.
2. Defense of ports on the south coast of Norway and of the inner Oslo Fjord north of Horten is the task of the Port Commanders and is therefore in Commanding Admiral, Norway's sphere as soon as harbor defense units are available.

The open sea area of the outer Oslo Fjord belongs to the sphere of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and therefore of Group Baltic.

3. Since there are at present no harbor defense flotillas in operational readiness for southern Norway and there is only a relatively small number of units available for the many tasks in the Baltic area, forces will still be allocated by Group Baltic for the present, taking into consideration vital tasks. Efforts are to be made to make available efficient harbor defense flotillas from the Baltic to Commanding Admiral, Norway as soon as possible or provision by Commanding Admiral, Norway of Norwegian vessels for these tasks.
4. Group Baltic will take into consideration as far as possible Commanding Admiral, Norway's request for the allocation of units. Group Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Norway will arrange the time when Port Commanders take over harbor defense assignments for the individual ports.

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Situation in the North Sea:

Because of a still unexplained explosion astern of the steamer FRANZ OHLROGGE, a mine warning report has been given for the Elbe between peacetime position Elbe I and buoy 17.

It is possible that the enemy is using aerial mines in the Elbe. Investigations by mine-exploding vessels and a harbor defense flotilla are in progress.

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Submarine alarm reports north of Kullen and south of Samsøe. According to the Radio Monitoring Service, eight enemy submarines are operating in the Skagerrak/Kattegat at present. Anti-submarine patrol and air escort as planned.

Mine Situation:

The steamer TOGO was damaged by striking a mine off Frederikshavn. 100 per cent searching sweep of the suspicious area is being continued.

Mines of the deep mine barrage at the northern entrance to the Little Belt were again swept.

The location of the WESER's accident was investigated. No discoveries.

The Danish steamer ANNE sent "S.O.S. Ship must be abandoned", in the Skagerrak.

Naval Staff's instructions to Group West to confirm the effectiveness of the Skagerrak mine barrage by a deceptive radio message have thus been carried out. The S.O.S. was picked up and repeated by British transmitters.

Transport Situation:

Transports of personnel and material proceed as planned.

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Submarine Situation

Commanding Admiral, Submarines has issued the following instructions for firing torpedoes with percussion firing:

With percussion firing depth = draught-1 m., against destroyers, submarines and steamers under 4,000 tons 3 m., in good weather 2 m.

Depth-setting 2 m. not permitted for G 7a.
Set depth at 5 m. for battleships.

Distribution of submarines

North of Trondheim:	U "25".
Northwest of Mosjoen:	U "38", "47", "65".
Bergen and area off Bergen:	U "61".
East of the Shetlands:	U "23", "24", "17", "14".
West of the Shetlands:	U "34".
North of the Hebrides:	U "52".
West of the Orkneys:	U "30".
East of the Orkneys:	U "59", "57", "58".
Pentland Firth:	U "13".
Return passage:	U "46", "51", "9", "60", "62", "19", "56", "26", "43".
Proceeding to Trondheim:	U "29".
Missing:	U "49", "50", "1".
In home waters:	U "10", "28", "32", "37", "4", "2", "3", "5", "6", "7", "18", "20", "21", "42".

Air Situation

Concentration on supporting Army operations and on reconnaissance and combat tasks in the Aalesund-Andalsnes-Namsos area. For particulars see "Air Force Events of the Day" (radiogram 2400 and "Air Situation").

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Merchant Shipping

The steamer AFRIKA sailed from Bergen to Stavanger without escort on 16 April, contrary to orders; she has been overdue since then.

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Items of Political Importance

Norway:

For General Falkenhorst's appeal for an amnesty, on the occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday, for Norwegians who have incurred a death sentence according to martial law see Foreign Press Report.

Sweden:

The King of Sweden has sent a letter to the Fuehrer expressing his desire for absolute neutrality. During his conferences in Berlin Admiral Tamm gained the impression that German authorities thought Sweden would not defend her neutrality with all possible means. The King stresses in his letter that Sweden will do everything to defend her neutrality by armed force.

(For appreciation of the situation in Sweden, see Political Review.)

Italy:

On National Labor Day the Duce made a short speech to the workers from the Palazzo Venecia. He said:

"Today's celebrations have an especially solemn character as a result of events. It can be summarized by the words:

'Work and Weapons'

I am certain that this is the watchword of the entire Italian nation from the Alps to the shores of Africa."

Russia:

It is revealed from a reliable source:

1. The Baltic States will be swallowed up by Russia in the summer, in August at the latest;
2. The internal political effect of the Finnish war has, by means of skillful propaganda by him, led to a great strengthening of Stalin's position inside Russia;
3. The Russian Army is at present divided into

three main groups:

- a) in the Baltic States
 - b) in front of Bessarabia
 - c) around Murmansk (as a front against surprise attacks from the Norwegian theater).
 - d) substantial reinforcements have not gone to the Caucasus.
4. Russia does not wish to quarrel with Great Britain and France. (Courier service through Russia permitted after cessation of other communications.)
 5. A severe blow has been struck to Great Britain's intelligence service from the whole Baltic area by the Norway operation.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

1. For Quisling's memorandum on the development of the situation in Norway see reference file "Weseruebung".
2. The Fuehrer ordered on 21 April that, with regard to the tense situation in Trondheim, the destroyers PAUL JACOBI and THEODOR RIEDEL should remain in Trondheim temporarily to strengthen the naval front.

Naval Staff has complied with this special wish of the Fuehrer since the present enemy situation and state of readiness of the destroyers make a return offer little prospect of success at the present time. It is, however, fundamentally of the opinion that the destroyers are most unsuited to the task intended for them by Armed Forces High Command and that they run the risk in Trondheim of being hemmed in or falling victim to dive-bombing from the enemy aircraft carriers.

It therefore adheres to its plan to propose to the Fuehrer the return of the destroyers when the enemy situation is more favorable.

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3. The various, still unexplained mine explosions and hits on mines in the Kattegat and on the Elbe now most probably indicate the first use of aerial mines by the British. It cannot yet be stated whether these are ground mines or moored mines and whether they were parachuted or laid from planes landing on the water. Speedy salvage of such a mine is of decisive importance in combatting them.

4. Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark and Group Baltic consider the present time politically most unsuitable for a possible taking-over of the Danish Fleet by Germany, which was being considered for carrying out defense assignments. Among Danish officers and in other circles of the Danish population there are those who regret the King of Denmark's decision for a peaceful solution, with reference to the Norwegian Army's defensive action. It is to be feared that a demand for the handing-over of the Danish Navy to Germany, which would strongly affect Danish honor, would greatly disturb pacification in Denmark. It is therefore proposed that such a measure be abandoned for the present.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the proposal. Taking-over of Danish naval vessels by Germany is to be entirely avoided if possible and instead the Danish Navy is to be requested to carry out defense and protective measures with its own personnel.

5. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff judges the situation in Trondheim to be very strained in view of the extensive landings by the Western Powers in the Namsos area and in Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes. Army troops and supplies are constantly being brought up by means of transport planes, but this cannot be done by air to the necessary extent, especially with heavy arms and guns. The Fuehrer therefore plans to bring up stronger forces by sea and has ordered that the fast steamers EUROPA and BREMEN and the East Asia steamers GNEISENAU and POTSDAM be made ready to sail at once. Naval Staff is to submit to immediate investigation the operational practicability of such a single supply operation to Trondheim.

For survey of the situation see reference file "Weseruebung".

The following conclusion is arrived at:

1. The operation would lead through an area which the enemy dominates with much superior forces and which is exposed to very severe danger from the air.

2. Escort of the transport formation by the battleships and all available destroyers and torpedo boats would be necessary.
3. The length of the route would make unobserved advance impossible and allow the enemy plenty of time to concentrate such superior forces that even before they reached their goal there would be nothing left for the vessels of the German Fleet but to fight to the last. The operation would therefore mean, for the second time, an all-out operation by the entire Fleet still in war readiness, with very slight prospects of successfully carrying out the transport operation.
4. The large transports would be very greatly exposed to danger from the air. Enemy bombing and dive-bombing attacks would endanger the ships, troops on board and material most severely even after the ships put in to Trondheim.
5. The loss of the transports and the battleships in action against a superior enemy would mean the most severe loss of prestige and thus a definite setback in the whole Norway action. After the loss of the battleships there would be very serious danger to the safety of sea communications in the Skagerrak because of the weakness of German forces.

Naval Staff is therefore forced to advise Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff decidedly against the execution of such a transport undertaking.

1500:

Commander in Chief, Navy in conference with the Fuehrer.

Commander in Chief, Navy submitted Naval Staff's objections to the Trondheim transport operation and proposed that in case of necessity the crossing could be made to Stavanger with the GNEISENAU and POTSDAM.

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The Fuehrer agreed with Naval Staff's objections and ordered the preparation of the East Asia steamers. If possible, transport as far as Bergen is to be undertaken.

Further points discussed with the Fuehrer:

- Submarine transports
- Transport of coastal batteries to Stavanger
- Transports for Oslo
- Use of naval forces for defense assignments
- Use of aerial mines by enemy planes
- Postponement of use of Danish naval vessels for the German Navy
- Report on failure of submarine torpedoes.

Commander in Chief, Navy also pointed out the urgent operational need for the use of aerial mines in Scapa and the Clyde by the operational Air Force. The Fuehrer stated that Commander in Chief, Air Force considers the formations not yet sufficiently trained to lay mines in Scapa.

Naval Staff cannot acknowledge this Air Force argument. The 9th Air Division has already carried out aerial minelaying operations and proved their practicability. It is now of decisive importance, regarding the British operations in Norway, if ground mines are laid in the main supply port, Scapa, and the main port of embarkation, Glasgow on the Clyde, so that the greatest difficulties are thus put in the way of the British. Naval Staff considers the request extremely urgent.

(For particulars see Commander in Chief, Navy's memorandum of conference with the Fuehrer, War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.)

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Nothing special to report.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

1 battleship, 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers were detected in the

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And Fjord/Harstad area. Off Narvik the cruisers PENELOPE, ENTERPRISE and four destroyers bombarded Narvik's harbor and defense installations.

In the Namsos area:

Several enemy destroyers were attacked by the Air Force. The transport CHOBRY, which disembarked troops in Namsos, put in to the Clyde on 21 April.

Namsos harbor has been burnt out as the result of air attacks.

Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes:

Lively traffic consisting of British transports and naval forces indicates that enemy action is at present concentrated here. Five transports put in to Molde Fjord and two cruisers were sighted putting out. The cruiser ARETHUSA and several destroyers off Andalsnes. Destroyers and steamers were reported putting in and out of Romsdals Fjord.

Home area:

Air reconnaissance reported three battleships and five cruisers in a bay on the west side of the Shetlands, also numerous large merchantmen in Kirkwall Bay. Scapa was not covered because of clouds. In the evening U "57" reported a large cruiser and destroyers on northeasterly course east of the Shetlands.

The battleship RESOLUTION and a second battleship are operating on convoy duties between the Shetlands and Lofotens.

During the last few days there has been no indication of the presence of heavy French vessels in the northern area.

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Own Situation:

Atlantic:

Auxiliary cruisers were informed about the movements of enemy forces and merchant shipping. (See radiograms 1501, 1514.)

North Sea area:

Sailing and action readiness of the battleships has been re-established except for a slight restriction of fire control on the GNEISENAU and for maximum continuous speed of 28.5 knots in the case of the SCHARNHORST. The urgently desired activity by the battleships through operations in the Shetlands-
Stadtlandet area must for the present be abandoned on account of the deeply regrettable state of readiness of the destroyers (at present only two in full operational readiness) and with regard to the final decision of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, still awaited, on the transport operation to Bergen.

With reference to the extension northwards of the theater of naval operations, Group West requests the transfer of the 806th Coast Patrol Group (He 111) to more favorably situated operational bases. Westerland is suggested, if necessary at least as a jump-off base for formations of Commander, Naval Air, West.

The question is being reviewed by the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy.

The Elbe is again opened by Group West after an unsuccessful check sweep for mines.

Twelve planes of the 3rd Squadron of the 506th Group and twelve further planes of the 1st and 2nd Groups of the 126th Bomber Wing carried out aerial minelaying operations in the area off Harwich and in the Downs. The planes were spotted and reported by enemy patrol vessels and minesweepers when dropping the mines.

(Mines are said to have been laid in the vicinity of Goodwin Knoll Buoy.)

Because of the aerial minelaying operation carried out in the Downs on 21 April, a directive was issued to all British air forces that all planes, whether with navigation lights on or off, would be attacked by night fighters if they approached the coast under 4,000 feet altitude within a 40 mile radius around Northumberland.

Narvik:

Tromsø transmitter advised the civilian population to leave the town as a British bombardment was imminent. At 1200 Group Narvik reported bombardment of railroad lines and defense installations by an ENTERPRISE class cruiser and a PENELOPE class cruiser and four destroyers. Further destroyers are obviously covering troop disembarkations in Bogen Fjord. Major General Dietl reports that Narvik will be held at all costs. At night British destroyers are patrolling in the immediate vicinity of Narvik and in Rombaken Fjord.

Trondheim:

Army operation against Steinkjaer and Verdalsoeren, supported by one destroyer and one torpedo boat.

Bergen:

Unit advanced as far as Vaksdal in Soer Fjord with the support of Ship "18". Ship "18" destroyed a Norwegian patrol vessel.

The BREMSE was refloated and is to go into dock in Stavanger.

At the request of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast, the 1st PT Boat Flotilla has been put at his disposal to help the Army operation against Voss. Group West must therefore relinquish operational control of the PT boats for this period.

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For defense of the sea route between Skudesnes and Kristiansand, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast proposes a flanking barrage outside the 3 mile line from Utsire as far as the enemy barrage system off Lister Fjord. Since there are at present no mines with long mooring ropes available for laying the requested flanking barrages, with which Naval Staff is in fundamental agreement, they must be postponed for the present.

Stavanger:

Unsuccessful air raids on the evening of 21 April ended in two enemy bombers being shot down.

The steamers PALIME and PELIKAN have put in to Stavanger with the first two 15 cm. guns for the coastal battery.

South coast of Norway:

Commanding Admiral, Norway considers that the situation on the south coast is now so far clarified that Norwegian naval vessels need no longer be expected in this area. Defense therefore now only necessary by patrol units.

Commanding Admiral, Norway now has at his disposal for defense of the inner Oslo Fjord the 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, consisting of 8 boats, whale catchers RAU "7" and "8", 2 Norwegian whale boats and the Norwegian boats of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which are constantly being added and cannot be used outside the fjords.

Group Baltic thus takes over defense of Oslo Fjord only from 59° 25' N, southwards. Defense, however, only as allowed by available forces, i.e. mostly only in the course of protection for transports to Oslo. Further, Group Baltic is equipping 10 motor drifters each for Oslo and Kristiansand as emergency harbor defense boats, with depth charges and minesweeping gear. Arming with captured Norwegian guns is planned (see radiograms 1356 and 2315).

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Skagerrak/Kattegat:

According to radio intelligence there were five enemy submarines in the Skagerrak area on the morning of 22 April. Two submarines left Harwich for the Skagerrak in the forenoon. Some of them are French.

Various submarine chases and depth charging had no visible result.

The western portion of the net barrage has been laid from the coast of Jutland near Ebeltoft via the island of Hjelm to Seelands Rev.

Mine Situation:

Minesweeping near Hirsholm and off Frederikshavn continues. Five brass-cap mines swept. Check sweeping of the Skagerrak barrage and sweeping in Sprogø Channel and the Little Belt is in progress.

Transport Situation:

Fast troop transport unit with 530 men put in to Larvik. Further troops and material on nine steamers in three groups are on their way to Oslo as planned.

Armed Forces High Command has ordered the immediate transfer of the 11th Rifle Brigade from Aalborg to Oslo. Five steamers have been hastily sent from Oslo to Aalborg for this purpose.

Situation in Sweden:

The Swedish Government has taken the following new legal steps for the purpose of ensuring defense of the country.

It is forbidden to put in to ports and enter port areas at all important places on the east and west coast of Sweden until permission has been obtained from the shipping control offices in Stockholm and Gothenburg.

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Submarine Situation

U "51" put in to port. U "52", "38", "47" commenced return passage. U "26" sank a 6,000 ton supply steamer from a convoy north of Stadlandet.

U "61" sailed for the Shetlands after taking on supplies in Bergen.

U "62" reports a suspected mined area 100 miles east of Fair Passage.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

Air Situation

The operational Air Force concentrated on supporting the Army in operations on land and in the adjoining sea area of Andalsnes-Namsos (see Air Force Events of the Day, Volume Air Situation).

Successes against naval forces:

1 destroyer hit by	1 x 250 kg. bomb north of Andalsnes;	severely damaged.
1 destroyer hit by	2 x 250 kg. bombs west of Molde Fjord;	stern cut off, unable to move.
2 steamers (supply?)		Sunk.
2 steamers		Severely damaged.

Merchant Shipping

The Naval Attaché in Stockholm reports that there is not a sufficient number of pilots available at present for Swedish territorial waters on the west coast. Sweden therefore asks us to send only groups of three or four ships at present. Provision of a sufficient number of pilots is again requested.

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

Pacification is making progress in southern Norway. Results of radio and leaflet propaganda discernible. Normal life and activities in Oslo. So far no acts of sabotage in the Oslo municipal area.

A Norwegian White Paper published in London makes the following statements:

1. The German Government undertook no demarche with regard to the Norwegian Government before the first units of the expeditionary corps had already arrived in Norwegian waters and were in action against Norwegian forces.
2. The German Ambassador in Norway, who knew before 8 April that a German expedition had left German ports, did not try to justify the German action as a countermeasure against the British minelaying.
3. The Norwegian Government tried to negotiate as long as possible. The Fuehrer, however, refused to conduct further negotiations with Norway and demanded the appointment of Quisling as Prime Minister; a demand that he himself had to relinquish later. This shows that Germany is incapable of making the slightest concessions even to a country which has always yielded to a great extent to her wishes.

Russia:

1. A reliable source states that as the result of skillful propaganda the Finnish war has led to a strengthening of Stalin's internal political position.
2. The Russian Army's main forces are, in the Baltic States, around Murmansk and at the Bessarabian frontier. No substantial reinforcements have gone to the Caucasus.

Ireland:

The Embassy in Dublin reports that strong representations by the Irish Government have succeeded in freeing the Irish citizens living in Great Britain from conscription. About 25,000 Irishmen are exempted from conscription by this important step.

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Near East:

Weygand's efforts to reinforce the Orient Army and to attain greater freedom of action are said to have been frustrated finally by Gamelin's resistance. Considerable differences of opinion are mentioned between Great Britain and France regarding the supreme command of the Orient Army and its operations. Weygand's demand for supreme command of all Allied forces has been nullified by a British counter-move, as General Wavell has been appointed Supreme Commander of all British forces in the East.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has relinquished its demand for a transport operation to Trondheim because of Naval Staff's rejection. Instead, transport to Bergen is to be reviewed.

Naval Staff considers the operation practicable, even though with certain misgivings. Crossing should be carried out so that at dawn the transports are off Skudesnes, where strong anti-submarine escort and precautionary anti-submarine measures will await the transports.

At a speed of advance of 20 knots in the open sea, the ships would then have to leave the estuaries about 0600 on the day before and cross the latitude of Hanstholm (57° N) at about 2100.

Defense:

From the Heligoland Bight to Skudesnes close escort by the Fleet, strong anti-submarine escort, own bow protection gear, own anti-aircraft weapons, air escort by Air Force fighter and heavy fighter formations.

Picked up by PT boats from Skudesnes; the Fleet forces will be out to sea and will protect the transports advancing in the skerries against penetration by enemy surface forces and partly also against surprise attacks by enemy bombers from the west.

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It is necessary for the operation that very strong air escort of the transports by fighter and heavy fighter formations be provided until the troops and material have been disembarked in Bergen.

Group West has very strong objections to the despatch of the POTSDAM and GNEISENAU because of the great danger from the air, and proposes that the troops should be given fast transport on destroyers and torpedo boats (possible to take over about 1,200 men at one time).

The question is being re-considered by Naval Staff.

Since the whole transfer, following the Group's proposal, would however be protracted and danger from mines and from the air would remain about the same, Naval Staff considers that the Group's executive plan offers no material advantages but, on the contrary, considerable disadvantages. (See also 24 April.)

1200:

Report by the Assistant Naval Attaché at the Hague, Lt. Cdr. Besthorn, to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:

The Dutch Government is firmly resolved to defend its neutrality against both sides with all the means in its power. While earlier only an Operation "East" was expected, Operation "West" is now also regarded as very threatening. Extensive security measures taken in Holland on 9 April. All men on leave recalled. Fear of British landing. Great alarm on 13/14 April because of alleged British Fleet demonstration off the Dutch coast. Assumed in Holland that if Germany attacks Holland the U.S.A. will enter the war on the side of the Allies.

Opinion on the Norway action is that the German landing was only possible as a result of the treachery of Norwegian officers.

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Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Great Britain:

The HOOD probably off the west coast of Great Britain. Radio intelligence detected transports sailing from and putting in to the Clyde with convoy escort.

Barrages in the Clyde have been extended to the North Channel off the Clyde and Kilbrennan Sound. The area was announced to be a declared area. Passing ships are individually informed of the gaps in the barrage.

In the Gibraltar area there is a strong concentration of forces previously operating in the Atlantic: the ROYAL SOVEREIGN, previously in Canada, appeared in that area. The MALAYA proceeded from Great Britain to Gibraltar on 21 April. The ORION, coming from the West Indies, put in to Gibraltar on 22 April, the NEPTUNE and the destroyers DECOY and DEFENDER, coming from Freetown, on 23 April. The two destroyers DIAMOND and DAINTY, so far also in Freetown, escorted the repair ship RESOURCE to Gibraltar and put in to Malta on 21 April.

The submarines OTUS and ORPHEUS, coming from the East, passed Port Said on 20 April; the British transport LANCASHIRE (9,557 tons) with 700 troops aboard, the French transport DESIRAD (9,645 tons) with 1,500 colored troops aboard passed Port Said towards the Mediterranean on 20 April.

The CORNWALL, formerly in the South Africa area, is at present in the Freetown area. The CUMBERLAND, also formerly in South Africa, has probably been moved there too. Quite possible that these two ships will go on to Great Britain.

France:

A number of the forces previously stationed off the west coast of Africa has been withdrawn during the past two weeks. Even if details cannot be ascertained, it can be assumed that only single destroyers, submarines, and perhaps one or two cruisers are still stationed in Dakar and Casablanca. The cruiser JEANNE D'ARC and several submarines are still suspected to be in Fort de France.

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The auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic (Ships "16" and "36") were informed by radiogram of intelligence on the enemy situation.

North Sea/Northern Waters

Area around Narvik:

Cruisers and destroyers in Ofot and Rombaken Fjords bombarded ore railroad installations. The cruiser VINDICTIVE appears to be controlling net laying in the Lofoten area.

Namsos area:

The anti-aircraft cruiser CALCUTTA and another cruiser off Namsos. Nothing new regarding troop disembarkations.

Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes:

The cruiser ARETHUSA left Andalsnes to proceed to Rosyth. The cruiser CURACAO is off Andalsnes as anti-aircraft defense. Air reconnaissance spotted and attacked destroyers and supply steamers at the entrance to Molde Fjord. No important landings could be seen.

Several destroyers and single steamers, some putting in and some out, were sighted in the fjords between Sogne Fjord and Kristiansund.

Home area:

Air reconnaissance by the operational Air Force sighted 2 aircraft carriers, cruisers and 15 destroyers in Scapa Flow on 22 April. U "65" reports a battle cruiser with destroyer escort 200 miles north-northeast of the Shetlands on southerly course.

The cruiser BIRMINGHAM put in to Scapa. According to subsequent radio evaluation, the GLASGOW and SHEFFIELD left Scapa on 20 April.

Lively minesweeping activity, primarily against magnetic mines, in the Downs is to be seen from radio traffic. The magnetic sweeps are said to extend specially to the channel between the Humber lightship and Spurn Point.

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The British steamer LOLWORTH (1,970 tons) and the Italian steamer ITALO BALBO (5,100 tons) struck mines off the southeast coast.

Own Situation

Atlantic:

Disposition of enemy forces was passed on to the auxiliary cruisers. Tendency at present to move heavy enemy forces to the North Sea, certain concentration in the Gibraltar area, weakening of Atlantic forces.

North Sea/Northern Waters

Situation in the North Sea:

Group West requests the allocation of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla, because of the complete lack of vessels suitable for escorting supply steamers on the Heligoland Bight-Stavanger-Bergen route. Group Baltic has great objections to handing over the flotilla, thus completely depriving Kristiansand of naval forces and removing any sort of defense for the entrance to the Skagerrak, since Group Baltic has no available substitute.

In spite of this Naval Staff feels obliged to put the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla at Group West's disposal, having regard to the new North Sea assignments (Bergen transports, defense assignments off the southwest coast of Norway, battleship sorties). The TSINGTAU is, however, to remain in Kristiansand, which will still be the main base of the PT Boat Flotilla until further notice.

Group West is to allocate assignments to the Flotilla so that if necessary it is still possible to use it for defense of the entrance to the Skagerrak.

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Narvik:

Close enemy destroyer patrol off the port and in Rombaken. Cruisers and destroyers bombarded the ore railroad installations from Rombaken in the forenoon. The Group is constantly requesting air support, since there are no defensive weapons available against naval forces. Commander, Armed Forces expects a large-scale enemy attack soon. Ore railroad was effectively cut by the enemy. (See radiogram 1803.)

Trondheim:

Because of the lack of communications between Bergen and Trondheim, Commanding Admiral, Norway has for the present assumed direct authority over Port Commander, Trondheim.

Supply submarine U "29" has put in to Trondheim.

Commanding Admiral, Norway was informed by Naval Staff that the return of both Trondheim destroyers is planned after the establishment of maximum possible readiness to proceed. Further armament is therefore not to be removed. A favorable opportunity for the return passage must be awaited.

Bergen:

Nothing special to report. Land operations against Voss were continued successfully. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests the allocation of armed trawlers, especially since Ship "18" urgently requires a 14 day overhaul after operations off Voss.

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Naval Staff has issued the following directive regarding definition of the areas of responsibility of Groups Baltic and West:

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1. The line dividing Group Baltic and Group West is the eastern limit of the Skagerrak declared area.
2. Patrol of the southern barrage gap is the affair of Group West.

Patrol of the northern passage is the affair of Group Baltic.
3. Limit of responsibility for coastal defense is the point of intersection of the eastern limit of the declared area with the coastlines. According to this, Hanstholm is under Coastal Defense Commander, North Friesland.
4. Military and administrative subordination as per military line of demarcation as under 3.
5. Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark will handle general economic questions for the whole Danish area.

Enemy submarines are appearing in greater strength in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. Submarine alarm reports south of Oslo Fjord, north of Skagen, north of Kullen, near Schultz Grund. Submarine-chaser "B" was torpedoed and destroyed north of Skagen. Torpedoboat T "153" and the 17th Submarine-Chaser Flotilla report probable destruction of three enemy submarines in all (two to be assumed as definite).

Mine Situation:

According to a Danish report, the dredger PROGRESS struck a mine and sank in the Drogden in the morning. At 1817 mine-sweeper M "1302" was lost off Frederikshavn after striking a mine.

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The 17th Submarine-Chaser Flotilla reports that at 2040 on 23 April it sighted three planes at a great distance dropping large parachutes, apparently mines, about 1 mile east of the Storamiddel Grund southeast of Anholt.

The flight of numerous enemy planes is reported via Schleswig Holstein into the Western Baltic as far as Warnemuende.

Check sweeping of the ferry route Nyborg-Korsoer with special gear was without result.

Transport Situation and Escort Service:

Transport assignments carried out as planned. Fast transport of 420 men has arrived in Larvik. Mixed material and troop transports arrived in Oslo.

Since no trawlers and drifters can be seized in the area of the south coast of Norway, Group Baltic requests the speedy seizure of 30-40 trawlers and the same number of drifters and quick transfer to the Baltic. Group Baltic also requests the quickest possible provision of guns for those units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic not yet equipped with them. (See teletype 1348.)

Naval Staff must refuse the Group's request for the allocation of the 4th and 6th Minesweeper Flotillas from the North Sea because of urgent assignments in that area.

Sweden:

For Swedish demarche because Swedish territory has in numerous cases been flown over, see radiogram file, 1815.

For reports about defense measures in Swedish ports and airports see radiogram 2330.

Submarine Situation

U "29" put in to Trondheim and was ordered to take up position in the area north of the Shetlands after refuelling. U "61" was allocated the North Minch and the area off Loch Ewe as operational area.

U "30" was allocated the area due north of the Minch and northwest of the Hebrides, U "34" northwest of the Orkneys, U "65" west of the Shetlands and U "25" north of the Shetlands. U "13" is west of Pentland Firth.

Otherwise unchanged.

Air Situation

Numerous Air Force operations to reconnoiter and combat the enemy landings. One destroyer off Molde Fjord damaged by bombs, also several transports. The operational Air Force concentrated on supporting Army operations.

For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day of 23 April.

Merchant Shipping

A rough estimate of the Scandinavian shipping which fell into the hands of the Western Powers because of the Norway and Denmark action shows, after subtraction of the shipping space already chartered by the Western Powers, an addition of about 2.4 million GRT, so that tonnage lost to date is thereby compensated. (Marginal note by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: estimated somewhat too high. Some were anyway always sailing for Great Britain.)

According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Lisbon, the Norwegians have painted over the neutrality markings on their ships, also the national markings, names and country of origin,

so that they are no longer recognizable as Norwegian ships.

The Soviet Government has given permission for German trawlers to put in to Murmansk and instructed the competent authorities in Murmansk to this effect.

It appears from a report from Santander that a Finnish steamer which put in there was equipped with a cable device against magnetic mines. It must therefore now be assumed that neutral steamers are also already provided with "anti-magnetic girdles".

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

Nothing to report.

Sweden:

The German Ambassador reports that Foreign Minister Guenther has made a very serious protest against violations of neutrality by German planes. (40-50 flights on 21 April alone.) He asked whether the German attitude to Swedish neutrality had altered; the Swedish public was greatly disturbed by the German violations of neutrality.

The Military Attaché reports that the Swedish Government has expressly repudiated the German Naval Staff's assertions that Swedish territorial waters have repeatedly been utilized by Norwegian or British naval forces.

The Swedish Government denies rumors according to which the Swedish authorities have permitted German reinforcements for Norway passage through Sweden. It is of course correct that 35 railroad wagons passed through Sweden, but these transported German Red Cross personnel and equipment and were thoroughly searched by the Swedish authorities.

France:

The Supreme War Council met in Paris on 22 and 23 April. A general communiqué included the statement:

"There was a general exchange of opinions on all political and military problems. New decisions were taken for effective Allied cooperation. The Polish Prime Minister emphasized the resolution with which the Polish Government, Army and people would continue the struggle. Thanks for and admiration of the Norwegian Government's heroic resistance were expressed. The Norwegian Ambassador thanked the Allies for their swift and effective aid."

It is reported from Paris that the French General Staff is very disturbed by the extent of military operations in Norway. Russian intervention is feared. The Allies might be forced to use larger forces. Serious differences of opinion are said to have arisen between the French and British General Staffs on the Norwegian question.

Russia:

For Russia's attitude to Germany and Russian foreign policy see Political Review No. 94.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. Report on the Fuehrer's directive of 21 April (OKW/WFA 106/40 Gkdos. dated 21 April, see "Weseruebung" file).

In it the Fuehrer expresses his unbounded appreciation to the troops in Norway and sets the goals for the next operations. The most important assignments of Group 21 are establishment of communications between Trondheim and Oslo, sealing-off the enemy forces landed on the northwest coast and defense of Trondheim to the north.

2. Report on Armed Forces High Command's directive (WFA/Abt L 868/40 Gkdos. dated 23 April, see "Weseruebung" file):

According to this directive, another mountain division is to be brought up for Group 21 by the quickest route, for the coming action in mountain country.

Transfer of the 11th Rifle Brigade (Mechanized) is abandoned. Fast special transport steamers are to take such units and replacements as ensure complete mobility and fighting strength by sea to the 69th Division in Bergen. High Command, Navy has made available for this purpose five special ships (ILLER class) for a first transport which is to be carried out as soon as possible. The second transport will follow on two East Asia steamers, as soon as these have been fitted up for this special purpose. High Command, Navy, in conjunction with Commander in Chief, Air Force, will take over protection of these transports.

For Group Trondheim all possibilities of reinforcement by heavy weapons are to be exploited. High Command, Navy and Commander in Chief, Air Force are to carry out the transports planned for Group Trondheim's reinforcement as a priority matter. High Command, Navy is to make preparations to increase as much as possible the shipping available for the transport operations to Norway.

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Commanding Admiral, Group West again asserted by telephone his objections to the mixed transports of troops and material to Bergen on the steamers indicated and considers that the transport operation can only be carried out if personnel and material are carried separately because of the great danger from the air, submarines and mines. The battleships would not then act as escorts.

Naval Staff takes a different view and sees some considerable disadvantages in the execution of Group West's transport plans:

- a) The first transport (1,800 men) would require several operations by the light forces, causing increased total risk and claim for some time on the units which could not be used for important Oslo transports.
- b) The total transfer would be greatly prolonged by several operations and separation of personnel and material. Transports of material require the same light forces to escort them as the personnel transports themselves.
- c) Because of its duration the enemy would gain time to instigate countermeasures.
- d) Danger from the mines and from the air is almost the same for destroyer transports as for steamer transports.
- e) The appearance of light enemy forces off the southwest coast and in the Skagerrak has been detected and may occur again at any time. There would thus be great danger for the destroyers and torpedo boats used for purposes of personnel transport and hampered in their fighting strength, unless they had strong support.

Group West was again informed by telephone of Naval Staff's opinion and instructed to abandon its proposal.

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The following order was therefore issued to Group West:

1. The speedy transport of troops and equipment of the 69th Division to Bergen has been ordered for the reinforcement of our forces in the Bergen area.
 2. The steamers EIDER, ILLER, SAAR, MEMEL (15 knots), MOLKEFELS (16 knots) will load in Stettin. Will probably arrive in the Elbe ready to sail, on 28 April.
 3. Battleship, destroyer and torpedo boat escort necessary for the transports. Previously planned battleship operation must therefore be abandoned.
 4. Further transports can be expected to follow.
-

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic:

Convoy HX 41 will leave Halifax at 0515 on 12 May and will proceed via 43° 30' N, 40° W, - 49° 45' N, 20° W, - 49° 55' N, 13° W, - 48° N, 8° W.

It will be met by home forces at the last but one position.

North Sea/Northern Waters

Disposition of forces on 24 April:

West Fjord/Tromsøe area:

The WARSPITE, FURIOUS, PENELOPE, AURORA, VINDICTIVE.

The FURIOUS was instructed to return to Scapa.

Namsos area:

The cruiser CALCUTTA and destroyers. Air reconnaissance discovered nothing new about position and strength of enemy troop disembarkations.

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Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes area:

Two cruisers and destroyers, one anti-aircraft cruiser. According to radio intelligence, the carrier GLORIOUS has also moved to the area off Andalsnes. She received data about the position of the British troops in the area southeast of Dombas from the cruiser CURACAO. It is apparent from a radiogram from General de Wiart to the War Office that he believes he can hold the position (apparently near Otta) if planes are sent from the carrier to his aid.

The following are on escort and patrol duty:

VALIANT	RESOLUTION	RODNEY (?)	REPULSE
GLASGOW	SHEFFIELD	ENTERPRISE	EFFINGHAM
SOUTHAMPTON	CARLISLE.		

In Scapa:

Air reconnaissance detected 1 battleship, 1 carrier, 8 cruisers and many destroyers. These may be the vessels concerned, amongst others:

ARK ROYAL	YORK	DEVONSHIRE	BERWICK
MANCHESTER	CURLEW	CAIRO	ARETHUSA
BIRMINGHAM.			

The following are assumed to be in Rosyth or the mouth of the Tyne:

RENOWN	BELFAST	EDINBURGH	NEWCASTLE
GALATEA..			

In the west coast area:

HOOD.

Supply service:

It is apparent from course instructions to the steamer FRANCONIA (20,000 tons) that the route for valuable transports runs at a distance of about 200 miles from the line Shetlands-Statlandet.

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Special Events:

For sortie by large French destroyers into the Skagerrak see Own Situation.

It seems from a delayed agent's report that the Allies originally planned a landing of about 100,000 men (?) in the Norwegian theater in Stavanger, Haugesund, Bergen, Molde, Trondheim and Narvik.

Own Situation

Northern area:

Narvik:

In the morning the town and ore railroad were bombarded by 2 battleships, 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers. No vital damage. Non-combatant units of troops and prisoners were evacuated along the ore railroad. Group Narvik blew up the ore pier and set it on fire. Coming from the north, the enemy attacked north of positions near Elvenes and on the Oalgge Pass.

(For report by Port Commander, Narvik, dated 18 April, see reference file "Weseruebung".)

Trondheim:

After visiting Trondheim, Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that the withdrawal of the destroyers without replacement of the personnel engaged ashore would very greatly prejudice Trondheim's defense and is therefore impossible.

(See radiogram file, 1450.)

In reply to a request made by Quartermaster General of Commander in Chief, Air Force, he was informed that six submarines at most

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could be made available for transport of aviation gasoline to Trondheim. The Quartermaster General had made a request which would have necessitated the withdrawal of 24 submarines for transport purposes alone.

Bergen:

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has ordered the immediate seizure of all Norwegian trawlers and drifters to bring units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic up to strength.

Reconnaissance of Sogne Fjord with reference to the setting-up of torpedo batteries has been carried out.

Naval Staff is forced to refuse Group West's request for the allocation of defense vessels from the Baltic area to Admiral, West Norwegian Coast, since it is not possible to remove vessels at present from the Baltic area because of losses incurred and great claims on all vessels. Group West has been instructed to investigate the question of handing over two patrol vessels from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and to hand over Ship "7".

Southern North Sea:

The ore steamer SAYN struck a mine and sank in the Hubert Gatt. An aerial mine is assumed. A second explosion which did not take place until some hours later in the wreckage of the steamer also makes sabotage appear possible.

It appears from enemy radio traffic that minesweepers have exploded a magnetic mine $1\frac{1}{2}$ cables from Chequers Shoals Buoy. This is the first definite information that the enemy possesses a ready minesweeping gear or "magnet gear" to sweep magnetic mines.

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Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Enemy destroyers broke through into the Skagerrak in the morning. Engagement with the enemy at 0420 southeast of Kristiansand by boats of the 7th Patrol Boat Flotilla. Forty salvoes fired by the enemy at a patrol boat without special success. About 0500 the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla sighted the enemy on southwesterly course, making off at high speed, without managing to attack. Description of enemy: clipper bow, two squat, widely spaced funnels.

Reconnaissance by Commander, Naval Air sighted the enemy forces leaving the Skagerrak about 1000, roughly 120 miles west-southwest of Lindesnes. Formation probably consisted of a French torpedo cruiser of the FANTASQUE class and two destroyers.

It can be assumed that the enemy carried out a minelaying operation in the eastern Skagerrak.

Enemy report led to temporary stoppage of transport movements to Oslo.

Because of the enemy break-through into the Skagerrak, Group Baltic requests the speeding up of improvised readiness for action of the guns of the outer fort at the southern entrance to Oslo Fjord.

Various submarine alarm reports in the Kattegat and Skagerrak.

Mine Situation:

Mine barrage detected east of Frederikshavn (laid by submarines); 21 mines swept. Whole area declared suspected of mines.

Area southeast of Anholt likewise suspected of mines because of observed minelaying. Latvian steamer struck a mine and sank south of Drogden lighthouse (aerial mine).

At noon Ship "20" was damaged by striking a mine at the Luebeck buoy off Travemuende and was beached. Priwall anti-aircraft observation post reports observing a low-flying plane, not

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notified, over Travemuende during the night of 23 April.

Area of Commanding Admiral, Norway:

Batteries "von der Groeben", "Koester" and South Memel are on the way to Hamburg to be sent on to Norway as coastal batteries for the Norwegian theater. Distribution of batteries and transport on to Norway as Commanding Admiral, Norway thinks fit.

(For High Command, Navy's order see teletype 1400.)

Commanding Admiral, Norway reports stoppage of work at the State Dockyard at Horten owing to difficulty of payment by the Norwegian Government and the Norwegian Trade Unions' objection to work for Germany. The necessary countermeasures are being instigated.

Group Baltic requests the provision of harbor defense units for the south coast of Norway. (See radiogram file, teletype 1025.)

Three harbor defense groups, each with six motor fishing vessels, are on their way to Copenhagen, Helsingoer and Frederikshavn.

For report by Commanding Admiral, Norway on the state of coastal defense, see reference file Norway.

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Transport Situation:

Further transports of troops and material as planned (900 men arrived in Oslo).

Submarine Situation

U "43" returned from Trondheim; U "19", "9", put in to port.

On return passage: U "38", "47", "56", "60", "62", "26".
In the operational area: 16 submarines.

Air Situation

(See radiogram 2400 Air Force Events of the Day.)

Bomber operations against the enemy forces reported in the Skagerrak were unsuccessful.

During armed air reconnaissance in the Norwegian coastal area an anti-aircraft cruiser in Romsdals Fjord received a 250 kg. direct hit forward and was severely damaged.

Merchant Shipping

The fact that a steamer (the SAYN) with a valuable cargo was ordered from the Baltic to Emden and struck a mine in the approaches to the Ems has made it advisable to point out the risk of such routing to the Ministry of Transportation and to suggest that steamers with specially valuable cargoes coming from the Baltic should, if possible, discharge their cargo in Baltic ports and that the inconveniences of transporting it by land should be accepted.

The following teletype was received from Group West on the

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afternoon of 24 April:

"Present lack of patrol forces and the danger from mines laid in the North Sea and estuaries make necessary course instructions to all merchant ships for the shortest sea route to the nearest port of discharge. Therefore direct steamers only to Baltic ports, if possible not to North Sea ports except Hamburg. Attention is drawn to the case of the steamer SAYN from Helsingborg to Emden."

The Ministry of Transportation has taken suitable steps. The effects on the inland transport situation will be considerable if the Ems is closed for a fairly long period. The Ministry of Transportation believes that it must accept the disadvantages, since it definitely desires to avoid further losses in view of the present lack of shipping space.

In the present case it is only a matter of closing the Ems for a short time; after a mine-check of the channel it will be opened again.

Appreciation of the Situation

The sortie made by the large French destroyers into the Skagerrak shows the possibilities of lively enemy activity to disrupt the vital sea communications to Oslo. Naval Staff expected such raids by light enemy forces and knows quite well that the Skagerrak mine barrage - in which the positions of the mines are uncertain because of the current's underflow - is not in a position to prevent such sorties.

On the other hand, it is convinced that no penetration by large or heavy enemy units is to be feared into the Skagerrak because of the existing danger from the air and mines. Light enemy forces make sorties into the Skagerrak for the purpose of laying mines on the transport route from Skagen to Oslo, attacking defense forces in the Skagerrak and trying if possible to intercept and destroy Oslo convoys. Naval Staff has at its disposal only a limited number of light forces for defense against such raids, consisting of the PT boats and later of the destroyers and torpedo boats at

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present still on escort and transport duty or not available. The deterrent effect of the Skagerrak area therefore lies - in addition to the ever present defensive effect of the Skagerrak declared area - in the very great threat from the air (bomb and aerial torpedo attacks). It is intensified by the presence of our battleships, whose readiness for action, however, must be shown by activity in the form of sorties into the northern North Sea.

In today's sortie by the French the enemy was able to ascertain a certain defensive readiness on Germany's part in his engagement with patrol boats and PT boats, as well as in an encounter with air forces, even if it was not possible to frustrate his plan to break through. It can be expected that our Air Force's great successes on the Norwegian coast will make the risk of frequent raids into the Skagerrak seem very high, so that Naval Staff does not expect frequent repetition of these sorties. In spite of this, every effort must be made to prevent a recurrence of such penetrations into the Skagerrak. Attempts must be made, by means of comprehensive evening air reconnaissance, to make out enemy plans in good time in order to enable withdrawal of the important transport traffic from the enemy's grasp.

The safety of the Skagerrak will be guaranteed to the necessary extent by stationing as many PT boats as possible at the entrance to the Skagerrak (Kristiansand), by setting up radar gear to intercept enemy movements in good time and by the constant readiness for action of Air Force bombers, in conjunction with the Skagerrak mine barrage.

The last few days have confirmed Naval Staff's supposition that:

1. The enemy has begun aerial minelaying operations in the North Sea estuaries, in the Kattegat, in the entrances to the Baltic and in the western Baltic and that
2. he is in a position to sweep the magnetic mines laid by us with a certainty not yet fully determined.

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The fact that the enemy is using aerial mines makes necessary the immediate introduction of all possible defensive measures. Geographical conditions of German waters with their shallow depth, well suited for the use of ground mines, favor mining operations by planes and show the considerable dangers involved for all German and neutral shipping, the transport services, as well as the exercise and training of naval forces in the western Baltic, the Kattegat, the entrances to the Baltic, the Kiel Canal and the North Sea estuaries.

Commencement of defense measures against the type of aerial mine used by the enemy depends on this mine's type of firing. Speedy salvaging of a mine is necessary in order to discover the firing procedure. It can be safely assumed for the present that it is a ground mine.

The immediate formation of a comprehensive observer system in all important channels, harbor entrances and in the Kiel Canal is of extreme importance in order to ascertain the places where the mines are laid for the purpose of subsequent salvaging or closing of the area. Provision of a large number of motor launches and motor boats in all ports is to be undertaken at once. High Command, Navy/Naval Staff, Service Division will have to undertake this speedily on a large scale. New distribution and setting-up of barrage balloon batteries is to be investigated.

Defense of the submarine exercise area and of the Kiel Canal merits the most careful consideration.

In view of the enemy use of aerial mines, Commander in Chief, Air Force has ordered, as an immediate measure, the shifting of concentration for light anti-aircraft batteries to the principal points in danger.

The Navy's most important task, apart from eliminating the danger from mines, is in the immediate future the further safe transportation of troops and material to Norway. The danger from submarines, severe at first, has decreased noticeably through large-scale use of defense and submarine-chaser forces and through the adaptation of the inexperienced escort service to its duties.

The accomplishment as planned of the transports to Norway, with relatively small losses, and of the comprehensive supply service must be judged as a great achievement by the units participating. These have so far successfully fulfilled the

tasks set them in all-out operations, facing most difficult demands and without sufficient rest and relief facilities.

The following tasks have now been set for further German naval warfare in the near future:

Offensive assignments:

1. Conduct of war against merchant shipping by auxiliary cruisers in foreign waters.
2. War against merchant shipping by submarines in the Atlantic. The solution of the torpedo problem is of decisive importance for successful submarine attacks.
3. Aerial minelaying operations on a large scale in cooperation with the operational Air Force; in the forefront of the demands of naval warfare are the complete blocking of the vital port of London, the mining of Scapa Flow, of the Clyde and of Liverpool Bay.

Defensive assignments:

4. Defense of Baltic shipping and of ore imports from Sweden as a necessity for a fairly long war; elimination of danger from mines, especially from ground mines, is a primary necessity for this.
5. Further assurance of troop and material transports to Norway.
6. Defense of the occupied Norwegian and Danish bases through the speedy reinforcement of their defensive power by all available means.

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

According to a Stockholm Radio report, the King of Norway has informed the Oslo Administrative Committee that the Norwegian Government will not negotiate with the Germans on any other basis than that of complete withdrawal of their troops from Norway. (The King's present whereabouts are unknown, he is said to have withdrawn to Northern Norway.)

"The Times" and Reuter report heavy fighting northeast of Trondheim. The presence of vessels of the German Fleet is a great advantage for the Germans, since they could bring strong combat units to any threatened point. German bombers constitute a serious danger. So far it has twice been necessary to move the position of the Operations Division of the British forces in Norway. Speedy execution of Allied operational plans is only probable if great efforts are made.

Sweden:

The German Ambassador wires:

"As today's radio has just reported, fishing boats were allegedly fired on by German planes inside Swedish territorial waters near Stroemstad. One fisherman was wounded. I should be grateful for immediate investigation and correction, for since yesterday suspicion of German intentions has grown to such an extent that I consider German-Swedish relations seriously endangered.

If we increase our pressure and test Sweden's patience even further, I fear that the consequences will be serious. I see this primarily in connection with the agreed deliveries of ore, since armed conflict would definitely mean these deliveries ceasing for a fairly long time. Sweden will only act against us if driven to despair. However, according to my knowledge of the Scandinavian character, I feel that this state of affairs might soon arise."

(See also Political Review No. 95, para. 6.)

Italy:

Mussolini is said to have told the Fascist leaders two days ago that it was only a question of weeks until Italy entered the war on Germany's side.

Sharp speech on foreign policy in the Chamber by Deputy Giunta, in the presence of the Duce, against Great Britain and France.

It is known that the Western Powers have lately been at pains to avoid everything which could increase tension with Italy.

With reference to the meeting some days ago of the Foreign Committee of the French Senate, the following statement by the Prime Minister has only just become known:

"Before and after 1 Sept. the French Government informed Italy that it was ready to seek a solution, acceptable to both powers, of outstanding questions by means of a friendly exchange of opinions. Italy has not replied to date. This in no way alters the French Government's intention and it is still endeavoring to effect a Mediterranean entente uninfluenced by ideological considerations."

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. Commander in Chief, Air Force states that upon the Fuehrer's instructions regarding defense of the Skagerrak against raids by enemy forces, an Air Force bomber formation is to be kept in constant readiness for operations in the Skagerrak. According to Commander in Chief, Air Force a torpedo squadron is to be kept ready for the same purpose by the Naval Air Arm. This measure cannot be carried out, since this squadron must definitely operate offensively against Great Britain as an aerial minelaying squadron. Chief, Naval Staff will inform the Fuehrer of this.

2. The following torpedo batteries are ready for action in Norway:

Trondheim: 2 triple tubes.
Bergen: 1 battery with 3 tubes.
Oslo: 2 batteries with 6 tubes.

Further batteries are planned to block the following entrances:

Kristiansund	Andalsnes	Nord Fjord.
Sogne Fjord	Hardanger Fjord	

Erection of the last two batteries is planned first. Reconnaissance has been carried out.

3. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered speedy establishment of the new torpedoboats' operational readiness. Four or five boats are to be ready for simple assignments in the middle of May (remaining boats June - 2, July - 2, August - 2, October - 1).

4. Chief, Naval Staff's decision:

"Until her repairs are completed (probably about 9 months) the LUETZOW is to be kept in commission with a diminished crew (25% of complement)."

5. Chief, Naval Staff points out the extraordinary urgency of the following measures and has ordered the use of all available means to attain the required objective:

- a) Expansion of our anti-submarine defense and speeding-up of supplies of echo-ranging sets.
- b) Defense against enemy use of aerial mines.
- c) Equipment of all patrol and defense vessels with protection against mines and with guns.
- d) Ensuring adequate numbers of new motor minesweepers and PT boats.

Survey of the SituationSpecial Reports on the EnemyAtlantic/Mediterranean:Great Britain:

Shipping movements: The cruiser EMERALD, formerly on the Atlantic route or in Canada, put in to the Clyde at noon on 25 April. The aircraft carrier HERMES was at sea in the South Atlantic on the afternoon of 24 April. Exact position unknown, base Freetown. The CORNWALL plans to put in to Freetown on 28 April from South Africa; the SHROPSHIRE sailed from Freetown on the evening of 24 April.

The cruiser LIVERPOOL with Commander, 4th Cruiser Squadron on board, formerly stationed in the East Indies, is at present proceeding to Aden, where she will arrive on 29 April.

Inquiries in Italy and Istanbul gave no confirmation of reports emanating from Vienna during the past few days about movements of British warships or troopships in the direction of the Black Sea.

France:

Several French vessels returning to Brest were located in the Irish Sea in the evening. A vessel detected west of Trondheim on 19 April was off Brest.

North Sea/Northern Waters:Narvik area:

1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser and small vessels detected off Harstad. Several destroyers off Narvik. Harbor bombarded.

Namsos area:

Commander, 20th Cruiser Squadron, on board the cruiser CARLISLE, is proceeding into the Namsos area to relieve the CALCUTTA. Air reconnaissance sighted 1 heavy and 1 light cruiser off Namsos. No new reports about troop disembarkations or large transports.

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Area south of Trondheim:

It is apparent from a radiogram from the Otta area that the carrier GLORIOUS is off the coast in the Kristiansund-Trondheim area.

Disembarkations of troops and material in Andalsnes are completed according to a radiogram from the Commander there; two cruisers and destroyers sailed after completing their assignment. Destroyers, freighters and steam tankers were detected in Romsdals Fjord, Nordal Fjord and Sjørungs Fjord and successfully attacked by the Air Force.

Air reconnaissance sighted enemy forces in the afternoon 60 miles northeast of Molde Fjord, consisting of 4 heavy ships (including 1 RENOWN) and 4 cruisers on course 150°. Plans not identifiable.

Home area:

The battle cruiser HOOD was spotted 30 miles northeast of the Shetlands by air reconnaissance. The cruisers GLASGOW and GALATEA in the Shetlands-Scapa area.

The enemy submarine disposition was detected to a great extent. About 7 boats are thought to be in the Skagerrak and Kattegat, 5 on return passage, 5 outward bound, 3 of the latter into the southern North Sea.

Shipping Losses:

1 minesweeper destroyed by a bomb hit in Romsdals Fjord, 1 torpedoboat damaged, 1 freighter (2,000 tons) beached in Nordal Fjord after a bomb hit, 1 steam tanker severely damaged by a hit. The British steamer CREE (4,800 tons) struck a mine near Smith's Knoll.

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Own Situation

Atlantic:

Auxiliary cruisers were informed about the situation in Norway, the enemy situation and routing of enemy shipping. (See radiogram 1300.)

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Narvik:

Close patrol by enemy destroyers. In the morning bombardment of positions at the eastern entrance to Narvik, with the support of the cruiser ENTERPRISE. Group Narvik requests air cover and dropping of snowshoes. Unit east of Elvenes carried out a successful attack on a Norwegian unit.

Trondheim:

Air raid on Verres airfield and seaplane base in the forenoon. Considerable damage. Hangar and 4 Ju 87's destroyed, 2 He 115's overturned, 3 He 115's damaged.

Port Commander reports that it is not possible to requisition Norwegian ships at present because of lack of personnel.

Bergen:

When searching steamers the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and minesweeper M "1" were subjected to heavy machine-gunfire near the ULVIK. M "1" slightly damaged. One ammunition steamer was captured. The ULVIK was set on fire.

Army operation against Voss with help from minesweeper M "1" as planned.

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast also requests about 400 naval personnel and 300 merchant marine personnel for manning of Norwegian ships in rapid succession, since otherwise sabotage and losses can be expected.

Stavanger:

Nothing special to report.

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Southern North Sea:

Mine Situation:

Elbe channel again open after unsuccessful check sweep.

Group West sums up the situation in the estuaries as follows:

"Three unexplained explosions in all, two in the Elbe near vessels. Another in the Ems. In the latter case a second explosion followed eight hours later. Sweeping of the points in question with remote clearance gear with linked sweeps and on the Elbe also with a mine-exploding vessel with magnet gear produced no results. We must therefore expect that single enemy aerial mines with an unknown firing principle were laid or dropped (magnetic or acoustic firing). Group West plans a daily sweep of the estuaries with remote clearance gear and linked sweeps. New buoying of the secondary channel to Emden. Endangered areas will be swept systematically and divers sent down so that a mine may be recovered as quickly as possible."

During the night of 25 April there was a fresh mine explosion off the Western Ems near patrol boat "802".

In view of the intensified enemy mine warfare, Station North Sea requests the provision of two sets of remote clearance gear and cable remote clearance gear each for the Elbe, Weser, Jade and Ems and the provision of further mine-exploding vessels, also equipment of all important naval and merchant vessels with degaussing.

With reference to Group West's coming transport operations to Bergen, concentration of suitable defense forces under Group West is indispensable. Naval Staff has therefore put the remaining boats of the 5th and 6th Torpedoboat Flotillas

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at Group West's disposal for these assignments. Transfer or time when they go into operation at Group West's discretion. While the boats are withdrawn transport and escort assignments of Group Baltic must suffer some delay.

With reference to the latest bombing attack on Sylt, Group West reports that bombs were dropped in sticks, which comprised simultaneously 1 large high explosive bomb, 1 bomb with time fuse (5-8 hours), 1 bomb with an even longer time fuse, 1 incendiary bomb and, in advance, mostly an aircraft parachute flare.

The dropping of time fuse bombs has already been observed elsewhere and their handling requires special care, since they are at first thought to be duds. It is necessary to fence off the area and watch the bomb until it is exploded or explodes.

The time fuse bomb must be regarded as a new, very effective weapon, defense against which will offer considerable difficulty. When dropped at important places (in dockyards, factories, traffic junctions), the time fuse bomb necessitates long isolation and thereby stoppage of the part of the factory affected, which may lead to considerable interruptions. Speedy investigation into possibilities of defense and protection is necessary.

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

In order to simplify instruction about movements of our naval forces during operations, the following definitions of sea areas are fixed by Group Baltic:

- Area A: Eastern limit of Skagerrak declared area up to the line Hirtshals-Risoer.
- Area B: From this line around Skagen up to the line Aalbeck-Vinga.
- Area C: South of this line up to the northern entrance to the Baltic Sea entrances.

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The first deep mine barrage in the Skagerrak declared area was laid as planned by Commander, PT Boats.

In reply to a query from Group Baltic, Naval Staff has again issued instructions that defense of the northern passage through the Skagerrak declared area is a matter for Group Baltic. Mine control as far as the western limit of our declared area along the coast is also included. The allocation of duties ordered seems practical because of the nearness of the base of Kristiansand which comes under Group Baltic (as opposed to Thyboroen or Esbjerg).

Submarine Situation

Submarines were detected east of Skagen and east of Lasø. Attacks on submarines without visible result. No interruption to transports.

Mine Situation

The 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla succeeded in recovering a British aerial mine west of Samsø. A most significant and gratifying success, which within the shortest possible time after the first enemy use of aerial mines has eliminated the element of uncertainty in the problem of combatting the aerial mine and thus represents the first step towards effective defense against it. According to the first statements, it is a ground mine with about 500 kg. of explosive, apparently magnetic firing. The Minelaying Experimental Command has commenced further investigations.

Numerous flights by enemy planes during the night of 25 April over Kiel Bay, North Schleswig into the Fehmarn-Eutin area and Lübeck Bay. Minelaying suspected. Several impacts by bombs or mines in the water are reported from the Elbe and Kiel Canal.

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Locations indicating mines were obtained by echo-ranging sets south of Anholt. Check sweeping is in progress.

Transport Situation

Transports of troops and personnel continue as planned. 2,500 men taken to Larvik, 900 to Oslo. Further transports en route with 2,100 men.

Commanding Admiral, Norway reports regarding the Norwegian naval vessels commissioned for German use and on vessels seized.

Commissioned with German crews:

2 destroyers
1 minelayer
6 torpedoboats, 2nd class
1 old minelayer
2 minesweepers
6 whalers
2 auxiliary vessels.

Submarine Situation

Nothing special to report.

Returned from operations:	U "26", "62".
North of the Shetlands:	U "25".
Allocated positions northeast of the Shetlands:	U "14", "17", "24".

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(For brief reports from U "26", "64", "9", "46", "51", see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.)

Air Situation

Concentration:

Armed reconnaissance off the west coast of Norway and support for Army operations.

Successes against naval forces:

1 minesweeper	Destroyed in Romsdals Fjord.
1 torpedoboat	Hit by SD 50. (Heavy smoke.)
1 battleship	Off Molde Fjord in the morning, probably 1 hit SC 250.

(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)

Merchant Shipping

Group Baltic has replied to a query from the Ministry of Transportation that there is no objection to German ships returning via Swedish territorial waters and for the present through the Kogrund Channel or north of Seeland and the Belts. Shipping companies must request the necessary Swedish pilots themselves.

Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

During the Army's successful battles near Lillehammer, most important documents were found on British officers in the form of operational orders for the British Norway operation, from which it is clear that a British landing in Norway had been scheduled for about the same date as the German one. Orders bore the dates 2 April, 6 April and 7 April. Operation had cover name "Stratford Plan". Forces participating were described as Stratforces. Landings were planned in Stavanger, to occupy Sola airfield, in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. The German action preceded the British plans by a few hours. After the German landing in Norway British forces were re-routed in that Stavanger troops were disembarked in Andalsnes and Bergen troops in Namsos. After all details have been submitted, the Führer intends to make known the documents discovered to the Diplomatic Corps.

According to a report from Kirkenes, a kind of interim Government has been set up in Northern Norway, which is organizing resistance there in agreement with the old Norwegian Government. The attitude of the mostly "Marxist" population is absolutely anti-German. Officers are fundamentally pro-German but outwardly adhere to the King and definitely reject the Quisling Government because it holds the confidence of no class of the people.

The British Air Ministry announces that German assertions that Britain has commenced unrestricted aerial warfare are unfounded. The attack on Sylt was directed against Westerland airfield, one of the most heavily fortified spots in Germany. No attack was made on the town of Heide. The civilian population also suffered from the German air raids on the Orkneys.

Sweden:

The Naval Attache in Stockholm reports that there are 15,000 men in the Swedish ore region near Kiruna in a very heavily fortified position with strong anti-aircraft defense. Preparations have been made for the effective blowing-up of the railroad line.

Swedish Trade Unions have issued a resolution according to which they are determined on the utmost defensive readiness.

Denmark:

The department of the British Ministry of Shipping in New York stated that all Danish ships on the high seas which had not transferred to the Allied flag would be seized as prizes since they technically represented enemy tonnage. Transfer to other neutrals would not be acknowledged. The Allies are, however, ready to make agreements on the chartering of such ships.

On the other hand, the Danish Shipping Committee in New York stated that Denmark had opposed the German invasion. Germany has therefore no legal rights over Danish ships. The British assertion that these ships are prizes according to International Law cannot therefore be acknowledged. Endeavors to come to an agreement with the Allies about the routes outside the European war zone have unfortunately failed.

France:

Reynaud spoke before the Foreign Committee of the Chamber. Investigation of the German threat to Sweden and possible eventualities. The Turkish Government's loyalty was recognized. France wishes an exchange of opinion in her relations with Italy and is not responsible for its previous failure to take place.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. Chief, Naval Staff again ordered the speedy commencement of all measures to combat the danger of aerial mines.

According to fresh reports from Group Baltic it is possible that the British ground mine does not work with magnetic but with acoustic firing. If this assumption is confirmed, we must also expect that the British torpedo possesses an acoustic control. (This explains various torpedo hits on the stern as e.g. the steamer FRIEDENAU, the cruiser LUEZOW.)

2. Chief, Naval Staff considers that further use of submarines off the Norwegian coast and for attacks on enemy naval vessels offers little prospect of success, in view of the torpedo difficulties and the slight chances of hitting fast-moving warships, and considers that the resumption of war against merchant shipping in the Atlantic as soon as possible is necessary and alone promises success.

Survey of the SituationSpecial Reports on the EnemyAtlantic:

Further reinforcement of Mediterranean forces: The cruisers ORION, NEPTUNE, the destroyers DEFENDER, DECOY and the repair ship RESOURCE have gone on eastward from Gibraltar. The submarine depot ship MEDWAY and three submarines left Colombo on 17 April for the Mediterranean.

Three boats of the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla, previously stationed in Singapore, passed Port Said on 23 April proceeding towards the Mediterranean.

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North Sea/Northern Waters:

Enemy landings in the Narvik area continue. Off Harstad a battle cruiser, a heavy cruiser, other cruisers, destroyers and troopships as well as a large number of armed vessels were sighted.

Lively activity by light enemy forces and transports in the Namsos-Andalsnes area. Various cruisers and numerous destroyers were detected in Romsdals Fjord, off Andalsnes, in Molde Fjord and in fjords adjoining Trondheim Fjord. British destroyers are in the Frohavet and south of the island of Hitra in order to guard the entrance to Trondheim.

Convoys were sighted northwest and northeast of the Frohavet and west of Molde Fjord in the forenoon.

A cruiser or destroyer in Sogne Fjord.

Own Situation

Atlantic:

Ships "16" and "36" received further reports on the enemy and data for the conduct of war against merchant shipping. (See radiogram 2143.)

Narvik:

Renewed bombardment of port and defense installations, also of Elvegaardsmoen by light enemy naval forces.

A Norwegian regiment was destroyed by a German counter-attack in the Elvenes area, with severe enemy losses. Group Narvik requests effective increase of supplies by air for Elvegaardsmoen, especially food and snowshoes.

If later developments render it necessary for Group Narvik to take to the mountains, it is planned to evacuate the bulk of the destroyer crews, wounded and prisoners to Sweden.

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The first train from Sweden has arrived at the frontier. Supplies, however, are extremely difficult, since the ore railroad is partly destroyed and without current. Supplies for Narvik are therefore not assured for any length of time.

Trondheim:

Because of the enemy situation off Trondheim, Ships "26" and "37", carrying howitzers and ammunition, were ordered to postpone putting in for 24 hours.

Commander, 2nd Destroyer Flotilla reports that the JACOBI will be repaired about two months after the gear parts arrive. He does not consider return passage possible until the sea and air situation has altered fundamentally. Armament is to be dismantled, as far as necessary, and can be re-installed later.

Bergen:

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports stubborn enemy resistance near Voss. The enemy was overcome during the day; Voss was taken. Reconnaissance of Hardanger Fjord with regard to torpedo batteries has been carried out. Forces passing through the skerries are still being fired on with hand arms and also with guns. Because of numerous assignments (pilot service, transport) he again requests another minesweeper, motor minesweepers and armed patrol boats.

Three PT boats are being sent out against the British cruiser reported in Sogne Fjord. Air support is requested.

Commanding Admiral, Norway proposes closing of Sogne Fjord by minelaying to stop supplies for British landing troops.

Southern North Sea:

Because of enemy minelaying in the estuaries, Station North Sea requests the inclusion in the system of wartime lights and buoys of secondary channels not so far included and considerable reinforcement of the harbor defense flotillas for the Jade/Weser, Elbe and Ems.

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Vessels are also requested for remote clearance gear and cable remote clearance gear. (See radiogram file, 1835 and 1825.)

Commanding Admiral, Norway has been ordered by High Command, Navy to set up harbor defense units in every base, subdivided into A and B groups with the same duties as in home waters. (See radiogram 0800.)

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Decrease in danger from submarines discernible at the moment. Only one submarine alarm northeast of Anholt.

Mine Situation:

Three mine barrages were located 30-40 miles north of Skagen with echo-ranging sets; they were probably laid by the French destroyers which penetrated into the Skagerrak. The area endangered by mines lies in the 20 mile-wide strip declared free of mines by Great Britain for traffic to Sweden.

Group Baltic reports, in view of yesterday's order, that mine control of the northern passage through the Skagerrak declared area as far as the western limit is not possible with the forces at present available. Exploratory sweeps will be carried out after the units now being assembled are in operational readiness.

Ground mines:

At noon a mine exploded on the west side of the channel in the outer Kiel Estuary 20 m. away from U "99", which sustained only slight damage. Aerial mine. (Numerous enemy flights over Schleswig-Holstein, the (Kiel) Canal and western Baltic tonight.)

Group Baltic has ordered valuable steamers to be stopped, 100% searching sweep in the Kiel Canal, fixing of routes, check sweeping of routes, cessation of training and trials. (See radiogram file, teletype 1150.)

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Effective immediately, Commanding Admiral, Submarines forbids any submarine training in Kiel and Mecklenburg Bays from Kiel, Neustadt, Travemünde and Warnemünde. Submarine navigation and firing training is to be transferred to Gdynia as quickly as possible. Shore training remains in Neustadt.

The Swedish Naval Attaché, Forshell, informs us that foreign submarines have not been detected in Swedish territorial waters. Merchant traffic in the channels along the west coast of Sweden involves difficulties, including lack of pilots.

Transport Situation:

Transports of troops and material continue as planned. About 2,000 men have arrived in Oslo and Larvik. Empty steamers on return trip undisturbed.

Submarine Situation

Returned from operations
and put in to port:

U "47", "56", "60".

In the operational area:

North Minch area:

U "61", "30".

North of the Shetlands:

U "25".

West of the Shetlands:

U "65".

Northeast of the Shetlands:

U "14", "17", "23", "24".

In the Orkneys area:

U "13", "57", "58", "59";

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submarines are instructed to take up their old operational areas again directly off Pentland Firth according to density of traffic and defenses.

On return passage:
In Trondheim:

U "38", "34", "52".
U "29".

The crew of U "64" has returned home from Narvik via Sweden (disguised as survivors from German steamers).

The brief reports from U "64", "46" and "51" from West Fjord give a picture of the extraordinary difficulties in West Fjord and Ofot Fjord arising from the length of the days, strong defenses and calm, clear water. (See Part B, Vol. IV.)

U "23" reports a double miss on a heavy cruiser 20 miles east of the Shetlands.

U "34" reports a double miss on the 20,000 ton supply steamer FRANCONIA north of the Hebrides.

Air Situation

For disposition of Air Force units for operations in Norway see radiogram file, 0800.

Air Force operations in the Narvik-Harstad area, Namsos Fjord and Andalsnes.

Special forces have been provided for 27 April against the aircraft carrier suspected to be in the Namsos-Andalsnes area. It can be expected that at daybreak the carrier

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will be near the coast to start its planes and will then move off into the open sea.

(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)

Merchant Shipping

Of the altogether 185 vessels (totaling about 242,000 GRT) lying in Bergen which are not German, contraband goods have been discovered so far on 27 ships which are not Norwegian. After the operation against Voss is over, transfer is to be begun, since there are no escort detachments available at present.

The Italian Government has released three (five according to other sources) Norwegian tankers and a freighter, which had at first been held, since the captains raised notarial protest against the refusal of harbor certificates.

The Italian steamer AMECIZIA, which had been held south of Bergen with a cargo of wood for Great Britain, has been brought into Stavanger. The ship is to be released after the cargo is discharged.

1500: Conference between Chief, Naval Staff and the Führer.

Points discussed:

1. Sortie by French destroyers into the Skagerrak on 23/24 April. Possibilities of defense against such raids.
2. Naval Staff's deliberations on further submarine warfare, withdrawal of small submarines for the schools, submarine war against merchant shipping in the Atlantic.
3. Defense of bases in Norway.
4. Combatting danger of aerial mines.

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5. German lack of freighters.
6. Land situation in the south Norwegian area has been cleared up.

The projected transport operation to Bergen, protected by a battleship sortie, can therefore be canceled. The Führer has ordered the transports to be re-routed to Oslo.

(For particulars see Commander in Chief, Navy's memorandum of conference dated 26 April, War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.)

The following directive has been issued to Groups West, Baltic and Fleet, in view of the Führer's decision to abandon the transport operation to Bergen:

1. Group West's transport assignment is canceled as the result of the speedy clearing up of the land situation in southern Norway.
2. Transport is to be carried out to Oslo as soon as possible. Steamers are lying in Stettin. Group Baltic will report plans.
3. Battleship operation is abandoned for the present because of the necessity of maintaining destroyers and five torpedoboats in readiness.
4. Further torpedoboats again at the disposal of Group Baltic.
5. Group West to report promptly plans for any destroyer and torpedoboat operations.

Naval Staff I op 790/40.

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Items of Political ImportanceNorway:

At noon in the Reich Chancellery Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, before the Diplomatic Corps and the German and foreign press, gave a statement on the political situation and made public White Paper No. 4 containing the diplomatic and military documents captured in Norway, from which the Western Powers' plans to extend the war to Scandinavia and the old Norwegian Government's guilt in this development are obvious.

Naval Staff's information from the enemy situation and reports from the Radio Monitoring Service, the press and agents for the beginning and middle of March (see War Diary) about the Allies' plans are confirmed.

The Supreme Commander of the Norwegian Army issued an order of the day:

"You did everything in your power to stop the enemy. You were often forced back and thus had to leave your positions. That is disheartening but the main thing was to gain time. You honorably discharged your duty, for which I thank you. This withdrawal movement is now at an end and I exhort you anew: Be of good courage and we shall be victorious."

Sweden:

The Foreign Office is at present trying to obtain the Swedish Government's consent to the carrying of survivors, wounded and prisoners on the return journey of the trains

running to Group Narvik. This measure is justified as an act of humanity. Even the question of possible internment by the Swedish Government will be no obstacle.

Denmark:

In reply to the blocking of Danish assets in the U.S.A., the Danes have blocked U.S. assets in Denmark.

Italy:

According to foreign press reports, Ciano is said to have stated in reply to the French Ambassador, Francois-Poncet, that the time was unpropitious for discussing the differences of opinion between the two countries.

Portugal:

The Embassy reports:

"Salazar continues to resist Allied encroachments. He told the British Ambassador that by their high-handed treatment of Portugal the Allies were doing everything to destroy sympathy for them."

Greece:

The British Ambassador is said to have submitted four demands to Metaxas:

1. Cessation of deliveries of products of military importance to Germany.
2. Granting of the right to establish naval and air bases in Greek territory.
3. Unrestricted entry for personnel of the R.A.F. and Royal Navy.
4. Adoption of a pro-entente tone by the Government and removal of pro-German persons from leading positions.

Metaxas expressed himself sharply against this and stated that he would not permit the Western Powers to intervene in Greece a second time.

U.S.A.:

The Embassy in Washington reports:

"The effect of Grand Admiral Raeder's statements to the press, which refuted exaggerated Allied victory propaganda in the U.S. press during the past few days, is said to be all the greater because the press is very struck by the swift advance of German troops in Norway and is now giving prominence to German military reports."

(See also appendix to Foreign Press (Naval News No. 100).)

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items:

1. The situation on land in the central Norwegian area is judged confidently despite certain difficulties. The Army is advancing northwards in spite of very difficult terrain. Very speedy relief of Trondheim is hoped for. Strong enemy forces suspected near Andalsnes and Dombas. The Trondheim Group is advancing southwards on Støren, in order to cut the enemy off from the north. Situation cleared up in Bergen; enemy beaten near Voss.

In view of the efforts of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to clear up the land situation speedily, Chief, Naval Staff considers it specially important that, with regard to the great strain on defense and transport units, overhasty execution of transport be avoided and that safety of the transports be the primary consideration. The danger from submarines and mines necessitates observance of all necessary defense measures.

2. British use of aerial mines: The opinion for a while that the British aerial mine might have acoustic or vibration firing is contradicted by a new report that the firing principle is based on induction. Discoveries to date show that our magnetic sweeping gear is probably fully effective. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered the strictest secrecy about the fact that a mine was recovered.

The question of the greatest possible speeding-up of the effectiveness of our anti-mine measures was again discussed. A large-scale patrol organization for the detection of places where mines are dropped is already being set up; requisitioning of large numbers of motor boats and patrol vessels has been started; the entire Kiel Canal is covered by visual observation. The Danes are to be induced to patrol their coastal areas and channels; similar measures are likewise to be suggested to the Swedes.

There are at present only 11 balloon barrage batteries in all, of which 9 are on the coast (3 in Hamburg, 6 in Group West's area in Wilhelmshaven, the Jade, Emden, Borkum). Further supplies of barrage balloons cannot be expected until August. Naval Staff, Operations Division proposes,

with reference to the urgency of combatting aerial mines, that two batteries be withdrawn from Group West and placed at the disposal of Group Baltic for the defense of the Kiel Canal and other important points.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees. Orders to this effect have been given.

3. Group West proposes dispensing with minelaying measures by surface forces in Operation "Gelb".

Reason: The larger number of planes holds out prospects of effective aerial minelaying. The enemy's greater preparedness and short, bright nights make unobtrusive execution improbable. Moreover, very undesirable losses are now more probably in view of the slight strength of our destroyer and torpedoboat forces.

Aerial minelaying in Operation "Gelb" is planned within the scope of the scheduled measures HL, IL, ÖL, WL, OL and also measure "Dunkirk". In all about 30 planes are scheduled to drop about 50 aerial mines with the first wave.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees fully with Group West's proposal. Because of the delay in Operation "Gelb" the necessary conditions for operations by surface forces have altered fundamentally. The shortness and brightness of the nights forbid any surface force operations in the area constantly covered by the enemy, since on no account is any preliminary warning to be given by naval measures. In the enemy's state of readiness we must expect immediate, heavy attacks, especially by the enemy Air Force, in the event of the slightest suspicion. If the element of surprise is lost the whole operation would unavoidably be greatly endangered. The small number of our light forces - urgently required for defense assignments - also makes it necessary that the available destroyers and torpedoboats should not be used for assignments in which losses seem probable from the start, as far as these same assignments, as in the present case, can also be fulfilled very effectively by the aerial minelaying formations of the 9th Air Division meanwhile set up.

4. Report by Captain Bey (Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla), who flew back from Narvik on High Command, Navy's

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order, on the actions off Narvik on 10 and 13 April and the present situation.

Fresh confirmation is given of the great readiness for action of the destroyers and the excellent behavior of the crews, who knew how to fight and die in the traditional destroyer spirit.

Captain Bey was appointed Commander, Destroyers as well as Commander, 6th Destroyer Flotilla.

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Since the enemy again partially changed his code on 26 April, there is much less possibility of decoding enemy radio traffic at present.

Atlantic:

Portishead coastal radio station broadcast the following QQQQ report:

38°41'N, 39°22'W (about 500 miles west of the Azores) the tanker DONNAX (8,036 tons) is being chased. Time 0948.

At 1238 the same radio station sent four times:

"QQQQ DONNAX canceled." Time 1034.

It is possible that Ship "36" was the originator of this alarm report.

The possibility arises from additional data that there are

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three battleships (possibly the QUEEN ELIZABETH, MALAYA and ROYAL SOVEREIGN) in the Mediterranean.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Narvik area:

Air reconnaissance sighted one cruiser and several destroyers off Harstad, a cruiser and destroyers off Narvik, ? battleship and destroyers in the fjords north of Narvik.

Trondheim area:

Eight transports and 2 cruisers were sighted in the morning northwest of the Frohavet on northeasterly course. One French and 2 other cruisers on course 350° and 2 aircraft carriers with 1 heavy cruiser and destroyers on course 30° were detected west and northwest of the island of Frøya at a distance of 30-100 miles. At noon there were 2 destroyers in Trondheim-Leden.

A cruiser and several merchantmen off Molde and Andalsnes.

From the home area:

Nothing special to report.

Evaluation of aerial photographs on 24 April shows that the following forces were lying in Scapa Flow on that day: 1 battleship each of the NELSON, RENOWN and REVENGE class, 1 cruiser of the LONDON class, 1 ENTERPRISE class, 1 ship of the D class; aircraft carrier HERMES, several destroyers, tankers, auxiliary vessels.

At 2000 on 26 April Commander in Chief, Home Fleet informed an unidentified vessel that two German trawlers were flying the Dutch flag. Further text of the message could not be made out.

This obviously concerns Ships "26" and "37", trawlers camouflaged as neutrals, which were then instructed to abandon Dutch camouflage, move off northward and separate.

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There is no immediate fear that the two vessels have been intercepted and sunk by the enemy. They were probably sighted by enemy air reconnaissance.

Shipping Losses:

The 7,000 ton tanker SCOTTISH AMERICAN was torpedoed near Cape Wrath, (northern entrance to the Minch), the British steamer PIZARRO (1,367 tons) "collision" at the eastern side of the North Minch. Ship had to be abandoned.

10,000 ton ship and 1,500 ton ship damaged by bomb hits off Molde Fjord.

Own Situation

Narvik:

Cruisers and destroyers bombarded defense installations and quarters near Bjerkvik, Laverget and Elvegaardsmoen. Great material damage. Norwegian planes attacked our troops near Elvenes. Air Force intervention is requested. Great difficulty in bringing supplies to the town of Narvik and to Elvegaardsmoen because of the destruction of the ore railroad on Rombaken Fjord and the ferry, as well as completely snowed-up supply routes.

Trondheim:

Landing parties from British destroyers reconnoitered the islands in Kraagsvaags Fjord and the Oerlandet Peninsula. Destroyers were unsuccessfully attacked by the 506th Coastal Patrol Group.

Vernes airfield is reported clear for landings and take-offs.

Bergen:

Voss and Boemoen taken by the Army; enemy withdrew to Gudvanger-Fretheim.

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According to a communication from Group West, the proposal to mine Sogne Fjord by surface forces cannot be carried out from home waters and is technically impossible with submarines. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast therefore plans to carry out minelaying after about 1 May if suitable vessels are available by then.

PT boat attacks on the enemy cruiser (or large destroyer) reported in Sogne Fjord unsuccessful, since the ship had already been attacked and destroyed by the Air Force beforehand.

Troopships from Stavanger arrived in Bergen as planned.

Southern North Sea:

In reply to yesterday's query about Group West's readiness for action - destroyers and torpedoboats - the Group reports:

Plan to use available destroyers and torpedoboats as defense for minelaying operation by four minelayers north of the declared area. Will probably sail early on 29 April.

Naval Staff agrees to Group West's plans. The Group was informed accordingly.

Esbjerg was examined by the Wilhelmshaven Dockyard Staff as to suitability as a Fleet base. In view of the water-depth and the great strain on Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, the harbor is considered suitable only for destroyers and for these only to a certain extent.

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Enemy Mine Situation:

The pilot steamer BODENWINKEL struck a mine and sank in the Hubert Gatt.

Crew saved. The Hubert Gatt is closed to traffic.

According to statements by the captain of the steamer HANS SCHULTE and the captain of the pilot vessel EMDEN, at about 0400 on 21 April two planes with lights landed on the Hubert Gatt, near the spot where the steamer SAYN later came to grief, and afterwards took off again.

The steamer SAYN struck a mine on 23 April. It is possible that mines were laid here by a plane which landed on the surface.

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Submarine alarm south of Oslo Fjord, near Maseskär and off Frederikshavn. Anti-submarine action unsuccessful.

Mine Situation:

The Danish steamer LUISE struck a mine 600 m. northwest of Drogden light. The German steamer OTTO KORDS was beached off Kolding Fjord (probably struck a mine).

Near Korsör mine-exploding vessel "4" swept a ground mine 80 m. away, bearing 330°, with magnet gear. The 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla detected the east wing of the enemy mine barrage off Frederikshavn. Our Fredericia barrage has been cleared.

A formation of Commander, Minesweepers carried out a check sweep of the routes in Mecklenburg and Kiel Bays. Routes proceed over the greatest depths of water possible. Routes are not announced. Traversed at present only by warships and valuable steamers.

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Group Baltic requests speedy provision of Commander, Minesweeper's units with gear to sweep the induction mines, and of all naval vessels and important merchantmen with degaussing equipment. The Group suggests that recourse be had to copper distance high tension conduits in Norway, if they are not required there for military purposes, in order to relieve the raw material situation in the construction of cables.

Preparations are being made for the transfer of training and trials by the Schools and Inspectorates to the central Baltic east of Rügen because of danger of aerial mines. Torpedo and Submarine branches will concentrate in Gdynia-Pillau.

Group Baltic plans to withdraw the cruiser EMDEN from Oslo to the eastern Baltic under close escort, utilizing fast steamer groups. Will probably be carried out on 30 April at dawn. The Group requests agreement.

Transport Situation

Transports as planned; 950 men arrived in Oslo both in the forenoon and afternoon, also material carried on 14 drifters and 2 tugs.

Empty transports as planned.

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Air reconnaissance reports lively steamer traffic along the Swedish coast northward and southward bound; Swedish traffic partly in the form of convoys.

Air Situation

Armed reconnaissance concentrated on the Narvik area, attack on transport movements and disembarkations in the Andalsnes-Trondheim area. Various supply steamers damaged by bombs. One cruiser damaged off Andalsnes and one north of Narvik (latter 1,000 kg. direct hit).

(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)

Submarine Situation

Since possibilities of success off the Norwegian coast are estimated as slight because of strong patrols in the fjords, difficulties with torpedoes and few prospects of hitting fast-moving targets, Commanding Admiral, Submarines has been allocated the following assignments for submarines, constituting a change in the previous order:

1. Constant occupation of Orkneys-Minch area.
2. As strong operations as possible in the Atlantic.
3. Further transport of supplies to Trondheim for the time being.
4. If occasion arises, use of submarines for Operation "Gelb".
5. Submarine training.

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Defense assignments in the Norwegian coastal area lapse
for the present.

In the operational area on 27 April:	U "13", "14", "23", "24", "25", "30", "57", "58", "59", "61", "65".
On return passage:	U "17", "29", "34", "52".
Returned from operation:	U "38".
Sailed with supplies for Trondheim:	U "A", "32".

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Items of Political Importance

For first reaction abroad to Ribbentrop's speech and the publication of the Anglo-Norwegian documents, see Foreign Press Report.

Denmark:

Negotiations are in progress at present between Coastal Defense Commander, Copenhagen and the Danish Navy about the use of Danish naval vessels to relieve our forces. The aim is to use Danish vessels under Danish command on minesweeping duties, for patrol and observation duties as well as for repairs to and inspection of Danish mine barrages. If necessary extra German signals personnel can be drafted to Danish ships. Group Baltic will control all operations by the Danish Navy.

Sweden:

According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Stockholm, the Swedes attach particular importance to the continued existence of their mine barrages in the Söder-Kvarken Strait. Naval Staff has no fundamental objection to this and only requests that safe passage at any time be guaranteed by clear marking of the channel and adequate, speedy provision of pilots. The possibility of ships going aground inside the marked channel must also be excluded. The Foreign Office was informed of this and requested to desist from Naval Staff's earlier request to have Sweden remove the mine barrage.

U.S.S.R.:

The Soviet Government has suggested Yokanya Bay as the new Base North.

Italy:

Ansaldo (director of the "Telegrafo") states in a radio address to the Italian Armed Forces:

"It is not possible for a country such as Italy to remain outside a conflict like the present one for the duration. This was established today with the greatest authority in the Fascist

Chamber and the Corporations by the most important statements of Grandi and Buffarini. Only one thing remains to be done: to be ready for the order which will come. The words 'be ready' comprehend the fate of Italy and the fate of us all."

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Special Items

1. Combatting British aerial mines: All offices have been informed of the great difficulties arising from the British use of aerial mines and of the urgency of solving the problem of effective defense and they are working towards this end with all the means in their power.

The attention of subordinate offices will be drawn to the necessity of maintaining special secrecy with regard to all reports about actual or possible further recovery of enemy aerial mines as well as hits on mines, especially also by merchant ships, and to all sweeping results. All information must be transmitted so that the enemy radio monitoring service can gain no insight.

For an appreciation of enemy and of our own minelaying operations it is necessary to ascertain soon how far the aerial mine as such is finished in construction by the enemy and scheduled for large-scale use. It is essential to discover particularly whether our own use of aerial mines decided the development of the present British aerial mine or whether it was developed independently by the British. It must be stated already that the British have shown themselves to be masters of improvisation in the use of aerial mines and defense against them and have with simple means, probably without very exact scientific investigations, quite obviously developed both a most useful offensive weapon in their aerial mine and a useful self-defense and sweeping gear. We must acknowledge that their success in doing this within a very short space of time is a very remarkable achievement.

It is now to be seen that the highly skilled Royal Air Force brings the aerial mines to our waters in darkness and in almost every kind of weather, and that it has so far succeeded in carrying the mines almost unmolested over Schleswig Holstein to the Baltic ports, while our own aerial mine formations - thanks to the enemy defenses and their own lack of training - have so far not been in a position to drop the aerial mines in Scapa, in the Clyde or over Liverpool Bay.

This discovery forces us, on the one hand, to make every endeavor to build up our anti-mine defense organization and, on the other hand, to make an urgent request to the operational Air Force that it should now speedily make widespread attacks by carrying the aerial mine to London, to Scapa and over the British mainland to Liverpool and the Clyde.

Group West objects greatly to the withdrawal of two barrage balloon batteries from the North Sea area for defense of the Kiel Canal and western Baltic, since it considers any weakening of the Wilhelmshaven and Jade defenses insupportable. In Naval Staff's opinion, however, the danger to the Kiel Canal and Kiel Bay is judged to be just as grave.

The main effect of the balloon barrages is psychological. The withdrawal of some balloons from the North Sea defense areas will not diminish the deterrent effect of the batteries still remaining, but will considerably increase defense for the Kiel Canal and Kiel Bay.

Naval Staff's order therefore remains in force.

2. Further Construction of the Aircraft Carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN: Naval Staff denies the necessity of continuing construction, particularly since there will not be the necessary military and armament prerequisites for the use of the ship in the near future. The whole anti-aircraft armament is at present being used for urgent military tasks at other points. It is not possible to provide it for the carrier again without severe military disadvantages. Complete armament cannot be installed until about one year after completion, i.e. the end of 1941. The problem of skilled workers offers very great difficulty. Naval Staff is therefore abandoning further construction work on the carrier.

Survey of the SituationSpecial Reports on the EnemyNorth Sea/Northern Waters:

Troopship movements: According to an intelligence report, five battalions of French Chasseurs Alpains, the 43rd Colonial Infantry Regiment and one battalion of the Foreign Legion passed through the Channel on 26 April on the way to Norway. An agent reported from Paris on 20 April that intensive work was being carried out on the formation of a new Expeditionary Corps, to consist of special troops. Ports of departure Le Havre, Boulogne, for material Rouen. Transports are to leave for Norway about the end of April/beginning of May.

Narvik area:

Air reconnaissance reported 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, several destroyers off Harstad, several transports and destroyers in Ofot Fjord, 3 destroyers off Narvik. Landings near Bogen.

Namsos area:

Two light cruisers, several destroyers, transports and auxiliary vessels were detected in Folda Fjord and Namsos Fjord; 1 battleship and 1 cruiser in the area off Namsos. No large-scale troop movements observed ashore.

Andalsnes area:

Enemy reports further successful landings in Andalsnes by radio.

Air reconnaissance spotted a cruiser, destroyers and several transports in RomsdalsFjord, further cruisers and destroyers off Trondheim Fjord, a large number of freighters and transports in the fjords to the south. In the afternoon a plane contacted an enemy formation, with which there were probably 1 or 2 aircraft carriers, 70 miles northwest of Molde Fjord. Strong fighter defense.

Reconnaissance and attacks by our bomber units is reflected in enemy radio traffic.

Reconnaissance reports give the impression that enemy landings are mostly completed for the present. Imminent attacks by the troops landed north and south of Trondheim against Trondheim, with support from the enemy carrier-borne planes, must be expected. Destruction of the enemy aircraft carriers therefore assumes decisive importance and is being striven after by the 5th Air Force with all the means in its power.

Reconnaissance activity off Trondheim by enemy destroyers leads us to expect landings and a footing on the islands off Trondheim Fjord.

Severe blows were struck against today's enemy operations by our Air Force attacks, which scored several hits on cruisers as well as great successes against enemy merchant ships and transports. (See own Air Situation.)

Own Situation

Narvik:

At 0430 the Group reported heavy bombardment of Elvegaardsmoen by warships. Lively scouting activity indicates offensive action soon by the superior enemy.

The Naval Communications Officer reports very difficult conditions, both technical and regarding personnel, in the development of radio traffic since all communication between units of Group Narvik is possible only in Code M (machine code) with naval radio operators and the radio station, in an exposed position, suffers daily bombardment. Very great strain on personnel.

Supplies of food for the civilian population of Narvik and the hinterland will be seriously endangered after Norwegian stocks are exhausted. Commander requests help via Sweden.

Trondheim:

Commander, 2nd Destroyer Flotilla has been instructed to endeavor to restore his destroyers' readiness to proceed,

both regarding personnel and engines, with all the means in his power.

Enemy carrier-borne planes attacked Trondheim at dawn. Hits on transmitter, village and airfield.

Because of Armed Forces High Command's information that Trondheim is adequately supplied with Army guns through those captured, Ships "26" and "37" (carrying field howitzers to Trondheim) have been diverted and ordered to put in to Bergen separately in favorable weather.

No news from either ship.

Bergen:

Operation to set up torpedo batteries in Hardanger Fjord has commenced.

Stavanger:

Stavanger 15 cm. battery will probably be ready for action with two guns on 1 May. Two more guns have arrived on the steamers ALSTERUFER and ALSTERTOR.

Because of the importance of Stavanger, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests that a regular Captain, with Staff, be appointed Port Commander, Stavanger. Previous Port Commander to Haugesund. High Command, Navy agrees to the proposal. Captain Fricke (Otto) has been appointed Port Commander.

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Several submarine sighting and location reports point to fresh intensification of the danger from submarines. Attacks on submarines without visible result.

No further mines detected. Minesweeping to detect and mark the British barrages off Frederikshavn continues. Check sweeping of various areas in the Kattegat fruitless.

The 17 cm. batteries "Schill" and "Raule" in Tyboroen and Hanstholm are temporarily ready for action with four guns.

Transport Situation:

Transport of troops and material proceeded according to plan under escort by units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and constant air cover by Commander, Naval Air, Baltic. Fast troopships took 780 men to Larvik. Further transports arrived in Oslo with men and material. The first party of the 2nd Mountain Division was transported. Material carried on drifters, so far unmolested. Empty steamers in the area as planned.

Submarine Situation

Unchanged. (For U "47"'s brief report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.)

Air Situation

Very successful Air Force attacks on naval forces and transports (merchantmen) in the area Namsos-Molde-Andalsnes; against harbor installations in Namsos, Kristiansand, Molde and Andalsnes, and in support of the Army's advance.

- 4 transports or freighters sunk
- 1 steamer destroyed, 3 beached
- 3 transports or supply steamers severely damaged.
- 1 light cruiser - 250 kg. bomb on stern
- 1 light cruiser - 250 kg. bomb on forecastle

(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)

The 5th Air Force has been directed to transfer a dive-bomber group to Trondheim as soon as possible.

Merchant Shipping

War against Merchant Shipping: Since the Führer's decree of 24 April 1940 established the existence of a state of war with Norway, Norwegian merchantmen and their cargoes will be fundamentally treated as enemy in accordance with Prize Regulations, Article 10 onwards.

After consultation with Reich Commissar Gauleiter Terboven, who reserves rights regarding treatment of Norwegian shipping in Norwegian ports for the purpose of centralized control of the whole economic area, Commanding Admiral, Norway has issued the following directive to offices in Norway:

"Treat neutral ships carrying contraband according to Prize Law. For Norwegian ships I shall issue, in agreement with the Reich Commissar, individual instructions in every case. Former ruling stands for use as auxiliary vessels."

Naval Staff explains the order in that requests by the Navy for shipping, including tankers, for military purposes are fulfilled in every case and that in these cases an agreement with Reich Commissar Terboven is only necessary on whether they are to be confiscated according to Prize Law without compensation or merely requisitioned while remaining the property of the shipping company.

Commanding Admiral, Norway was informed to this effect. It is also necessary to clarify with the Commissar how far Norwegian cargoes on Norwegian ships are to be rejected by Prize Law. This always seems advisable if the cargo was destined for enemy powers. Commanding Admiral, Norway has been instructed to inform Oslo Naval Office in good time, as the representative of the Reich Commissar at the Prize Court in Hamburg, of all seizures under Prize Law.

The treatment of foreign shipping and cargoes in Denmark has not yet been cleared up. Negotiations are in progress with the Foreign Office.

Items of Political Importance1. Norway:

Reports from Norway give the following picture of the situation in the entourage of the King of Norway: (dated 19 April)

King Haakon, completely broken, in Northern Norway. His entourage split in two directions. Foreign Minister Koht and General Ruge, commanding the central Norwegian forces, are said to be ready to come to an agreement with Germany (?). Prime Minister Nygaardsvold and General Laaka are sharply opposed to any agreement. Great despondency in the Norwegian High Command. The troops themselves are still resolved to resist outside the battle zone as the result of British propaganda.

2. For reaction abroad to the Foreign Minister's statement, especially the official counter statement by the British Government, see Political Review No. 98.

3. Sweden:

The Swedish Military Attaché in Berlin again stated Sweden's unconditional desire to remain neutral and to be as benevolent towards Germany as possible. Swedish measures have rendered surprise landings in ports or on airfields impossible. Violations of the frontier near Kiruna would bring about the demolitions prepared, so that any despatch of ore would be impossible for at least two years.

4. U.S.A.:

The German Chargé d'Affaires in Washington reports as follows on the attitude taken up by U.S. public opinion towards the Norway operation:

1. The operation has proved that widespread and willingly believed reports about a state of exhaustion in Germany were false.

2. Germany was forced to take counter measures by the British violation of neutrality.
3. Great Britain has been forced to use strong troop formations in Norway for strategic and propaganda reasons.
4. If Great Britain does not succeed in doing away with the German occupation of Norway she runs the risk of losing the war.
5. All other neutrals, including Turkey, have received a lesson and a warning.

There are many negative reactions opposed to the positive ones:

1. Feeling towards Germany has deteriorated extraordinarily, especially in the Middle West, which is settled to a great extent by Scandinavians.
2. The American people have reached a state of excitement in which the interventionists have an easy game. The U.S.A. could influence the result of the war decisively without using their own troops, by increased deliveries and by the removal of the credit blockade.

In conclusion, the Chargé d'Affaires states:

"While the election campaign is on, important decisions regarding foreign policy can only be expected under exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances would arise if Sweden or Holland were attacked. The situation in the Pacific would preclude full U.S. support for the Allies. The U.S.A.'s entry into the war would necessitate complete military and economic mobilization, for which the organizational and financial basis is at present still lacking. The prospects of Roosevelt's re-election have increased considerably."

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. The supply ship NORDMARK reports her position as 79°N, 2.5°E and requests permission for privateer warfare in northern waters. Group West has granted the request and suggests that the ship operate first in northern waters and then in the Atlantic on cruiser warfare, since there are no other assignments for her at present.

Naval Staff thinks otherwise and cannot agree to the Group's proposal. Use in cruiser warfare for which the ship, as a tanker and supply ship, is in no way specially suitable, does not correspond to the main assignments scheduled for her. She should only be considered for cruiser warfare when she has fulfilled her task as a supply ship or is released from it. Naval Staff is making every endeavor to send the battleships on sorties into the northern North Sea as soon as possible. If this plan has so far not been practicable, the reason is the deficient readiness of the destroyers, a minimum number of which must assume protection of the battleships. As long as we are still considering operations in northern waters in the immediate future the readiness of the NORDMARK in the northern area may be of great importance. Group West has been informed of Naval Staff's viewpoint and instructed that the NORDMARK is to be held in readiness away from all traffic. The ship's subsequent transfer to Base North is planned.

2. The Führer has learned of Naval Staff's plan to withdraw the cruiser EMDEN from Oslo. Because of the slight anti-aircraft defenses of Oslo harbor, the Führer has decreed that the EMDEN is to remain in Oslo until sufficient anti-aircraft defense has been ensured.

The Führer also fears an undesirable withdrawal of defense forces from present, very urgent transport operations. Naval Staff sees a specially favorable opportunity for the return of the EMDEN at present, since there are still sufficient fast defense vessels available for anti-submarine escort in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. The EMDEN's return would not cause any delay to transports.

In accordance with the Führer's wishes, Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that the EMDEN remain in Oslo for the present. He will discuss the matter with the Führer.

3. The Submarine School units (torpedo recovery vessels, anti-submarine unit) should return to the School on 1 May, since their presence there is urgently necessary for the training of officers and crews. Naval Staff does not fail to appreciate the difficulties of training, but does not feel in a position to withdraw the vessels now in view of the great urgency of transport, especially of the 2nd Mountain Division. Group Baltic has therefore been ordered to retain the units temporarily and keep them on transport duty.

4. The Commander of the cruiser LUETZOW has suggested that, for the speedy re-establishment of the ship's war readiness after repairs are completed, the officers and crew should not now be completely separated or should anyway be re-assembled in good time so that the experiences gained during the first months of the war may on no account be lost.

With regard to the availability of two pocket battleships at the end of 1940, the Commander of the LUETZOW also suggests investigation of the question whether combined operations by the two ships in close tactical conjunction would not be a better guarantee for the greatest possible success than separate operations. He is thinking of combined appearance in the North and South Atlantic, then simultaneous appearance singly in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Bengal and Arabian Sea.

Naval Staff completely agrees on the subject of maintaining or ensuring the personnel of the crew.

According to previous information from Naval (Ship) Construction Division, repairs to the ship will require about nine months. We can therefore expect readiness to proceed and commissioning again about the end of December 1940/ beginning of January 1941.

So that the LUETZOW can be in operational readiness as soon as possible after commissioning but at latest by a date which still offers favorable conditions for the break-through into the Atlantic in the winter months 1940/1941 (i.e. end of February to end of March 1941 at the latest), also so that the experiences gained during the first Atlantic operation and during the period of preparation for the second (planned) operation should not be lost, the ship must be recommissioned by the personnel of the old crew. Prompt readiness for action for long-range operations cannot be expected otherwise.

Instructions to this effect have been sent to Naval Staff, Service Division, Bureau of Naval Administration and Officer Personnel Department.

The combined use of both pocket battleships in the Atlantic, proposed by the LUETZOW, can only be considered if both ships are ready for operations at the same time. As far as can be seen, the ADMIRAL SCHEER will be ready for operations about October 1940, the LUETZOW about the end of February to March 1941, so that the possibility of combined use cannot be counted upon.

If, however, through unforeseen circumstances the ships should become ready at the same time, the question of combined or separate action, in accordance with the strategic situation, and of the objective to be achieved by use of the pocket battleships in the Atlantic will have to be reviewed.

Since the pocket battleships' assignment is not action, but attainment of a strong diversionary effect, it is true that close tactical connection would force the enemy to appear in greater strength; he would, however, have only one area and one task force to take into account.

In principle it therefore seems practical to separate the two pocket battleships, but to have Naval Staff bring them together for a combined operation on occasion.

Naval Staff is keeping in mind the question of operations against the British-Norwegian whaling fleets during the winter of 1940/41. The pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER and the auxiliary cruisers then in readiness would come into question for such an operation.

Survey of the Situation

Special Reports on the Enemy

Atlantic/Mediterranean:

Great Britain:

Scheveningen radio announces:

"It is forbidden to anchor in the Straits of Dover north of the line connecting Dungeness and Cap d'Alprech, with the exception of the Downs."

Forces in the Mediterranean:

The MALAYA and ROYAL SOVEREIGN in the western Mediterranean, apparently en route for Malta. A "C" class cruiser is in the Rhodes area, single auxiliary cruisers in the Lemnos area.

The submarines already in the Mediterranean, USIRIS, ORPHEUS, OTUS and OTWAY, and the submarines proceeding from East Asia to the Mediterranean, PROTHEUS, PARTHIAN, PHOENIX, OLYMPUS and ODI, which were in the Red Sea on 27 April, are to form the 1st Submarine Flotilla in the Mediterranean.

France:

Patrol service in the eastern Channel and merchant control off the Scheldt estuary.

Mediterranean:

The BRETAGNE, LORAINNE, and PROVENCE, also two destroyers, put in to Algiers on 28 April. The ships were last detected on 18 April in Oran.

North Sea/Northern Waters:

Admiralty announcement:

"Mines laid in West Fjord as far as north of the line stretching towards 12°E, i.e. from Vaerøy Island light, 67°39'N, 12°45'E as far as the mainland. Mines likewise laid in the channels northeast and south of Steinvaer Island, 69°10'N, 16°35'E. Ships traversing these areas without obtaining instructions from the local British or the Norwegian authorities, do so at their own risk."

Narvik area:

Customary warship activity off Narvik. Air reconnaissance reported six destroyers off Narvik and cruisers, destroyers and transports off Harstad.

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Namsos area:

Two cruisers, several destroyers and transports, also three auxiliary vessels off Namsos and in Namsen Fjord. The town, railroad station and harbor installations of Namsos were destroyed in an air raid.

Molde Fjord-Andalsnes:

One cruiser, several transports sighted by air reconnaissance. Successful air attacks on transports and supply steamers, three of which were sunk and several damaged. No unloading was observed.

Home area:

The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS, with destroyer escort, and the cruiser ARETHUSA planned to put in to Scapa on 28 April.

Losses:

The Admiralty announces the loss of two trawlers through bomb hits. It appears from radio deciphering that the anti-aircraft cruiser CURACAO was damaged on 24 April by a bomb hit in the engine and boiler room.

The Admiralty denies the sinking or damaging of 5 steamers and 13 transports reported by Germany.

Own Situation

Situation on land:

Group Narvik reports reinforcement of the enemy who attacked our defenses near Elvenes with superior forces. Defenses had to be withdrawn. Own situation is judged to be serious if the Air Force does not succeed in bringing considerable relief. Narvik reports successful intervention of planes so far in action; apparently great effect on enemy.

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Trondheim Group advanced as far as Stören from the north. The most forward units of the 196th Division, coming from the south, are near Ullsberg 45 km. before Stören. Greatest difficulty in advancing, since all the bridges are blown up and the enemy is firmly entrenched. The east group encountered strong resistance near Røros. Situation completely cleared up in south Norwegian area; Bergen unit advancing quickly.

With regard to the situation in the Trondheim area, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff requests that the 2nd Mountain Division be brought over very quickly. It is hoped that transportation will be completed by 8 May. (16,000 men, 4,000 horses.)

Situation at Sea:

Narvik:

No defense from land possible against the constant warship activity off Narvik.

Trondheim:

Nothing special to report.

Bergen:

Unsuccessful bombing attacks were made on a STINNES steamer off Eide and on the tank installations near Grimstad Fjord. Sixty men from the crews of the steamer AFRIKA and a STINNES steamer were freed in Voss. Discharging of the "export" steamer BAERENFELS continues.

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the Hardanger Fjord torpedo battery is ready for action.

The torpedo battery in Sogne Fjord will probably be in readiness by the end of the week.

The 24 cm. battery at Sandvigen has had firing trials and is ready for action.

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Admiral, West Norwegian Coast plans to mine Sogne Fjord with captured Norwegian mines during the night of 30 April.

In view of instructions from the British Commanding Admiral, Submarines to a boat in Bjorne Fjord, picked up by the Radio Monitoring Service, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast again points out the danger from submarines in the fjords off Bergen.

Southern North Sea:

A minelaying formation of Commander, PT Boats sailed as planned to reinforce the Skagerrak mine barrage against submarines by mines with antenna firing.

Mine Situation:

Entrance to the Ems still endangered by mines. North Sea Station requests the immediate provision of the vessels requested for use of cable remote clearance gear, since remote clearance gear can only be streamed up to wind strength 3.

Transport traffic from and to Stavanger has so far proceeded as planned. According to course instructions from Group West, the steamers proceed, according to their speed, west of the Skagerrak or along the coast to cross the Skagerrak by the shortest route. Escort is provided by PT boats and the Naval Air Arm.

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

Attacks on submarines north of Skagen, south of Oslo Fjord, east of Låsö. Submarine-chase probably successful in two cases (5th Submarine-Chaser Group and 17th Submarine-Chaser Flotilla), one submarine very probably being destroyed east of Låsö.

Mine situation unchanged. Planned minesweeping and clearing delayed by the weather. Laying of net barrage near Seelands Rev continues.

Transport Situation:

Transport movements continue as planned under the protection of units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, Naval Air, Baltic. Fast troopships to Oslo (2,100 men) and Larvik (780 men). Transport of material on drifters and return voyage of empty steamers unmolested.

Situation in Denmark:

Group Baltic has been ordered to commence negotiations through Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark with the Danish Navy about the use of Danish naval vessels for tasks in Danish waters.

The aim of the agreement is the inclusion of Danish forces in the execution of assignments concerning both Navies. Danish sovereignty will be fully maintained. Tasks for the Danish formations to be used are to be assigned by the Danish Navy; we control and supervise activity in agreement with the Danish Naval Staff.

The following tasks are planned:

1. Minesweeping in Danish waters and also, according to Group Baltic, in areas of the entrances to the Baltic, along the Danish coast and on certain shipping routes.
2. Patrol in Danish waters and in areas allocated by Group Baltic. Harbor defense tasks, patrol of Danish mine barrages, anti-

mine and anti-aircraft escort service for merchant traffic are concerned.

3. Observation service against enemy minelaying planes.
4. Repair and maintenance of Danish mine barrages.

Group Baltic has been instructed to reach agreement about the vessels to be used and kept in commission for these tasks and if necessary also the seizure of mine-exploding vessels by the Danish Navy and possible drafting of German communications personnel. The question of flags is to be left to the Danish Navy. The equipment of Danish vessels with sweeping gear against ground mines is not to be mentioned to the Danes at present.

Situation in the Atlantic:

Ship "36" has been ordered to appear again in the North Atlantic, in case the QQQQ report from the tanker DONNAX originated from her. If necessary she is to change her operational area, since Naval Staff has the impression that the enemy has not yet recognized the presence of a merchant raider in the North Atlantic.

Submarine Situation

Returned from operation:	U "52".
On return passage:	U "29", "34", "17", "23".
In the operational area:	U "25", "65", "61", "30", "13", "57", "58", "59", "14", "24".
Proceeding to Trondheim:	U "32", U "A".

Air Situation

Air Force operations concentrated on aid for Narvik and armed reconnaissance in the Andalsnes-Namsos area.

Two transports damaged off Andalsnes. Six transports and freighters sunk or destroyed in Molde Fjord and Trondheim Fjord. Two steamers damaged in Namsos Fjord. Air reconnaissance gained the impression that the enemy is evacuating Namsos.

(For particulars see Air Situation 2400.)

Merchant ShippingScandinavian Shipping:

The Spanish Government has made a proposal to the Norwegian Government to take over the Norwegian ships now in Spanish ports, together with cargo.

Reports come from the U.S.A. of representations made by U.S. trade circles to the State Department for unimpeded traffic by Danish and Norwegian ships lying in neutral ports or transfer of their cargo.

According to a communication from the head of the transport department of the people's commissariat for foreign trade, there are no Danish and Norwegian ships in U.S.S.R. waters.

It is reported from Chile that the Danish ships are remaining, while the Norwegians are putting out.

Supplement to 29 April

1530: Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Führer.

Points discussed:

1. Further construction on the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN.

Führer agrees to construction being stopped.
 2. The EMDEN is to remain a further two weeks or so in Oslo, until anti-aircraft defense of the port is sufficiently assured.
 3. Carrying out troop transports to Norway.
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(For particulars see Commander in Chief's memorandum, War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.)

Items of Political Importance1. Norway:

The Norwegian Government has issued an official statement from its unknown headquarters. It says:

"The Norwegian Government has learnt from the radio of the German Government's statement on 26 April that it was at war with Norway. It must confirm that it has had knowledge of a state of war already since the night of 8 April."

Otherwise the statement is directed against German operations and ends with the words:

"The fight for freedom and independence goes on."

Foreign Minister Koht gave his opinion on Ribbentrop's declarations and maintained that they represented a complete distortion of the facts.

2. Italy:

According to the report of an authoritative Italian, a change of mood has actually taken place in wide circles of the population since the Brenner conference and Ribbentrop's visit. There has been a return to the Axis, even though a section of the population is still not convinced of the necessity for Italian participation in the war. It is still important, however, he states, that the Church also should not conduct itself in an inactive or reluctant manner in such an event but take up some definite attitude to the question.

3. Tangier:

Diplomatic circles wish to ascertain whether Tangier will immediately be occupied by the Western Powers if there is conflict in the Mediterranean.

4. U.S.A.:

The B.B.C. announces that the U.S.A. have released the latest models in tanks and guns for sale abroad.

Survey of the SituationSpecial Reports on the EnemyAtlantic/Mediterranean:Great Britain:

Intelligence Center, Spain confirms that the MALAYA and RESOLUTION sailed to the east from Gibraltar on 28 April. At 1100 on the same day, Admiral, Gibraltar ordered all warships and merchant ships lying in the harbor to be ready to sail at four hours' notice.

France:

French radio traffic in the Mediterranean indicates greater activity by the forces there. The Admiralty was informed of the sailing at noon of four vessels from Bizerta, including at least one cruiser. The formation is probably proceeding into the western Mediterranean.

Neutrals:

An intelligence report from Constanta dated 25 April:

"Crews of Italian ships are said to have stated that their ships have orders to return to Italy by the quickest route."

North Sea/Northern Norway:

Intelligence Center, Belgium reports departure of a French Expeditionary Corps, in the strength of a division, from Rouen and Le Havre. The Expeditionary Corps is said to consist of mountain artillery, a battalion of Chasseurs

Alpins, four batteries of field artillery, engineers and one infantry regiment. British troops are also said to have left the port of Falmouth in the direction of Namsos on 29 April (steamers HIGHLAND CASTLE, EMPRESS OF BRITAIN, MOORLAND).

Northern Norway:

Several naval vessels and transports in Gratangen Fjord north of Narvik. Further troop disembarkations. Group Narvik expects enemy attacks by greatly superior forces.

Central Norway:

Enemy vessels in the area of Namsos, Molde and Kristiansund. One cruiser and destroyers in Namsos Fjord. Successful attacks by our Air Force. Air reconnaissance reported 2 cruisers with 2 destroyers on northeasterly course 70 miles west-northwest of Stadlandet and 2 cruisers on southwesterly course 30 miles north of this group.

Southern Norway:

The submarine TRITON received a radio message in which she was informed of the appearance of mines south of Skudesnes inside the 100 fathom line and in which the entrance to Skudesnes Fjord west of Hvidingsøy was described as mine-free.

Home area:

The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS put in to Scapa on 28 April with six destroyers. The anti-aircraft cruiser CURLEW at Scapa on 30 April. The anti-aircraft cruiser CURACAO, which was damaged by a bomb hit near Aalesund, plans to proceed to the Nore base. The cruiser PENELOPE in the area Shetlands-Norway.

The Admiralty announces the loss of the submarines TARPON (1,090 tons) and STARLET (690 tons), also of the trawlers BRADMAN and CAPE SIERETKO.

Own SituationAtlantic:

Nothing to report. Enemy shipping routes passed on to the auxiliary cruisers (see radiogram 1100). The supply ship NORDMARK was instructed not to conduct cruiser warfare but to stand on and off in northern waters.

North Sea/Northern Waters:Narvik:

Light enemy forces bombarded roads on Herjångs Fjord. Enemy attack is expected on Elvenes with simultaneous advance from the southwest from Bogen. Air Force support urgently requested.

The Staff of Group Narvik is in Sildvik.

Naval and Air Force radio station in Narvik.

Trondheim:

Nothing special to report.

Bergen:

Minelaying operation in Sogne Fjord commenced by minelayers ULLER and TYR. The 15 cm. Army guns which were salvaged from the steamer BAERENFELS have been put at the disposal of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast by the Army for the purpose of coastal defense. Army personnel is being sent from Germany.

Single prize steamers were despatched to home waters from Bergen via Stavanger.

Southern North Sea:

Since the remote clearance gear is only capable of limited use in wide North Sea estuaries because of the prevailing weather, Group West requests an increased allocation of cable remote clearance gear with addition for shallow water. Increase in production is considered urgently necessary in view of losses of gear. Allocation of further mine-exploding vessels is requested.

Everything is being done by High Command, Navy (Naval Staff, Service Division and Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch) speedily to bring the Groups' equipment of clearance gear against magnetic mines to a satisfactory status.

Ship "40" confirms the destruction of an enemy submarine west of Tyboroen on the morning of 10 April by subsequent appearance of pieces of wreckage and other objects.

Skagerrak/Kattegat:

The minelaying operation by Commander, PT Boats, West to extend the North Sea West Wall went as planned. Because controls broke down on the LEOPARD the boat was rammed by the minelayer PREUSSEN and sank. The crew was saved except for one officer.

The barrage lies: from 57°20.5'N, 5°3.5'E
to 57°38.3'N, 4°54' E.

482 EMD mines without contact setting,
depth-setting 3 m.,
1,119 explosive floats, type D,
depth-setting 6 m.

Submarine warning northeast and east of Lasø. Results of attack questionable. Air attack on submarine west of Skagen on 29 April was very probably successful according to observations subsequently reported.

Mine Situation:

Unchanged.

Group Baltic suggests closing the northern entrance to the Sound by a double net barrage. Gap in barrage off the coast of Seeland at 10 m. depth in order to make possible Swedish traffic from Malmö to Gothenburg even for the largest steamers. No pilot service, gap in barrage well marked, barrage patrol.

Transport Situation:

Transports of troops and material as planned.

Mine Defense in the Baltic:

Group West requests the setting up of new harbor defense groups in all important ports on the Baltic and Danish coast because of increasing threat from mines. (See radiogram 2017.)

Submarine Situation

Put in to port:	U "34".
In the operational area:	U "25", "65", "61", "30", "13", "57", "58", "59", "14", "24".
Proceeding to Trondheim:	U "A", "32", "101".
U "A" is carrying:	185 cbm. aviation gasoline. 15 tons lubricating oil. 2 x 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns. 16 x 250 kg. bombs.
U "101" is carrying:	60 cbm. aviation gasoline. 1 x 8.8 cm. gun. 8 x 250 kg. bombs.
On return passage:	U "29", "17", "23".

Air Situation

See Air Force Events of the Day.

During the attacks in the Namsos-Andalsnes area a cruiser (flotilla leader) was severely damaged by two 250 kg. hits and sank. Another cruiser damaged by a 250 kg. hit. Several transports and freighters damaged, one steamer sunk.

The 9th Air Division carried out an aerial minelaying operation on the east coast of Britain; 23 aerial mines were laid. Attack from Dunkirk to Blyth. Fighter and anti-aircraft defense in Dunkirk. Barrage balloons on barges 500 m. south of the southern mole on the Tyne estuary.

Enemy air raid on Oslo during the night of 29 April. Attacks in waves on Stavanger in the afternoon; 8 British planes shot down so far; 4 of our fighters lost.

Merchant Shipping

The following ships are reported as under construction in Danish yards for foreign or Danish account:

a)	Launched:	British motor vessel	9,100 GRT
		" " "	11,000 GRT
		Norwegian " "	3,100 GRT
			(Refrigerating chambers)
		Danish " "	1,836 GRT
		" " "	(Passenger ship)
		" " "	9,900 GRT
	also	British " "	9,100 GRT
			(Steam tanker)
			<u>43,936 GRT</u>
			(Roughly completed).

b) Keel laid down:

For France	1 ship	10,700 GRT
" U.S.A.	1 "	9,400 GRT
" Chile	1 "	3,300 GRT
" Norway	5 ships about	38,000 GRT
" Denmark	7 ships about	46,000 GRT
		<u>107,400 GRT</u>

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffSpecial Items

1. Fleet Command requests (in gkdos 764 A3) a longer period of training for the battleships, HIPPER and also the destroyers in the Baltic, since the present state of training is judged to be quite insufficient.

For operational reasons Group West adopts a negative attitude to the request.

Naval Staff agrees with the Group Command's opinion and has come to the following decision:

"The special situation which has arisen from the Norwegian assignment and can still be regarded as by no means settled and the new tasks for the Navy expected to arise from Operation "Gelb" require that a special standard be applied to the points raised by Commanding Admiral, Fleet."

It is known that training in the sense of a systematic peacetime training cannot be carried out to the desired extent; on the other hand the forces in action have so far done full justice to the demands made on them. A certain amount of training in operations themselves must be taken into account.

The operational situation does not at the present time permit us to dispense with the battleships. Widespread use of the ships is still to be one of our endeavors.

Operations which take place must, however, make allowance for the material state of readiness of the ships. A 14-day training period in the Baltic Sea, i.e. away from the operational base line of the Heligoland Bight, also cannot be granted at present; its possibility will depend on the development of the situation.

A decision to commence a 10-week dockyard period is likewise still impossible.

When listing the necessary work all possibilities must be exhausted and only the essentials worked out, in an attempt to shorten the dockyard period.

Destroyers: A dockyard overhaul of the destroyers SCHOEMANN, BEITZEN and HEINEMANN, at present still able to proceed, seems unavoidable. It is to be commenced when the destroyers at present in dock have attained full readiness for action. The latter are to commence a training period of 14 calendar days at most in the North Sea, if necessary also in the Baltic, after completion of the dockyard period. It must be possible to have recourse to them for operational use at any time.

It remains to be seen whether the operational situation will permit the full execution of such training (especially in the Baltic).

The new torpedoboats are not to be included in calculations of light forces ready for use. Their final readiness for action is still a matter of complete uncertainty.

The fundamental evil with regard to the complaints about lack of training is the constant change of personnel. Every endeavor must be made, in certain circumstances even accepting disadvantages for the individual or abandoning certain conditions of promotion, to limit drafting to a minimum.

2. The Führer has decreed investigation of the question as to whether transport of the 2nd Mountain Division to Norway can be speeded up by the use of the East Asia steamers GNEISENAU and POTSDAM. The investigation has shown that in practice there would be no speeding-up but rather a delay as against normal transport in view of the four or five days required to fit up the ships and their poor facilities for carrying horses and gear.

Chief, Naval Staff has therefore decided:

2nd Mountain Division is not to be carried on the GNEISENAU/POTSDAM but by previous transport facilities. The GNEISENAU and POTSDAM are, however, in any case to be fitted up as troopships in case fast transports are necessary later on.

3. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered the formation of numerous motor boat flotillas for use on defense and reconnaissance tasks in the Norwegian fjords. Consideration is to be paid to defense of the bases, especially Bergen and Trondheim, against attacks by enemy PT boats. (Creation of boom defenses, if necessary quick-firing barrage batteries, advance defense and patrol positions.)

4. Report on the Situation on Land:

The unit in the Gudbrand Valley advancing in pursuit of the retreating enemy reached the railroad and road junction of Dombaas. Land communication with Trondheim via Ullsberg-Støren was established. The main railroad line from Oslo to Trondheim also fell into our hands through the occupation of Opdal. Strong Norwegian units surrendered.

The Western Powers' attempt to oppose Germany's occupation of southern Norway and to encircle Trondheim can thus be regarded as a failure. Southern Norway as far as north of Trondheim is now safely in German hands. The situation of the Allied troops landed south of Trondheim can be described as hopeless. We can expect speedy and complete pacification of the occupied area.

GLOSSARY

"Bremen"

Cover name for Bergen.

"Detmold"

Cover name for Trondheim.

EMC

Standard mine, type C; a contact mine against surface vessels.

EMD

• Plummert sinker mine with contact firing (old model).

"Gelb"

Cover name for planned invasion of the Low Countries.

"Kassel"

Cover name for Copenhagen.

"Nienburg"

Cover name for Narvik.

SC (250,500)

Thin-shell high-explosive bombs.

SD (50)

Thick-shell high-explosive bombs.

"Weseruebung"

Cover name for planned invasion of Norway.

"Weseruebung Sued"

Cover name for planned invasion of Denmark.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL